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Abstract
Reflective Database Access Control (RDBAC) is a model in which a database privilege is
expressed as a database query itself, rather than as a static privilege contained in an
access control list. RDBAC aids the management of database access controls by
improving the expressiveness of policies. However, such policies introduce new interactions
between data managed by different users, and can lead to unexpected results if not
carefully written and analyzed. We propose the use of Transaction Datalog syntax and
semantics as a formal framework for expressing reflective access control policies.
Using a formal logic-based language provides a basis for analyzing policies and enables
secure implementations that can guarantee that certain configurations built on these
policies cannot be subverted. We demonstrate this by defining two classes of policy
configurations, and proving that under any set of such policies, a decidable algorithm can
determine whether or not access to a sensitive data item can ever be leaked to an
unprivileged user.
Although the Transaction Datalog language provides a powerful syntax and semantics
for expressing RDBAC policies, there is no efficient implementation of this language for
practical database systems. We demonstrate a strategy for compiling policies into
standard SQL views that enforce the policies, including overcoming significant differences
in semantics between the languages in handling side-effects and evaluation order. We also
report the results of evaluating the performance of these views compared to policies
enforced by traditional access control lists, using a common off-the-shelf relational
database management system.
We also present two case studies for systems that can be protected using RDBAC
security policies. These case studies demonstrate the flexibility of the system by
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implementing a wide range of functionality, as well as the practicality and scalability of
using such a system in real-world applications that require non-trivial policy definitions on
large data sets.
This work establishes the theoretical soundness of using RDBAC as a basis for access
control. It describes an efficient translation process for executing a useful subset of
RDBAC rules in standard SQL, thereby demonstrating its practical feasibility using
existing software. We show how RDBAC can be applied to realistic applications. These
results suggest a rich field of further research.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Current databases use a conceptually simple model for access control: the database
maintains an Access Control Matrix (ACM) listing the resources provided by the
database, such as tables, views, and functions; the users that are allowed to access each
resource; and which operations each user is allowed to perform on the resource, such as
read, insert, update, or execute. If access control is needed at a fine-grained level, in which
a user should only be granted access to certain portions of a database table, then a
separate view is created to define those portions, and the user is granted access to the
view. This model is flexible enough to allow users to define access privileges for their own
tables, without requiring superuser privileges. However, ACMs are limited to expressing
the extent of the policy, such as “Alice can view data for Alice,” “Bob can view data for
Bob,” etc., rather than the intent of the policy, such as “each employee can view their own
data.” This makes policy administration more tedious in the face of changing data, such
as adding new users, implementing new policies, or modifying the database schema. Many
databases attempt to ease administration burdens by implementing roles in addition to
ACMs to group together common sets of privileges, but this does not fully address the
problem. In a scenario such as the policy of “each employee can view their own data in
the table,” each user requires an individually-defined view of a table as well as a separate
role to access each view, which yields no benefit over a standard ACM-based policy.
We propose the idea of Reflective Database Access Control (RDBAC), in which access
control policy decisions can depend on data contained in other parts of the database, such
as attributes of the user, attributes of the data being queried, or relationships between the
user and the data. While most databases already do store ACMs within the database
itself, the policy data are restricted to the form of a triple 〈user, resource, operation〉 and
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separated from the rest of the database; and the query within the policy is limited to
finding the permission in the ACM. RDBAC removes these restrictions and allows policies
to refer to any part of the database.
Let us illustrate with an example. Suppose we have a database that contains a table
listing a company’s employees, along with their position in the company and the
department in which they work. Suppose also that we want to grant all employees that
are managers access to the data of the other employees in their department. When a
manager queries this table, the policy will first check that the user is indeed a manager,
then retrieve the manager’s department, and finally return all employees in that
department. This approach has at least two benefits. First, the policy leverages data
already being stored in the database. Second, the policy describes its intent rather than
its extent; thus, privileges are automatically updated when the database is updated (for
instance, when an employee receives a promotion to manager), preventing update
anomalies that leave the database in an inconsistent state.
This kind of behavior could perhaps be enforced by using triggers to update access
privileges when a database changes. However, this is not an ideal solution because a policy
may depend on a table for which the policy definer does not have sufficient privileges to
define a trigger. Additionally, when the policy implementation is split between ACMs and
triggers, any future modifications to this policy will cause administration headaches.
The concept of reflective access control is important enough that access control
extensions offered by major vendors do support it. For instance, Oracle’s Virtual Private
Database technology [68], in which every query on a database table is rewritten by a
special user-defined function, can implement reflective access control. This system and
others like it have at least three drawbacks. First, the privilege to define these policy
functions is considered an administrator privilege [69], so not all users can define reflective
policies on the tables they create. Relaxing this restriction will make the system more
scalable by supporting multilateral administration. Second, policies that refer back to the
table being queried (such as our example policy for granting access to managers) are
disallowed, as they might otherwise cause a non-terminating loop when the policy
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recursively invokes itself by querying the table. A system that enables safe forms of such
reference will have useful additional expressive power. Third, and most importantly,
existing implementations of reflective access control have no formal description. Since the
interactions between access privileges and arbitrary data in the database are complicated,
analysis of what arbitrary users can or cannot do is not always intuitive. Hence a formal
foundation for better analysis is needed.
The Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML), while not specifically
designed for database access control, is also capable of expressing policies flexible enough
to handle RDBAC through the use of XPath expressions on the request document and/or
customized attribute functions [65]. While some formal mathematical models of XACML
exist, none include semantics for accessing the data being protected, since XACML was
designed to be a general-purpose access control language and makes no assumptions on the
content of the protected data. Additionally, XACML semantics do not implicitly account
for reflective policies that may need to be evaluated under a non-administrator privilege.
The goal of this thesis is to develop the concept of RDBAC theoretically in a way that
addresses these limitations. Specifically, we show that Datalog-based reflective database
access control can provide a flexible, scalable, and efficient mechanism for defining,
enforcing, and formally reasoning about fine-grained access control policies. This thesis
provides:
• The first formal treatment of RDBAC, in which policies can be defined in terms of a
proof-theoretic system. We develop a model using Transaction Datalog [13] and
argue that it can be used to accomplish this. Transaction Datalog (TD) is an
extension of classic Datalog that allows modifications to a database and has a
precise mathematical semantics, incorporating recursive (cyclic) definitions and
transaction-based atomic updates, assuring serializable execution of transactions. We
propose that access policies be written in TD, and we exhibit a variety of scenarios
that show this to be a natural and intuitive model. Our contributions also include
an analysis of the weaknesses of existing approaches both in expressiveness and in
formal foundations, and a formal framework that addresses these limitations. We
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also provide a theoretical analysis of decidability properties of our proposed system.
In particular, we describe the problem of formal security analysis—specifically,
whether untrusted users can ever gain access to some protected data—and show
that while this problem is in general undecidable, there are reasonable restrictions
on policies that allow decidable security analysis algorithms.
• The first formally-analyzable implementation of an RDBAC system. This system is
implemented in a standard SQL-based relational database, using TD as a policy
language1, by compiling TD rules into standard SQL:1999 recursive views. We also
describe simple optimizations that improve the performance of querying these views.
We report on the evaluation of the compiled views as compared to using hand-coded
views that implement the same policies using standard ACM-based enforcement.
• The two most detailed case studies to date that depend on RDBAC policy
enforcement. These case studies are motivated by real-world applications and
demonstrate the usefulness of such a system.
The rest of this document is divided into six chapters. In Chapter 2 we discuss related
work. In Chapter 3 we present challenges that arise in implementing an RDBAC system
that motivate the need for a formal basis for RDBAC. Chapter 4 establishes this formal
basis by using syntax and semantics defined by the TD language, and demonstrates how
this model for access control can be used in formal security analysis by defining two
classes of policy configurations in which the problem of analyzing whether an unprivileged
user can ever gain undesired privileges is provably decidable. Chapter 5 describes the
compilation process of using TD-based access control policy rules in an off-the-shelf
commercial database system, as well as optimizations that yield significant performace
benefits. Chapter 6 presents the two case studies, including the database schemas and the
TD rules for access control. An example of proving a safety property of one of these
systems is also provided in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, we discuss future work suggested by
this project, and conclude.
1A similar compilation strategy could be applied to other more common policy languages, such as
XACML [65].
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Chapter 2
Related Work
In this chapter, we first describe work that has been done previously in computational
reflection, including how this concept has been applied to access control and to databases.
We then describe the current technology relating to database access control, including
studies in how policies might refer back to the database being protected. While these
studies have similar functionality to the work presented in this thesis, none of them
provide the combination of a mathematical access control model, a system in which
lower-privileged users may write policies for their own data, and a mechanism for
executing side-effects as part of the policy execution, all of which are provided by our
work. Previous work related to the use of Datalog to represent database queries is then
presented, in which many of the same principles for query semantics apply to our work; to
our knowledge, however, ours is the first to translate Transaction Datalog into SQL and to
use this translation as a means of access control. Finally, we list related work for
application development for medical information systems and building automation
systems, some of which include designs or principles for designing access control policies,
but none of which use the concepts of RDBAC in their implementation.
2.1 Computational Reflection
The term “reflective” as applied to computation was first described by Maes [61] for
programming languages that enable a system (namely, a set of data objects) to reason
about itself. Using computational reflection for access control has been examined in using
history metadata and temporal logic on arbitrary system resources [7], and in using a
specialized Java extension to enforce access control on compiled Java code [91]. Both
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applications, however, still maintain a stratification on the data being protected and the
data used to make policy decisions.
The concept of computational reflection has also been applied to database logic.
QCM [40], and its successor, SD3 [51] allow for a form of computational reflection in
evaluating distributed queries, in which the locations of a subquery can be determined
based on the results of another subquery. However, all of these access control systems
assume “omniscient access” (without restrictions) to the policy data. Salas et al. describe
a middleware system for databases that uses reflection to provide replication,
independently of the actual underlying database system(s) [75]. Their system uses
information from the database to perform some scheduling optimizations. None of these
projects addresses the idea of using reflection for access control, which introduces new
challenges such as cyclic policy queries and information leakage.
2.2 Database Access Control
Griffiths and Wade [38] proposed an access control model for databases that is still largely
in use in modern commercial databases. In their model, the database maintains entries of
an access control matrix to enumerate user privileges on database resources such as tables
and views. Each resource is owned by a particular user, who may then grant privileges on
the resource to other users, as well as revoke the privileges.
Hippocratic Databases [6] make a distinction between users that own a database table
and users that own the data contained in the table. Studies on this paradigm have shown
how policies for such databases might depend on data contained within a table and touch
on the idea of allowing the user to define arbitrary policy logic [59]. But these studies do
not further examine any security implications of this, focusing more on using the Boolean
values in query optimization. Compliance with privacy policies using audit-based methods
has been proposed [4] using an extension to SQL syntax that specifies data to be
protected and definitions for when a query uses that data in a “suspicious” way. This tool
does not prevent such queries from occurring, it merely enables auditing of these queries.
All of these projects assume that policy definers have omniscient access to the database.
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Other recent work reveals a trend towards implementing RDBAC. A proposed
extension to the standard SQL grant syntax limits the conditions under which a grant
may be performed, including server conditions like time of day and user conditions like the
names of the user executing the grant and the user receiving the grant [72]. The paper
also addresses when revocations of a grant may be temporary, and how often to evaluate
the grant conditions. The grants may depend on the state of the database, constituting a
reflective system to some degree, although the paper does not define a formal syntax or
semantics. Several other projects implement RDBAC to some extent [5, 12, 25, 37],
although none of these projects define a formal model. Agrawal et al. [5] describe an
algorithm for translating privacy policies written in a language such as P3P [26] into a
specialized access control language which bases access control decisions not only on the
identity of the user but on the purpose and the recipient of the data. The authors also
describe an algorithm for rewriting user queries based on this specialized language. These
policies can be fine-grained and can themselves contain queries, providing reflective
capabilities. Their system assumes that policy definers have omniscient access to the
database. Bobba et al. [12] introduce the idea of “Attribute-Based Messaging,” an
application for dynamically creating recipient lists for messages based on user attributes.
In other words, rather than explicitly specifying which users should receive a message, the
sender creates a policy of which user attribute values are required, and the recipient list is
created using this policy as an attribute database query. Senders may have restricted
access to certain attributes. Recipient policies are generated semi-automatically by
providing the sender a form with the attributes he is allowed to use, which also prevents
the sender from formulating a query based on sensitive attributes. This application would
not be appropriate for full database query functionality, since it provides neither row-level
filtering nor full policy expressiveness (policies must be based on the values of user
attributes only). However, it does represent a simple, useful application for reflective
policies. Cook and Gannholm [25] describe a middleware system for evaluating and
enforcing rule-based access control policies on a database. The system uses a policy
language that allows for rules that may be reflective. It uses query rewriting to filter the
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results, thus benefitting from the database’s own optimization techniques. The policy
writer is assumed to be omniscient. Goodwin et al. [37] introduce the idea of “implicit
grouping,” in which user groups are parameterized based on the attributes of a user,
which are stored in the database. Permissions are granted to these groups based on the
values of these attributes, and the database recognizes that these permissions must be
automatically updated when the attribute values are updated. However, queries within
the policies are limited to the user attributes, rather than arbitrary database logic. It also
assumes that the policy definer has full omniscient access to the attribute table.
Oracle’s Virtual Private Database technology (VPD) is a significant implementation of
RDBAC, in which queries on a resource are rewritten based on a policy function that can
filter the results of the query [68]. The policy function may in turn contain other queries,
and these queries may in turn be rewritten based on other policy functions. We discuss
some of the shortcomings of VPD in Section 3. Sybase’s Adaptive Server Enterprise
database [81] similarly uses query rewriting based on logical conditions, including
arbitrary logic written in user-defined Java functions. This model behaves similarly to
Oracle’s VPD model, and similarly lacks a formal mathematical model.
Rizvi et al. describe using query rewriting to determine whether a given query is
authorized, without actually changing the query [71]. In other words, if a query can be
rewritten using authorized views, then it is an authorized query, but it puts the burden of
actually determining how to formulate the query properly on the user. They call this
approach a “Non-Truman model,” as opposed to a system such as Oracle VPD that
performs query modifications, which they categorize as a “Truman model.” (The authors
named this terminology after the movie “The Truman Show,” in which the main
character, Truman, was presented with views of the world that did not truly indicate
reality.) They also allow views to be parameterized based on system values like the name
of the user, and because the policies are defined by the views, this also constitutes a
reflective model. Non-Truman models provide benefits such as providing query answers
that represent the actual database state and not adding extra execution tasks that may
adversely affect the optimization task. Truman models, by contrast, perform query
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rewriting (perhaps without any user knowledge) and may give misleading results, or
worse, may give incorrect answers if part of a larger set difference or existence query.
There are also several drawbacks to using Non-Truman models, including burdening the
users to formulate correct queries, and giving undescriptive feedback when a query is
disallowed. Our work follows the example of Oracle VPD in rewriting queries based on
policies on the underlying data; it thus constitutes a Truman model.
Security issues with optimizing database query plans that contain user-defined
functions have been studied by Kabra et al. [53]. Na¨ıve optimizers may rearrange the
query in such a way that it executes efficiently, but gives user-defined functions access to
sensitive data before any filters are applied. Our work will not address this concern;
however, this does constitute a major issue that must be considered for deployed systems
that may use RDBAC with user-defined functions.
An extension to the SQL syntax and semantics for including predicates in grant
statements, called predicated grants, was proposed by Chaudhuri et al. [23]. These
predicates follow the syntax of SQL where clauses; thus, this allows policies to contain
arbitrary read-only queries on the database. The grantees may also be optionally specified
by a query-defined user group. Queries on these tables are rewritten based on these
policies, constituting a Truman model. Furthermore, these policies are non-omniscient;
that is, they are in turn rewritten based on the definer’s view of the database. Predicated
grants currently disallow policies that refer back to the same table they protect, as well as
policy cycles. Our prototype easily handles such policies, which can occur very naturally
in practice. For instance, consider the policy “all employees may view names and
addresses of other employees that work in the same store.” This policy protects the
employees table, but also needs to query that table itself to find out what store the
querying user works in. The authors briefly mention a prototype implementing portions of
their extended syntax, however no details are provided so it is unknown how well the
prototype performs. They also do not provide formal policy analysis for their access
control model, nor does their syntax allow for policies that contain side-effects. Both of
these shortcomings motivated our use of Transaction Datalog as a policy language, which
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provides a mathematical model to enable formal analysis and the ability to execute
side-effects in an encapsulated database query.
2.3 Transaction Datalog and SQL
The relationship between the expressive powers of Datalog and relational algebra has long
been recognized [1, 21, 84], although few systems that analyze the practical use of Datalog
or Prolog together with database management systems have actually been
built [22, 28, 42, 62]. Draxler’s work offers the most details and is most similar to ours, in
describing a translation process from a subset of general-purpose Prolog syntax into
SQL [28]. He also offers a survey of other earlier literature describing the translation
process. Disjunctions, negations, and aggregates are all supported, as are some
non-Datalog features of Prolog such as findall and nested predicates; however it does not
handle recursive view definitions, or even views that depend on the results of other queries
defined in the program (unless, of course, the query is copied verbatim, making the system
susceptible to update anomalies). Additionally, applications using this interface must also
be written in Prolog. The report mentions two proposed approaches to incorporating
database updates in their system; however both approaches are only described at a high
level, and neither appears to have been implemented. Other publicly-available translation
engines from Prolog to SQL exist, but all are derived from Draxler’s code base.
U-Datalog [20] is an alternative extension of Datalog that defines update semantics, in
which all updates are deferred until the end of a query evaluation. Conflicting updates, in
which reordering the updates results in a different final database state, are detected and
aborted. U-Datalog could offer a reasonable alternative language to TD; however, ordering
of updates are very important in certain policies. Consider, for instance, a policy in which
only one user may access a data item at one time, which could be implemented as
token(X), del.token(X), read data, ins.token(X). Clearly the ordering of these
predicates is significant, as other orderings may cause a policy violation or deadlock.1
1
While there are practical considerations for our prototype to restrict updates to the end of any query evaluation,
similarly to U-Datalog, we note that TD as a policy language can implement policies such as the one described.
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2.4 Case Studies
Motivation for flexible and fine-grained access control in medical applications was
provided by Verhanneman et al. [89], although they focused more on the lack of
programmatic controls using J2EE or .NET rather than on database enforcement.
Anderson proposed a set of principles for clinical information systems [8], which provides a
set of practical guidelines for designing policies for use in the medical field. While these
guidelines emphasize the use of access control lists, which are not used by our security
model, our policies do generally follow the intent of the guidelines related to policy
enforcement, with a few exceptions2 that better accommodate current medical practices.
The trust management prototype Cassandra [11] was created with a case study that
provided policies for interacting between health organizations under the UK National
Health Service, although its focus is on communicating full records between independent
organizations, rather than on fine-grained access control. Another case study for access
control policies in medicine was provided by Dekker and Etalle [27], using a novel
technique called Audit-Based Access Control [31]. This technique does not prevent
unauthorized accesses, it only provides an audit method for detecting unauthorized
accesses after the fact, and assumes the existence of external deterrents to allow users to
police themselves. Such a system, however, requires that all users know and understand
the access policies beforehand, and would not be helpful against accidental disclosures. A
relational database schema designed jointly by database designers and medical experts
was briefly described by Friedman et al. [35]. The authors motivate the use of off-the-shelf
DBMS products over customized databases and describe a tradeoff between storing all
patient data in a single table, which clusters all relevant data for a patient together but
requires a very generalized table structure to handle the different data types; and storing
data for each domain in separate tables, which allows more natural table structures but
scatters patient data over various tables. They chose the former approach while we chose
the latter. They do not provide full details, although they do show the schemas of two
2One such exception is to permit emergency access to a patient’s records, even if the clinician is not
ordinarily granted such access. This indicates that further development and revision of Anderson’s principles
may be warranted; however, such is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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tables. They also do not address access control policies. Nadkarni also acknowledges the
challenges of designing a relational database schema for heterogeneous data such as
clinical data [64] and briefly lists some common proprietary medical record systems.
Because building automation systems (BAS) are not a typical case study for database
systems, very little work exists in example policies or schemas. However, database access
control is a good fit for BAS, since typical commercial systems must keep track of a large
number of resources and are likely to use a database for this purpose; certainly, they must
interface with a database system in order to integrate personnel data with their access
control policies. Several proprietary automated building control systems
exist [45, 52, 76, 82, 83] as well as some communication protocol
standards [9, 29, 30, 67, 94]. Boyer et al. described an architecture for enforcing BAS
policies at the application level in an open environment such as the internet [17]. Our
BAS case study extends these policies with additional access patterns and moves the
enforcement mechanism to the database level.
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Chapter 3
Reflective Database Access Control
In this chapter we first motivate the need for the access control model provided by
RDBAC. We explain the generalized model that commercial databases currently use, and
describe its shortcomings for implementing common policies. Many front-end application
designers, when confronted with these shortcomings, bypass the database’s native access
control system and implement access control in the application itself; however, we will
argue that this approach introduces new shortcomings itself. Next, we present the
intuitive concept behind RDBAC, and describe what would be required of an ideal
RDBAC system. Finally, we provide two examples of state-of-the-art technologies that are
currently capable of implementing RDBAC: Oracle’s Virtual Private Database (VPD),
and OASIS’s eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML), a set of XML
elements for defining access control policies along with a basic set of algorithms for
evaluating the policies. We describe how these technologies fall short of our requirements,
thereby demonstrating the need for the system we describe in the remainder of the thesis.
3.1 The Case for RDBAC
Griffiths and Wade proposed the database access control model that forms the basis for
current database access control technology [38]. In this model, table owners may grant
privileges on their tables to database users. If a user should only be granted access to
certain portions of a database table, then the table owner creates a view definition on the
table to specify those portions, and grants the user access to the view. All of these
privileges can be stored by the database as entries to an access control matrix.
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To handle large numbers of database users with similar privileges, many databases
extend the Griffiths-Wade model by implementing a form of Role-Based Access
Control [32], allowing table owners to grant access to a database role, rather than to each
user individually. Multiple privileges can be granted to a single role, so that these sets of
privileges can be granted (or revoked) en masse to a single user simply by assigning (or
deassigning) that role to the user.
For many common cases, however, the Griffiths-Wade model is cumbersome or even
impractical. For instance, data relating to each user, such as the user’s position in the
company, is often stored in other tables in the database. This data may be directly or
indirectly related to the user’s privileges, such as in the policy “all managers get access to
the personnel table,” the access control matrix entries become redundant information.
Even when simplifying the implementation of such a policy by defining a role for
managers, the role membership data is still redundant information since it can be deduced
through the table listing each user’s position. Redundancies in the database are prone to
error when some of the redundant data is updated and some is not, such as when a user is
demoted from a managerial position and the data table is updated but the permissions are
not. While database triggers could be used to prevent redundancies by updating the
privileges when the user data table is updated, the access control matrix still does not
explicitly use this information and can still be manipulated directly, independently from
the user data table. This allows the possibility of putting the database into an
inconsistent state.
Another problem occurs when each user’s view of a table is unique, such as in the
policy “all users get access to their own salary data.” In this case, creating each unique
view of the salary data for each user in the system is impractical for large numbers of
users. Because no two users can see the same data, using role membership does not
simplify the problem.
Many database application designers who require such policies implement the access
control checks at the application level, rather than at the database level. Such an
architecture is shown in Figure 3.1(a), in which the database connection from the
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Figure 3.1: Security architectures for database applications
application is able to access the entire database, and simply uses its own program logic to
limit the privileges of the user running the application. While such an architecture does
allow enforcement of more complex policies, it also suffers from two drawbacks: first,
because the database connection is at an elevated privilege compared to the privileges of
any single user that runs the application, the application is prone to privilege escalation
attacks, such as SQL injection [54]. Second, if other applications are written for the same
data, the policy logic must be duplicated within each application. This redundancy
increases the likelihood of coding errors and may lead to policy violations, depending on
which application is used to access the data.
3.2 Access Control with RDBAC
We defined Reflective Database Access Control in Chapter 1 as a database access control
paradigm in which access decisions are dependent on attributes and relationships
contained in the current database state. RDBAC policies, rather than explicitly specifying
which users may access a given resource, contain queries on the database to retrieve these
attributes and relationships. RDBAC may also be used for fine-grained access control, so
15
that a single policy on a database table may cause different portions of the table to be
returned to the user, including but not limited to full access to every table value or no
access at all. When any values in the database change, any policies that depend on those
values immediately reflect the new database state, affecting any subsequent queries that
are protected by such policies.
Because database queries can compute more complicated algorithms than a simple
“permit” or “deny” access decision, RDBAC policies can implement a wider range of
policy logic. This greater expressibility in defining more robust policies enables
application designers to push policy enforcement from the application back to the
database as shown in the architecture design in Figure 3.1(b). In this architecture, the
application makes the database connection on behalf of the user running it, and the
connection only has the privileges of that user. The enhanced security layer may be part
of the database itself, such as Oracle’s VPD technology (which we will describe in
Section 3.3.1), or it may be a middleware layer through which all database connections
pass, as described by Cook and Gannholm [25]. In either case, the security layer may itself
perform operations on the database during the evaluation of a policy, such as querying
whether the user is recorded in the database as a manager; and if so, of which department.
Policies in the Griffiths-Wade access control model, defined by views and ACM entries
as described in Section 3.1, are already capable of using the current database state and are
therefore already reflective, albeit in a limited way. Consider the following view:
create view sales employees as
select * from employees
where department = ’sales’.
When a user queries sales employees, the rows in the employees table that are returned
depend on whether the department value is equal to “sales.” If a newly-hired employee
gets added to the database, then the response to this query will automatically include the
new employee without any changes to the query or to the policy, and is therefore
dependent on the current database state. However, this reflective capability is limited: it
cannot, for instance, look up attributes of the user executing the query. Such capability is
16
required for policies such as “all users that are managers may view records for employees
in their respective departments.” Under an RDBAC model, such a policy could be
expressed by including a subquery to the employee table to look up the current user’s
position and department. If the user’s position is “manager,” then the policy filters the
user’s query to include only those records of employees in the user’s department.
RDBAC addresses both of the shortcomings of the Griffiths-Wade model as previously
described: redundancy and manageability of customized unique views. By making a
policy dependent on auxiliary data stored in a table, such as the aforementioned policy
(“all managers get access to data for their employees”), the enforcement mechanism
queries the auxiliary data on each access1 to ensure that the policy holds for the user
executing the query. Thus, as soon as the auxiliary data is updated, such as when a user
is demoted from a managerial position, the privileges are automatically updated as well.
When multiple customized views must be defined on a single table, such as the example
policy of “all users get access to their own salary data,” a single RDBAC policy can use
the database’s own logic to create a view for each user dynamically based on that user’s
identity by computing whether the data in the table should be visible to the user,
preventing the need for explicitly setting up static view definitions.
Allowing policies to query the database also broadens the types of policies that can be
enforced when we allow other types of queries, such as database update queries, to be
executed by the policy enforcement mechanism. For example, Chinese Wall policies define
partitions of data that constitute conflict-of-interest categories [18]. Initially, a user may
query data from any partition, but once a user queries one of them, he may no longer
access data from any of the other partitions. Such a policy requires the state of the
database to change when a user makes a query. For another example, audit policies
require the creation of a new audit record when a user executes a query, detailing who is
making the query and what data was accessed by the query [31]. RDBAC can handle such
policies by allowing the enforcement mechanism to execute any series of database
operations during a user query, rather than just executing read-only queries. For instance,
1Caching techniques could be used on repeated accesses to save processing time, provided the cache is
invalidated when the data is updated.
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a Chinese Wall policy could be implemented by having the policy check a metadata table
to see if the user is allowed to access the data being queried, i.e. that the user has not
already viewed data from one of the other conflict-of-interest categories. If access is
allowed, the policy immediately inserts a record in the metadata table to disable access to
any of the other categories, and returns the requested data; otherwise, no data is returned.
We note that the Griffiths-Wade model does not require the policy definer to be a
database administrator. Arbitrary users that are given permission to create their own
tables generally also receive permission to define who should be able to access their tables.
Lesser-privileged users may create views based on data owned by other users, but only if
they themselves have been given access to this data. If their access to this data is ever
revoked, then any of the users’ views that depend on this data are invalidated. Such an
approach to access control gives each user considerable autonomy in protecting his own
data, while still ensuring that no information is leaked. This removes the bottleneck of
having a single, omniscient system administrator that can view any data in the database
and defines the access control policies for everyone else. This paradigm of a
“non-omniscient” policy definer is similarly desirable for making RDBAC system
administration scalable; however, it is important that a policy definer not be able to trick
the system into revealing data that should not be readable. This problem is considerably
harder for an RDBAC model than for the Griffiths-Wade model, since it may not be
immediately obvious which users have access to a given set of data, nor in turn may it be
easy to see which users can modify the database in such a way as to grant new
permissions to untrusted users. For this purpose, the access control model for RDBAC
should have a mathematical basis by which properties can be formally proven.
Finally, an RDBAC system must be practical. Well-established database systems have
been improved over many years to become extremely efficient at answering queries. A
small performance drop in day-to-day database operations may be tolerable in exchange
for the flexibility of RDBAC, but a significant slowdown would undoubtedly be
unacceptable.
In summary, an ideal RDBAC system should contain the following features:
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• Policies can be defined to query other portions of the database to look up attributes
of the user executing the query, the data being requested, relationships between such
attributes, or system environment data. These queries should be able to perform
any operation that the policy definer can perform manually.
• Database updates immediately affect the evaluation of any policy that depends on
the changed data.
• Policies should be fine-grained, so that a single policy protecting a table may filter
out different rows, columns, or both, depending on who is querying the table.
• Policies may contain database operations that modify data contained in the
database.
• Users that create their own database tables should have broad autonomy in defining
their own access control policies, without requiring an expert to review the policies
to detect malicious behavior.
• The access control model should have a formal proof-theoretic basis.
• Performace of evaluating queries should be comparable to current database
technology.
3.3 State-of-the-Art Systems
3.3.1 Oracle VPD
The commercially-distributed Oracle Enterprise Edition Database contains an additional
access control system called Virtual Private Database (VPD). Oracle’s VPD technology
was designed to allow policy writers to have more expressive policy logic by using
arbitrary code written as a user-defined function [68]. Oracle still maintains a
Griffiths-Wade-style access control matrix model, so using VPD policies is optional. In
fact, VPD policies operate in addition to the standard security settings, so that a user
that is not granted access to a table in the ACM is always denied access, no matter what
the VPD policy contains.
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The method for creating a VPD policy consists of writing a user-defined function
(UDF), followed by making a system call that attaches the UDF to the table or view to be
protected. Writing the UDF is no different than writing any other UDF, using the same
PL/SQL language. The parameters to the function must be two strings, one of which will
contain the name of the schema (or namespace) of the table to be protected, and the other
will contain the name of the actual table. The function must return a string. The system
call to attach the policy to the table is the ADD POLICY stored procedure in the
SYS.DBMS RLS package.
Once it is attached to the table, the UDF is automatically executed every time any
user performs a query on the table. The names of the schema and table are automatically
passed into the UDF. The return value of the function must contain an SQL substring
that can be inserted into a WHERE clause, such as the string ‘A = 1’, assuming the table
contains an integer attribute A. Such a return value indicates that only those rows in the
table with attribute A equal to 1 should be returned to the user. Thus, after evaluating
the UDF, the database then rewrites the user’s query to include the return value as an
added condition in the WHERE clause. Figure 3.2 demonstrates this process. A policy
function may access any data available to the definer, including system calls that provide
the username of the user that created the login session, the query executed by the user,
any application-defined context data that may exist, and the results of any other valid
query. The return value may also contain subqueries to be evaluated in the rewritten
query. All queries executed by the policy are themselves subject to any other policies
protecting the tables referenced in the respective queries. This gives sufficient
expressibility to implement nearly arbitrary RDBAC policies.
Table 3.1 shows an example policy employeeFilter for a VPD. (Readers unfamiliar
with VPD policy syntax can safely ignore the function signature and focus on the function
body, which describes the return value.) When a policy writer defines this as a policy
function protecting a table employee and a user executes the query select * from
employee; the function employeeFilter automatically executes. This returns the string
“username=’” (the double-quote characters in the function are a special symbol
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Table 3.1: Example Oracle VPD function
create or replace function employeeFilter
(p schema varchar, p obj varchar)
return varchar as
begin
return ’username = ’’’ ||
SYS CONTEXT(’userenv’, ’SESSION USER’) || ’’’’;
end
representing the apostrophe character, as distinguished from the single-quote characters
that delimit a string), concatenated with the return value of a function call to
SYS CONTEXT, concatenated with another apostrophe character. SYS CONTEXT is a built-in
function that accesses a map of special system variables; in this case, it looks up the string
associated with the key SESSION USER, the user currently logged in. If the session user is
Bob, then this function returns the string “BOB”, the function returns the string “username
= ’BOB’”, and the query is rewritten to select * from employee where username = ’BOB’.
Effectively, this enforces the policy “all users may access employee data about themselves,
and no one else.”
A similar policy could also be written into a view definition using traditional
ACM-based access control in many commercial databases, if the database provides access
to a system variable like SESSION USER and allows arbitrary UDFs to be called from a view
definition. One major difference with VPD policies is that other databases must write an
explicit view definition through which the user must access the data; with VPD, the user
may query the base table directly.
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Table 3.2: Oracle VPD function that exploits the function from Table 3.1
create or replace function attackFilter
(p schema varchar, p obj varchar)
return varchar as
begin
for row in (select * from alice.employees) loop
insert into bob.leaked info values(row.username,
row.ssn, row.salary, row.email);
end loop;
commit;
return ’’;
end
There are, however, some subtleties with VPD functions that may cause serious
security violations if they are not written carefully, even with such a simple policy as the
one from Table 3.1. For instance, suppose that Bob (an employee without superuser
privileges) is put in charge of making food assignments for a company picnic, creates his
own table picnic for keeping track of the assignments, and is given the privilege of
defining policies on it. Bob surreptitiously creates a third table called leaked info which
contains the same fields as the employees table, and then defines a policy function for
picnic as shown in Table 3.2. Note that this policy function loops over all rows returned
by the query select * from alice.employees and inserts the values returned by this query
into the leaked info table. If another user, say Carol, happens to execute a query on
Bob’s picnic table, then, because Alice’s policy executes based on the user that is logged
in, Carol’s row (which Bob should not have access to) is copied to Bob’s table, which he
can then access at his leisure. Note also that the policy returns the empty string, which
means Carol’s original query will seem to execute as she expected, so Carol is unaware
that any other operations on her data have taken place.2 Similar problems occur in other
databases when user Bob is allowed to create views that contain user-defined functions,
which could similarly query a protected table and store the information in another table
to which Bob has full access.
2This problem should not be “fixed” simply by allowing some clue that other operations are occurring, or
even allowing Carol to inspect the function before executing it. It would be difficult to distinguish this from
a legitimate audit trail operation, particularly if Bob obfuscates the code in a way that makes it difficult for
even experts to understand.
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At our request, Oracle’s technical support staff reviewed this example and responded
to us with three points [69]. First, the ability to define policies in VPD is an
administrative privilege that also includes the ability to drop policies. This privilege
applies over the entire database, not just over tables to which a user has been granted
access. Thus, if Bob has the ability to define such a function as described in Table 3.2, he
also has the ability to drop the function protecting the employees table described in
Table 3.1 and thereby gain access to the entire table. Such a privilege should only be
given to trusted users in the first place. In our design we wish to allow non-administrators
to define policies on their own tables, as the Griffiths-Wade model already does, since this
supports more flexible and scalable management. Second, Alice could preclude this
behavior by using the function call SYS CONTEXT(’userenv’, ’POLICY INVOKER’) instead.
Rather than returning the current logged-in user, this would return the user “responsible”
for invoking the policy, which in this case would be Bob since it was his function that
tried to access the employees table. This is a subtle difference that may be lost on
less-experienced administrators. Third, there is always a danger that users can be tricked
into executing a function written by someone else; if the code contains a Trojan Horse, it
could cause the same kind of policy violation. Developers at MySQL and PostgreSQL
agreed with this perspective when we wrote variations of this example using UDFs that
executed in their respective systems and discussed the results with them. Of course, one
would ideally use built-in protections to eliminate Trojan Horses rather then simply
surrendering to a “let the executor beware” philosophy. At a minimum, it would be good
to have ways to reason precisely about the code to address such threats.
A simple solution to preventing this problem would be to insist that policies not be
allowed to change the database, or in other words, disallow updates within the policy
language and within user-defined functions. In fact, we will revisit this condition on
policies when we discuss safety analysis in Section 4.3.3. While this would indeed solve the
problem, the solution comes at the expense of disallowing legitimate and even useful
policies, such as Chinese Wall policies or audit policies. The RDBAC model we develop
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Table 3.3: A disallowed Oracle VPD function that contains a cycle
create or replace function managerFilter
(p schema varchar, p obj varchar)
return varchar as
begin
return ’department in ’ ||
’(select department from employees where username = ’’’ ||
SYS CONTEXT(’userenv’, ’SESSION USER’) || ’’’’ ||
’and position = ’’manager’’)’
end
allows the use of such policies while also providing a mathematical basis for analyzing
information flow.
Additionally, there are other useful policies that cannot be expressed in Oracle VPD.
Suppose that Alice decides to implement the policy of “managers can access the data of
employees in their department” using a policy like the one in Table 3.3.3 While this
function appears to express what Alice meant in her policy, it actually has the effect of
creating an infinite loop: when a user queries the employees table, this function will add a
subquery to the original query. This subquery accesses the employees table as well, and
therefore the policy must again be executed, adding another subquery to the subquery,
and so forth. Oracle actually detects the infinite loop in this example and in other simple
examples, and disallows any queries on the employees table as long as this function is
attached to it. This solution prevents the infinite loop from occurring, but it also prevents
potentially useful policies such as the one in Table 3.3. In our project, we also address this
issue by allowing policies on a table to access the table itself.
Because of the lack of a formal mathematical basis for VPD, the inability to allow
untrusted users to write policy functions, and the restriction on the types of subqueries
that may appear in a policy, VPD does not satisfy our requirements for an ideal RDBAC
system.
3It is important to point out that Oracle VPD functions are combined conjunctively; that is, adding
more policy functions only adds further restrictions on what may be accessed, rather than granting access
to additional users that do not already have it. In a real deployment, such a policy must be implemented in
the existing function(s), such as the function from Table 3.1, rather than in a separate function.
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3.3.2 XACML
XACML is a specification for a set of XML elements for describing access control policies
and for communicating access requests. It allows for policy logic to be based on a user’s
attributes and on attributes of the object(s) being accessed. Version 2.0 of XACML added
a method for retrieving attributes by means of an XPath expression on the request
document, provided that the attributes are included in the request document [65]. While
XPath does not constitute a complete query language, it does provide some reflective
capabilities to XACML systems. For example, one of the scenarios provided in the Core
Specification [65] does describe a fine-grained access control policy in which a doctor may
access the medical record of any patient “for which he or she is the designated primary
care physician.” However, the specification for XACML only includes the ability to define
XPath expressions on the request document. Thus, if a user wished to query an entire
XML document, the user’s request would have to include data on each element in the
document to be retrieved in order for the XPath expression to evaluate properly. XACML
does allow for customized functions which could be defined to evaluate an XPath
expression on the document rather than on the request, however both approaches are still
undesirable for several reasons. Building a request document containing identifier data for
each record would be very time-consuming. XACML implementations are not required to
allow requests for multiple resources [66], and forming a new request document for each
possible record in the database would be extremely slow. The user may not even know
ahead of time how to identify each record in the document.
An alternative method for using XACML-based policies for fine-grained database
access control, rather than treating each cell or each record as a resource, is to treat the
entire table as a resource and perform any necessary query rewriting as an obligation in
the access control decision. The Ladon project [78] takes this approach. Jahid et al. [49]
similarly defines RDBAC policies on entire tables, but rather than evaluating the XACML
policy on each user query, they proposed compiling the XACML into entries to the
database’s access control matrix, thereby using the database’s native access control system
to enforce the policies. They also describe the process of automatically updating the
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access control matrix when the state of the database changes. Hsieh et al. [46] propose a
method of fine-grained access control by extending XACML syntax to store the protected
data within the XACML policy that protects it. Franzoni et al. [34] propose another
method of fine-grained access control with XACML that employs a query rewriting
technique, similar to Oracle’s VPD.
XACML offers many benefits for policy specification. Among these are the ability to
specify explicit denials, and the ability to specify obligations. Explicit denials may be used
to list exceptions to a more general policy rule that grants access. Our formalism does not
directly provide for such exceptions to policy rules, although exceptions can be
programmed as part of every rule body to which the exceptions apply. Obligations are
actions that must occur upon returning the access control decision. The types of actions
that could occur vary between systems, and thus the XACML specification does not
include any standard definitions for actions. Each individual system must therefore
establish such definitions separately. For an access control system protecting databases,
for example, such obligations could take the form of updates to the database.
Formal semantics for XPath version 2.0 have been proposed in conjunction with
XQuery [90]. Humenn describes the formal semantics of XACML version 1.1 [48] by
creating a reference implementation in Haskell, a declarative language which in turn has
formally defined semantics. While version 1.1 of XACML does not include some features
such as retrieving attributes with XPath expressions, and therefore does not address any
reflective capability, Kolovsky has extended this work in a draft proposal of formal
semantics of the next version of XACML, version 3.0 (which itself is in draft form and
undergoing review) using proof-theoretic deduction rules [55]. Other formal
representations of subsets of XACML semantics include a propositional logic-based
model [33], a description logic-based model [56], a set-theoretic model using a bounded
domain [47], a translation process from the formal model specification language
VDM++ [19], and another translation process from the first-order logic language RW [93],
any of which can be used to transform and combine policies and determine whether a
given resource is protected under a composite policy with a static environment. None of
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these descriptions includes semantics for executing obligations or for customized functions,
since both are application-specific and not standardized by the XACML specification.
There are two key differences between XACML and the formalism we propose. The
first was previously mentioned: XACML does not provide standard definitions or
semantics for every aspect of the language, such as obligations or customized functions.
The second is that reflective access policies using XPath expressions on the requested data
are assumed to be omniscient. That is, the policy writer has full access to the protected
document. Relaxing this assumption by allowing arbitrary lower-privileged users to store
data and giving them autonomy to define their own access control policies leads to a
similar problem to the one described for Oracle VPD: an unprivileged user could define a
policy that includes an XPath expression for a privileged data item and an obligation that
copies the data into a readable location. Thus, XACML does not fully satisfy the
requirements for an ideal RDBAC system either.
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Chapter 4
Theory
In this chapter, we introduce the formal mathematical model of our RDBAC
implementation: the language and semantics of TD. We also propose an extension to TD
to express a more flexible form of negation. We then describe how to define RDBAC
policies using TD rules. Finally, we address the issue of formal security analysis of RDBAC
policies in our model, and describe two classes of policies for which analysis is decidable.
4.1 Datalog Overview
Datalog is a well-recognized language used in defining query logic. It has a
mathematically-defined semantics and efficient query computation algorithms [10, 36].
Several extensions to classical Datalog have been proposed; one of particular interest to
this work is allowing Datalog rules to modify the database [2, 13]. In this section we
review the syntax and semantics of classical Datalog, describe an extension we will use for
this work, and discusses the efficiency of evaluating rules.
4.1.1 Syntax and Semantics
We begin with a brief review of Datalog syntax and semantics as defined in literature such
as [10, 36]. We assume the existence of three types of symbols: variables, constants, and
predicate names. For the purposes of this paper, we will use the convention of representing
variables as alphanumeric strings beginning with a capital letter, constants as either
integers or alphanumeric strings beginning with a lowercase letter, and predicate names as
either non-alphanumeric strings or as alphanumeric strings beginning with a lowercase
letter. Whether a particular string refers to a constant or to a predicate name will be clear
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from the context, although for readability we will often surround string constants with
single-quotes. We also assume that each predicate name is associated with a fixed integer,
called its arity. Following these conventions, X, Y1, and Name are all variables while p,
patients, and alice may be either constants or predicate names. 1 is a constant. = is a
predicate name. We also use a syntactic sugar of “don’t-care” variables by using the
underscore character “ ”, as Prolog uses. This is semantically equivalent to replacing each
occurrence of the don’t-care variable with its own unique variable.
A literal is a string of the form p(t1, t2, ..., tn) where p is a predicate name with
arity n and each ti for 1 ≤ i ≤ n is either a constant or a variable. We call the sequence
(t1, t2, ..., tn) a tuple with arity n, and each element ti in the tuple an argument. A
variable assignment is a functional mapping of variables to constants. We will often use
the following shorthand extension: for some variable assignment σ, let σ(t) = t if t is a
constant. We will also often use the shorthand notation σ(t1, . . . , tn) to represent
(σ(t1), . . . , σ(tn)), and the shorthand notation σ(p) to represent p(σ(
−→
t )). For these
shorthands, whether a parameter to σ refers to a variable, a constant, or a predicate name
will be made clear by context. A rule is a statement of the form p :- q1, q2, ..., qn.
where p and each qi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n is a literal. We call p the head of the rule, and
q1, q2, . . . , qn the body of the rule. A fact is a rule such that the head is a literal that
contains no variables, and the body is empty. A fact may equivalently be written without
the colon and hyphen separator, e.g. p(t1, ..., tn). A predicate corresponding to a
predicate name is the set of all defined rules such that the head of the rule is a literal with
the given predicate name. (We also use the term predicate to refer to the set of tuples
inferred from the predicate using Datalog semantics.) A database is a non-ordered,
possibly infinite set of rules.
Example 1. The following rules define a simple employee database
employee(‘alice’, 90000, ‘hr’, ‘manager’).
employee(‘bob’, 70000, ‘sales’, ‘clerk’).
employee(‘carol’, 90000, ‘sales’, ‘manager’).
employee(‘david’, 80000, ‘hr’, ‘cpa’).
manager(Person, Dept) :- employee(Person, Salary, Dept, ‘manager’). 2
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Datalog semantics follow a simple inference system, where predicates over tuples of
terms are inductively derived from facts and repeatedly using rules, where a rule derives
the head if there is an assignment to the variables such that the body of the rule is
conjunctively true with respect to this assignment. The formal inference rules for Datalog
can be found in much of the Datalog literature [10, 36].
We typically partition the rules of a database into built-in predicates and database
predicates. A built-in predicate is a predicate with a pre-defined mapping that remains
constant over every database configuration. The name for a built-in predicate is usually a
non-alphanumeric string. For instance, the equality predicate is a built-in predicate
containing the rules =(1,1) and =(X,Z) :- =(X,Y),=(Y,Z) (among many others). A
database predicate is any predicate that is not a built-in predicate. Because the semantics
of built-in predicates are constant over every database, we typically omit rules for built-in
predicates when describing a database definition, and only list the database predicates.
4.1.2 Transaction Datalog
Transaction Datalog [13] augments classical Datalog with syntax and semantics to allow
Datalog rules to modify the underlying database. Transaction Datalog (hereafter
abbreviated TD) was designed as a high-level programming language to model workflows,
where programmers can specify transactions containing both queries and updates,
composing them using sequential and parallel constructs. TD also has a precise
mathematical semantics that includes atomic updates to databases that prevent nontrivial
interference between transactions and maintain serializability.
For simplicity, we will not consider all of the features provided by TD. We will restrict
ourselves to using only serial conjunction, and will assume that rules are evaluated in
isolation. For a reader familiar with TD, the formal way to interpret a rule in our
framework of the form p :- q1, q2, ..., qn. is to view it as the TD term p :- ⊙ (q1 ⊗
q2 ⊗ ...⊗ qn). where ⊗ is the sequential composition operator and the isolation
operator ⊙ isolates the execution of the rule from other rules. The difference with full TD
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does not indicate incompatibility with our work; indeed, future work may incorporate the
omitted features.
We will now provide the syntax and semantics of TD rules; the latter will involve state
updates that could be applied to the database in order to evaluate the rule, and will
implicitly capture the rollback mechanism in case the rule fails to evaluate to true, and
also capture the atomicity of evaluation of rules with respect to other rules. Without loss
of generality, we assume that a user-defined set of predicate names (with corresponding
arities) is partitioned into either a set of base predicate names or a set of derived predicate
names,1 with each predicate name renamed as necessary so as not to conflict with the
following special database-defined predicate names: for each base predicate name p with
arity n, there exists an assertion predicate name ins.p and a retraction predicate name
del.p, both with arity n; as well as an empty predicate name empty.p with arity 0. The
definition of a rule is as before, with the restriction that the literal at the head of the rule
must have either a base predicate name or a derived predicate name (i.e. not an assertion
or retraction predicate name). Additionally, if the name is a base predicate name, then
the rule must be a fact (i.e. the body must be empty). Since evaluating a rule may change
the database state, it is no longer sufficient to define a single database model as we did
before. Thus, in order to define the semantics of predicates in this extension, TD also
defines an inference system for answering queries. The state of a database is the set of
facts for the database’s base predicate names. A transaction base is the set of rules in a
database that are not in the database state, i.e. rules for the derived predicates. Because
assertion and retraction predicate names are only defined for base predicate names, this
partition of the database rules into the state and the transaction base effectively separates
the part of the database that remains constant (the transaction base) from the part that
can be modified (the state).
The inference rules for TD are similar to the inference rules for Datalog, with the
addition of keeping track of the sequence of database states required to reach the
conclusion. Inferring a tuple for a base predicate name does not change the state; its truth
1
This terminology was chosen to be consistent with Datalog literature. While we will also define assertion predicates
and retraction predicates with names derived from base predicates, they are not considered to be derived predicates.
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value is simply computed based on whether or not the tuple exists as a fact in the
database. Inferring a tuple for an assertion predicate ins.p(
−→
t ) or a retraction predicate
del.p(
−→
t ) is always true; however, the state of the database is changed by inserting or
deleting the fact p(
−→
t ), respectively. Inferring a tuple for a derived predicate is the same
as in classical Datalog, with the condition that the sequence of states in the derivation of
the body of the rule must be continuous. That is, the final state of the derivation for each
predicate must be the same as the initial state of the derivation for the next predicate.
Definition: An execution trace is a sequence of (possibly repeating) database states.
In the following axioms and inference rules, let P be a transaction base, S be a
database state, 〈S1, . . . ,Sn〉 and S be execution traces, and p(
−→
t ) be a literal.
Axioms:
1. P : 〈S,S〉 ⊢ true
2. P : 〈S,S〉 ⊢ p(
−→
t ) if p(
−→
t ) ∈ S
3. P : 〈S,S〉 ⊢ empty.p if there exists no tuple
−→
t such that p(
−→
t ) ∈ S.
4. P : 〈S1,S2〉 ⊢ ins.p(
−→
t ) if S2 = S1 ∪ {p(
−→
t )}
5. P : 〈S1,S2〉 ⊢ del.p(
−→
t ) if S2 = S1 − {p(
−→
t )}
Inference Rules:
1.
P : 〈S1,1, . . . ,S1,n1〉 ⊢ p1 . . . P : 〈Sk,1, . . . ,Sk,nk〉 ⊢ pk
P : S ⊢ p1, . . . , pk
if Si,ni = Si+1,1 for each
1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, where S is the concatenation of each 〈Si,1, . . . ,Si,ni−1〉 for each
1 ≤ i ≤ k, with 〈Sk,nk〉 concatenated at the end.
2.
P : S ⊢p1(σ(
−→
t1 )), . . . ,pk(σ(
−→
tk ))
P : S ⊢p(σ(
−→
t ))
for any variable assignment σ, if p(
−→
t ) :-
p1(
−→
t1 ), . . . ,pk(
−→
tk ) is a rule in P.
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Intuitively, the assertion predicate ins.p(
−→
t ) and the retraction predicate del.p(
−→
t )
transform the state with insertion and deletion of p(
−→
t ), respectively. In order for a
state-transformation to satisfy a rule, we must find an assignment of variables (using rule
2) such that all the clauses in the body of the rule can be executed sequentially (rule 1).
Note that, by definition, if some clause in the rule fails, we require that no change be
made to the database (which in effect means that all changes made must be rolled back).
Further, note that the definition precludes non-serializable interference between rule
evaluations.
Example 2. Recall the database from Example 1. Assuming the existence of the
built-in predicate >=, suppose we add a rule for adding new employees that enforces a
minimum salary of 50000, such as hire(Name, Salary, Dept, Pos) :- >=(Salary, 50000),
ins.employee(Name, Salary, Dept, Pos). If P represents the transaction base of the
example database, S represents the original state of the database, and S′ represents the
state augmented with the additional fact employee(‘emily’, 60000, ‘support’,
‘service’) then we can represent the execution of activating the hiring rule with the
following steps:
1. Infer >=(60000, 50000), with the state sequence 〈S,S〉 (i.e. no change to the
database state).
2. Infer ins.employee(‘emily’, 60000, ‘support’, ‘service’) with the state
sequence 〈S,S′〉.
3. Infer hire(‘emily’, 60000, ‘support’, ‘service’) with the state sequence
〈S,S,S′〉, using the given rule for hire. 2
4.1.3 Negations in TD
The only form of negation defined in TD is the empty predicates. These are limited to
checking whether an entire base predicate is unsatisfiable, rather than checking whether
arbitrary predicates with arbitrarily-bound arguments can be satisfied. It is not clear
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whether more generalized negations, such as those with semantics defined by Ross [74],
can be evaluated using only empty predicates; additionally, defining semantics for
negations of derived predicates, which represent transactions rather than simple queries, is
not a trivial task [15]. However, we find negations to be a useful construct. Extending TD
to defining negations only for base predicates allows us to use query negations while
avoiding the problem of defining what the negation of a transaction means.
We replace empty predicates in TD with a more generalized type of negation by
defining a set of negation predicates. The semantics for our definition of the negation
predicates was chosen to correspond closely with the SQL NOT EXISTS clause.
Definition: The projection
−→
t S of a tuple
−→
t = (t1, t2, . . . , tn), S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}, is the
result of deleting all arguments ti from
−→
t such that i 6∈ S.
For instance, the projection
−→
t {1,3} of
−→
t = (‘alice’, , ‘sales’, ) is the tuple
(‘alice’, ‘sales’).
For each base predicate name p with arity n and each subset S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we
define a new negation predicate name emptyS.p with arity |S|. We replace Axiom 3, which
described how to infer facts about the negation predicate, with the following axiom:
3. P : 〈S,S〉 ⊢ emptyS.p(−→u ) if there exists no tuple
−→
t = (t1, t2, . . . , tn) such that
p(
−→
t ) ∈ S and
−→
t S = −→u .
For example, using the database state in Example 1, our new Axiom 3 allows us to
infer empty{1,3}.employee(‘alice’, ‘sales’). Notice that empty{}.p is equivalent to
empty.p as originally defined. This change does not affect the useful properties of TD,
such as soundness and completeness—it is straightforward to step through the soundness
and completeness proofs using the new axiom replacing the old. In fact, more complicated
negation semantics could be defined for queries over multiple base tables; however, the
syntax would be messier. This form of negation suffices for our purposes.
These negation predicates can be transformed into negations in classical Datalog as
follows: Given predicate name emptyS.p, define a new predicate name existsS.p (without
loss of generality, we assume this predicate name is unique) with arity |S|. Construct a
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literal with predicate name p and tuple
−→
t with n arguments. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if
i ∈ S then let argument i be Xi, else let argument i be the “don’t care” variable (or
some unique variable name). Finally, define the rule
existsS.p(
−→
t S) :- p(
−→
t ). (4.1)
and replace all occurrences of the literal emptyS.p(−→u ) with the literal ¬existsS.p(−→u ).
Theorem 1. Using classical Datalog inference and rule 4.1, S ⊢ existsS.p(−→u ) if and
only if there exists a tuple
−→
t such that p(
−→
t ) ∈ S and
−→
t S = −→u .
Proof. Assume S ⊢ existsS.p(−→u ). Since there is only one rule for inferring conclusions
about existsS.p, we must have previously inferred S ⊢ p(
−→
t ) such that
−→
t S = −→u . Since p
is a base predicate (i.e. there are no rules defined with p in the head of the rule), we can
only conclude this if p(
−→
t ) ∈ S.
Conversely, assume there exists p(
−→
t ) ∈ S with
−→
t S = −→u . Then from the rule defining
existsS.p, we can infer S ⊢ existsS.p(−→u ). 2
Corollary 2. For any transaction base P with state S and for any negation predicate
emptyS.p, P : 〈S,S〉 ⊢ emptyS.p(−→u ) if and only if S ⊢ ¬existsS.p(−→u ) using classical
Datalog inference.
Proof. By the new Axiom 3, P : 〈S,S〉 ⊢ emptyS.p(−→u ) if and only if there does not exist a
tuple
−→
t such that p(
−→
t ) ∈ S and
−→
t S = −→u . By Theorem 1, this is true if and only if
S 6⊢ existsS.p(−→u ). From classical Datalog inference, this is true if and only if
S ⊢ ¬existsS.p(−→u ). 2
4.1.4 Query Evaluation
Two natural and important questions to consider about a given database are: whether
computing an answer to a query is decidable (a condition sometimes called safety), and
whether there exists a unique answer to each query. Fortunately, there has already been
earlier work on finding useful cases for both conditions.
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One simple and well-known categorization for guaranteeing safety is strong safety [10],
which includes two conditions on rules: the first is range-restriction, meaning every
variable in the head of the rule appears somewhere in the body of the rule. The second is
that every variable that appears in a built-in predicate term in the body must also appear
as a variable in a database predicate term in the body. If every rule in a database is
strongly safe, then every query on that database is safe.2
The complexity of evaluating rules in TD was shown to be undecidable [14]; however,
applying some reasonable restrictions to the TD rules gives more encouraging results on
execution complexity. Most significantly to our work, allowing assertions and retractions
but disallowing concurrent composition (as we do) reduces the complexity to EXPTIME.
Other restricted fragments of TD can be made to reduce the complexity further [14].
Safe Datalog rules without negation always satisfy the second condition [88]. Datalog
rules with negations also satisfy it if the rules are stratifiable [74]; that is, if each rule can
be assigned to a numbered stratum such that for any rule with a negated predicate in the
body, the negated predicate is from a lower stratum. Range restriction when allowing
negations is also extended to require that variables appearing in a negated literal must
also appear in a positive literal in the body. Since we have only augmented TD with
negations of base predicates, and since base predicates cannot appear in the head of a
rule, we can stratify any set of rules based on TD with negations by assigning all base
predicates to stratum 1 and all derived predicates to stratum 2.
4.2 Defining Policies
TD provides a well-developed theoretical foundation for database logic. We propose the
use of TD for enforcing fine-grained RDBAC.
For each database predicate name p with arity n, we define a set of three view
predicate names: view p, view ins.p, and view del.p, each with arity n+ 1. The rules for
these predicate names may be defined at the discretion of the database administrator, but
have the interpretation that view p(U, T1, ..., Tn) can be derived from the current
2
Strong safety is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for safety.
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Table 4.1: Example view predicates
1. view employee(User, Person, Salary, Dept, Pos) :-
employee(Person, Salary, Dept, Pos),
=(User, Person).
2. view employee(User, Person, null, Dept, Pos) :-
employee(User, , Dept, ‘manager’),
emloyee(Person, , Dept, Pos).
3. view ins.employee(User, Person, Salary, Dept, Pos) :-
employee(User, , hr, ),
ins.employee(Person, Salary, Dept, Pos).
4. view picnic(User, Person, Assignment) :-
employee(Person, Salary, Dept, Pos),
ins.leaked info(Person, Salary, Dept, Pos),
picnic(Person, Assignment).
database state if and only if user U should be granted read access to the values of p(T1,
..., Tn). The database state after the derivation may or may not be the same state as
before the derivation. Similarly, view ins.p(U, T1, ..., Tn) (respectively,
view del.p(...)) can be derived from the current database state if and only if user U
should be allowed to insert (respectively, delete) the fact p(T1, ..., Tn) into the database
state. Access to the database for any non-administrator user is then restricted to using
only the view predicates.
Example 3. Recall the database from Example 1. We may wish to allow all
employees to access their own records. This is accomplished by defining the first rule in
Table 4.1. We may also wish to allow all managers to view the names and positions of
employees in their departments, but not salary values. This is accomplished by defining
the second rule in Table 4.1. Note that field-level filtering is accomplished in this rule by
replacing the Salary field in the head of the rule by a null constant. Note also the
semantics of Datalog queries means that these two rules are combined disjunctively, i.e. a
query only needs to satisfy one rule to return an answer. Thus, a manager may query the
table to get all accessible values, and the answer will include the manager’s own data
(including salary) and the data of all employees in the department (excluding salary).
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Table 4.2: Corrected policy rule from Table 4.1 with basic privilege rules
1. view picnic(User, Person, Assignment) :-
view employee(‘bob’, Person, Salary, Dept, Pos),
view ins.leaked info(‘bob’, Person, Salary, Dept, Pos),
view picnic(‘bob’, Person, Assignment).
2. view picnic(‘bob’, Person, Assignment) :- picnic(Person, Assignment).
3. view ins.picnic(‘bob’, Person, Assignment) :-
ins.picnic(Person, Assignment).
4. view del.picnic(‘bob’, Person, Assignment) :-
del.picnic(Person, Assignment).
5. view leaked info(‘bob’, Person, Salary, Dept, Pos) :-
leaked info(Person, Salary, Dept, Pos).
6. view ins.leaked info(‘bob’, Person, Salary, Dept, Pos) :-
ins.leaked info(Person, Salary, Dept, Pos).
7. view del.leaked info(‘bob’, Person, Salary, Dept, Pos) :-
del.leaked info(Person, Salary, Dept, Pos).
We may also wish to allow all HR employees to insert new employee records into the
database. This is accomplished in the third rule in Table 4.1. 2
Example 4. TD provides a very powerful language for expressing policies. Allowing
users other than administrators to define their own rules without restrictions can lead to
security violations. Recall the example from Chapter 3 in which Bob is put in charge of a
company picnic. As before, if Bob defines the policy for his picnic table as shown in the
fourth rule in Table 4.1, then any query on any employee’s assignment from picnic will
also copy that employee’s data (including confidential salary data) into Bob’s leaked info
table because it queries the employee table directly as a superuser, rather than using Bob’s
permissions defined by view employee. 2
Example 4 demonstrates how the policy described in Table 3.2 might be encoded using
TD and view predicates, which provide a model that is much easier to analyze. Preventing
malicious users from writing such a policy could be accomplished by only allowing the
policy to be executed under their privileges, so that the effects of a policy are limited to
anything that user is already allowed to do manually. In other words, they should only be
allowed to access view predicates under their own privileges, or built-in predicates which
require no special privileges.
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Example 5. The first rule shown in Table 4.2 corrects the faulty policy from the
fourth rule from Table 4.1. In this rule, all table lookups in Bob’s policy are replaced with
view predicates with the username “bob” as the first parameter. Consequently, when
another principal, say Alice, accesses the picnic table by invoking view.picnic, the first
clause in the body of the rule will fail if Bob does not have read-access to Alice’s employee
table information. Consequently, the rule will not fire, and hence protect Alice’s data from
being written onto Bob’s leaked info table. This has the added consequence that Alice
cannot read the data in the picnic table, making this a rather useless “fix.” It does,
however, serve to demonstrate that any policy Bob writes can do no more than Bob
himself would be able to do manually. The other rules in Table 4.2 provide basic privileges
for Bob to the table he owns and must be created by an administrator (although it would
be straightforward for these basic privileges to be created by the database automatically
when Bob creates the two tables). 2
The problem introduced in Example 4 and the fix proposed in Example 5 demonstrate
one of the pitfalls in RDBAC. In Example 5, the problem was fixed by executing the body
of the rule under the policy definer’s (Bob’s) privileges. This violates the guideline
advocated by Rosenthal and Sciore [73], who suggest that policies should be executed
under the privileges of the query invoker, rather than the policy definer. However, we
believe that executing the policy under the definer’s privileges is crucial, especially in the
setting where evaluating the policy has side-effects (such as writing to a table). Modifying
the policy from Example 5 to execute under the invoker’s privilege (by replacing the
constant bob with the variable User) would still suffer from the same problem as the
original policy in Example 4: all employee data visible to the query invoker would be
leaked to Bob’s leaked info table.
The above examples give a simple yet powerful and robust scheme to write policies in
a straight-forward manner using TD, simply by making sure that all accesses in untrusted
user policies are replaced by appropriate view-predicates. The power of having rules with
side-effects is useful in a variety of scenarios, like auditing/logging accesses to the
database, and also in certain policies like the Chinese Wall policy, where accessing one
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category in a database automatically causes a side-effect that prevents the same user from
accessing another category [18]. TD semantics provides a sound semantics to the policies
and algorithmic solutions to evaluate access-rights.
4.3 Security Analysis
Formal security analysis can intuitively be described as answering the question “can user
u ever gain privilege p on object o?” This is substantially different than simply analyzing
whether a given action should be allowed or disallowed— it requires us to examine not
just the current system state, but all future system states. The well-known “HRU model”
describes a simple matrix-based access control model, with the surprising property that
even if every policy in a system can be efficiently evaluated, security analysis can be
undecidable [44]. This is not the case for every access control model; security analyses of
some existing access control systems without the same expressiveness as the HRU model
can be decidable while still allowing useful policies to be expressed [60, 77]. It is therefore
important to evaluate a new access control model such as RDBAC to determine its
analyzability.
4.3.1 HRU Model
We first present a brief overview of the HRU Model as originally defined by Harrison et
al. [44]. The HRU model defines a set of subjects S, a set of objects O, S ⊂ O, an access
control matrix mapping S ×O to sets of privileges P , and six basic operations, from which
more complicated commands can be defined. There are six basic HRU operations, where
R is a right, XS is a subject, and XO is an object:
1. enter R into (XS ,XO): if XS ∈ S and XO ∈ O, then R is added to P [XS ,XO].
Otherwise, no change occurs.
2. delete R from (XS ,XO): if XS ∈ S and XO ∈ O, then R is removed from
P [XS ,XO]. Otherwise, no change occurs.
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3. create subject XS : if XS 6∈ O (and therefore XS 6∈ S), then XS is added to O and
to S and all entries P [XS , o] for o ∈ O are set to {}. Otherwise, no change occurs.
4. create object XO: if XO 6∈ O then XO is added to O and all entries P [s,XO] for
s ∈ S are set to {}. Otherwise, no change occurs.
5. destroy subject XS : if XS ∈ S then XS is removed from O and from S and all
entries P [XS , o] for o ∈ O are removed from the matrix. Otherwise, no change
occurs.
6. destroy object XO: if XO ∈ O − S then XO is removed from O and all entries
P [s,XO] for s ∈ S are removed from the matrix. Otherwise, no change occurs.
Commands in the HRU model consist of
command α(X1, . . . ,Xk)
if R1 ∈ P [Xs1,Xo1]∧
R2 ∈ P [Xs2,Xo2]∧
. . .
Rm ∈ P [Xsm,Xom]
then
op1
op2
. . .
opn
end
Each command has the intuitive effect on the system that if each of the conditions
Ri ∈ P [Xsi,Xoi] for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m are true, then each of the operations op1, . . . , opn
are executed sequentially. The value of m may be zero, in which case the operations are
executed unconditionally. The formal parameters X1, . . . ,Xk may be subjects or objects,
and may be referenced in any of the conditions or operations.
The following is due to Harrison et al. [44]:
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Theorem 3. It is undecidable whether a given configuration of a given protection system
is secure for a given generic right.
4.3.2 Security Analysis and Decidability
Given the undecidability result of security analysis in such a simple model as the HRU
model, it is no surprise that using a more complicated model such as RDBAC with TD
gives a similar result. Indeed, it is easy to show that the HRU model can be simulated in
TD, using the extension for negation predicates as defined in Section 4.1.3.
Theorem 4. There exists a set of TD rules that can simulate the HRU model.
Proof. We first describe a translation of the basic HRU operations into sequences of TD
literals, and then an algorithm for transforming arbitrary HRU commands into TD rules.
We define base predicates subject(S), object(O), and privilege(S, O, R) to represent
the sets and the matrix, with the following interpretations:
1. privilege, with arity 3. privilege(S, O, R) is true if and only if subject S has
privilege R on object O.
2. subject, with arity 1. subject(S) is true if and only if S is a valid subject.
3. object, with arity 1. object(O) is true if and only if O is a valid object.
We also define a transformation T that maps the basic operations into sequences of
TD literals. It is easy to see that the set of rules
addPriv(S, O, R) :- subject(S), object(O), ins.privilege(S, O, R).
addPriv(S, O, R) :- empty{1}.subject(S).
addPriv(S, O, R) :- empty{1}.object(O).
accomplishes the same effect as the operation enter R into (S,O), so define T (enter R
into (S,O)) as addPriv(S, O, R), adding the above rules for the predicate name addPriv.
Similarly, define the other operations as follows:
• T (delete R from (S,O)) 7→ deletePriv(S, O, R) with rules
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deletePriv(S, O, R) :- subject(S), object(O), del.privilege(S, O,
R).
deletePriv(S, O, R) :- empty{1}.subject(S).
deletePriv(S, O, R) :- empty{1}.object(O).
• T (create subject S) 7→ createSubj(S) with rules
createSubj(S) :- empty{1}.object(S), ins.subject(S), ins.object(S).
createSubj(S) :- object(S).
• T (create object O) 7→ createObj(O) with rules
createObj(O) :- empty{1}.object(O), ins.object(O).
createObj(O) :- object(O).
• T (destroy subject S) 7→ destroySubj(S) with rules
destroySubj(S) :- subject(S), del.subject(S), del.object(S),
retractPrivS(S).
retractPrivS(S) :- del.privilege(S, O, R), retractPrivS(S).
retractPrivS(S) :- empty{1}.privilege(S, , ).
destroySubj(S) :- empty{1}.subject(S).
• T (destroy object O) 7→ destroyObj(O) with rules
destroyObj(O) :- object(O), empty{1}.subject(O), del.object(O),
retractPrivO(O).
retractPrivO(O) :- del.privilege(S, O, R), retractPrivO(O).
retractPrivO(O) :- empty{2}.privilege( , O, ).
destroyObj(O) :- subject(O).
destroyObj(O) :- empty{1}.object(O).
Note that initializing the access matrix privilege is not necessary for the createSubj and
createObj rules because if the created object did not previously exist, no previous entries
for that object can exist in privilege due to the fact that addPriv ensures that the object
must exist before adding any privileges; and if the created object had been previously
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deleted, all previous entries for that object in privilege must have been previously
removed by the rules for destroySubj or destroyObj.
Now, we create a TD rule for each command α of the form:
command α(X1, . . . ,Xk)
if r1 ∈ P [Xs1,Xo1]∧
r2 ∈ P [Xs2,Xo2]∧
. . .
rm ∈ P [Xsm,Xom]
then
op1
op2
. . .
opn
end
Because T maps each basic operation into a sequence of TD literals that execute each
operation, the sequence T (op1), T (op2), . . . , T (opn) executes the body of α. The
condition of α requires that the specified privileges exist in the matrix. This is true if and
only if the sequence privilege(Xs1, Xo1, r1), privilege(Xs2, Xo2, r2), ...,
privilege(Xsm, Xom, rm) holds. Thus the rule
α(X1, . . . , Xk) :-
privilege(Xs1, Xo1, r1), privilege(Xs2, Xo2, r2), ...,
privilege(Xsm, Xom, rm),
T (op1), T (op2), . . . , T (opn).
can be invoked if and only if the command α can be executed, and the state of the
database after invoking the rule is exactly the state of the HRU model after executing α. 2
Corollary 5. Formal security analysis for policies based on TD is undecidable.
Proof. From Theorem 4, we know that TD can simulate any configuration of the HRU
model. If there were a decidable algorithm for formal security analysis for TD, this
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algorithm could be used to analyze any HRU configuration. Since security analysis of HRU
is undecidable (due to Theorem 3), security analysis of TD must also be undecidable. 2
In spite of the undecidability result of the general case, it is possible to make
restrictions on the policies that enable decidable security analysis algorithms. To show
this, we will follow the formalism for access control systems defined by Li and
Tripunitara [60] as a four-tuple 〈Γ,Ψ, Q,⊢〉 where Γ is the set of possible system states, Ψ
is a set of rules that may be used to change the state, Q is a set of logical formulas for
determining access privileges, and ⊢ is a function mapping Γ×Q→ {true, false} that
indicates whether a given logical formula is true for a given system state. A security
analysis instance is a four-tuple of the form 〈γ, ψ,T ,2φ〉 where γ ∈ Γ, ψ ∈ Ψ, T is a set of
trusted users, φ ∈ Q, and 2 is a temporal logic operator [57] meaning “in the current and
in all future states.” This instance is true if and only if for any sequence of state changes
starting with γ using transitions in ψ and not initiated by any user in T , φ holds in each
state.
To express RDBAC systems in this formalism, let Γ be the set of possible databases,
including both possible database states and the transaction base, as defined in
Section 4.1.2. Let Ψ be the set of transaction bases for these databases. Q and ⊢ must be
defined in terms of what security properties we wish to prove about our system. For the
purposes of this paper, Q will be the set of formulas of the form canRead(U,P, T1, . . . , Tn)
or ¬canRead(U,P, T1, . . . , Tn) where U is a given principal, P is a given predicate name
with arity n, and {T1, . . . , Tn} are either variables or constants.
3 For a database D ∈ Γ,
D = 〈S, ψ〉, and a given formula
φ = canRead(U,P, T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Q,
we will define ⊢ (D, φ) = true if and only if there exist a variable substitution σ and a
sequence of database states S such that view P (U, σ(T1), . . . , σ(Tn)) can be inferred using
the sequence S. For negated formulas, ⊢ (D,¬φ) = true if and only if ⊢ (D, φ) = false. In
3
Adding formulas for expressing other access privileges, such as canInsert or canDelete, would follow this same
pattern.
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each of the following theorems, security analysis will entail calculating whether the
canRead formula can ever be true in any future database state resulting from a
non-trusted user executing any sequence of rules.
4.3.3 Side-Effect-Free Policies
The first class of policies for which we show security analysis is decidable is a restricted
class in which untrusted users cannot execute policies that cause side-effects on the
database (i.e., contain neither assertions nor retractions).
Note that this is a very reasonable restriction, as there are many policies whose
evaluation does not require any side-effects on the database. Also, notice that this
precludes the possibility of untrusted users to expand the domain of the database
(introduce new subjects/principals, new attributes, etc.)
Lemma 6. Given a database with state S and transaction base P, if no rule in P causes
side-effects on the database, then for all conclusions P : S ⊢ p(
−→
t ) where the sequence S
begins with S, S also ends with S. That is, no query will ever change the state of the
database.
Proof. By induction on the inference sequence. For axioms 1 and 2, as well as inference
rule 3, this is trivially true. Axioms 3 and 4 do not apply because each one causes
side-effects. For inference rule 1, assume S begins with S. Since S is the concatenation of
the state sequences 〈S1,1, . . . ,S1,n1〉, 〈S2,1, . . . ,S2,n2〉, . . . , 〈Sk,1, . . . ,Sk,nk〉, S1,1 = S. By
the inductive hypothesis, S1,n1 = S. Thus S2,1 = S1,n1 = S, and again by the inductive
hypothesis S2,n2 = S. Similarly, each of the state sequences must begin and end with S.
Thus, Sk,nk = S, and so S ends with S. For inference rule 2, since the state sequences are
identical, the inductive hypothesis already shows that if S begins with S it must end with
S. 2
Theorem 7. Security analysis is decidable for a database with state S and transaction
base P with all rules containing no side-effects.
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Proof. From Lemma 6, we know that any operations on the database will leave it in its
initial state. Thus, we only need to determine whether
P : 〈S, . . . ,S〉 ⊢ view P (U, σ(T1), . . . , σ(Tn)) for any U 6∈ T . This is not only decidable,
but evaluable in polynomial time [14]. This covers all “future states” because the database
state never changes. 2
While this may initially seem very restrictive, it is important to note that we only
need to consider untrusted users not in T . If a policy in the transaction base contains an
assertion or retraction, but that policy can only be invoked by trusted users in T , and no
operations initiated by other users will cause that policy to be invoked, then we need not
consider that policy for the purpose of security analysis, allowing us to use Theorem 7.
Checking whether users not in T can invoke the policy could at worst be done by trying
each user one by one to see whether the policy is satisfiable for that user, although in
many cases this can be made simpler (such as if the policy contains a condition to check
for a constant set of users). Checking whether operations initiated by other users will
cause the policy to be invoked can be done by recursively examining the other policies in
the transaction base. If the policy in question appears in the body of any other policy,
then that policy must similarly only be invokable by trusted users, and cannot be invoked
by operations initiated by other users.
We can similarly extend the usefulness of this class of policies by separating write
privileges on the database. If an assertion or retraction to a predicate p’ does not affect
the policies on another predicate p, then policies that change p’ can also be effectively
removed for the purposes of security analysis on p. This check can also be done with a
recursive process. We will say that p depends on p’ if there exists a rule for p such that at
least one of the literals in the body of the rule either has predicate name p’, or depends on
p’. If p does not depend on p’, then no invocation of any rule for p will access values in
p’, and thus will not be affected by changes made to p’.
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4.3.4 Safely-Rewritable Policies
Allowing untrusted users to make updates to the database complicates security analysis.
Understanding the effect of a set of policies on a changeable database state has already
been shown to be undecidable. However, we can simplify the problem if the policies
impose limits on the kinds of changes an untrusted user may make.
We describe below a class of policies that satisfy two conditions— they allow adding
new facts to the database but allow no retractions or negations, and secondly, they
disallow policies to change the domain of possible values that appear anywhere in the
database, the latter being formalized as a condition called “safe rewritability.” For this
class of policies, Theorem 9 shows that security analysis is decidable, and Theorem 10
shows that it can be approximately decided using a simple Datalog query.
Definition: The rewrite operation ⊲ is a function mapping a retraction-free and
negation-predicate-free rule to a set of rules, defined recursively as follows: given a rule
r = p(−→t ) :- p1(
−→
t1), ..., pn(
−→
tn)., if the body of r contains no assertion predicates, then
⊲(r) = {r}. Otherwise, let pi(
−→
ti ) be the first assertion predicate ins.q(
−→
ti ), so that no
pj(
−→
tj ) for j < i is an assertion predicate. Let r1 be the rule q(
−→
ti ) :- p1(
−→
t1), ...,
pi−1(
−−→
ti−1). and r2 be the same as rule r but with pi(
−→
ti ) omitted. That is, r2 = p(
−→
t ) :-
p1(
−→
t1), ..., pi−1(
−−→
ti−1), pi+1(
−−→
ti+1), ..., pn(
−→
tn). Then ⊲(r) = {r1} ∪ ⊲(r2).
For example, if r = p :- p1, p2, ins.p3, p4, ins.p5, p6., then ⊲(r) consists of the
following three rules:
p3 :- p1, p2.
p5 :- p1, p2, p4.
p :- p1, p2, p4, p6.
Note that the rewrite operator is well defined, because r may only have a finite
number of assertion predicates, and r2 has one fewer assertion predicates than r. Observe
that since ⊲(r) removes all assertions, it constitutes a classic Datalog program and can be
evaluated as such. However, note that the rules of ⊲(r) are not semantically equivalent to
r; in fact ⊲(r) allows all inferences that r does, and possibly more.
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Definition: We call a set of TD rules {r1, . . . , rn} safely rewritable if each of
{⊲(r1), . . . , ⊲(rn)} is safe (in the classical Datalog sense).
Safe rewritability prohibits expanding the domain of a database, and allows us to compute
a single, finite model for the Datalog database derived from rewriting each rule in a TD
database. Note also that the Datalog database is not a simulated execution of every rule
in the TD database. The inference rules for TD require that all predicates in a given rule
hold, not just the predicates occurring before an assertion. It is, however, a maximal
database in terms of set containment. (We will say that a literal q ∈ D if q can be inferred
from D.)
Lemma 8. For any TD database with safely rewritable rules and initial state S and
transaction base P and any finite sequence of rule invocations, the final state is a subset of
the model of the Datalog database derived from the union of S and the rewritten rules from
P (i.e. ⊲(P)).
Proof. Let D be the model of the derived database. We know that S is already a subset of
D, and since any finite sequence of rule invocations r1, r2, . . . can be simulated by invoking
a single rule r :- r1, r2, . . ., we will show by induction on the length of the inference
sequence that invoking the rule with an initial state S0 that is a subset of D gives a final
state Sf that is also a subset of D; and furthermore, that any inferred clauses in the
original TD database can also be inferred in D.
Let q(−→s ) be a ground clause in Sf . If q(
−→s ) was already in S0, then since S0 ⊆ D we
already have q(−→s ) ∈ D. Otherwise, let r = p(−→t ) :- p1(
−→
t1),...,pn(
−→
tn). be the invoked
rule so that P : S ⊢ p(σ(−→t )) where S begins with S0 and ends with Sf . By combining
inference rules 1 and 2, this means that P : S1 ⊢ p1(σ(
−→
t1 )), . . . , P : Sn ⊢ pn(σ(
−→
tn)), where
S1 begins with S0 and Sn ends with Sf . Let Si = 〈Si,1, . . . ,Si,ni〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ n be a state
sequence such that q(−→s ) 6∈ Si,1 but q(−→s ) ∈ Si,ni and that this property does not hold for
any other Sj for j < i.
We know that P : Si ⊢ pi(σ(
−→
ti )). This could not have been concluded from Axioms 1
or 2 or from Inference Rule 3, because in each case the initial state and final state are equal
and we picked Si such that the initial state and final state are not equal. This also could
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not have been concluded from Axiom 4 because a database with safely rewritable rules
cannot contain retraction predicates. It could not have been concluded from Inference
Rule 1 alone (without using Inference Rule 2) because this would require us to conclude
that it was already true in Si−1. Assume, then, that it was concluded from Axiom 3.
Then pi(σ(
−→
ti )) = ins.q(−→s ). According to the rewriting operation, the derived database
contains the rule q(−→s ) :- p1(
−→
t1), ..., pi−1(
−−→
ti−1)., with any other assertion predicates
omitted. We also know that P : Sj ⊢ pj(σ(
−→
tj )) for and j < i. By the inductive hypothesis,
we know that D ⊢ pj(σ(
−→
tj )) for each predicate, thus, we can conclude D ⊢ q(−→s ).
The only other option is that q(−→s ) is not a ground clause, but an inferred clause that
was concluded from Inference Rule 2; that is, it was concluded from some other rule q :-
q1,...,qk in the database, so that P : Si ⊢ q1, . . . , qk. Since this was concluded with a
shorter inference sequence, we can use the inductive hypothesis that D ⊢ q1, . . . , qk
(omitting any assertion clauses), and the rule q :- q1,...,qk with assertion clauses
omitted is in D, so we can conclude D ⊢ q(−→s ). The inductive hypothesis also lets us
conclude that the final state in Si is a subset of D, since the sequences in the hypothesis
and the conclusion of Inference Rule 2 are the same. 2
Theorem 9. Security analysis is decidable for a database with state S and transaction
base P with rules that contain no retractions or negations and are safely rewritable, given
a finite number of users.
Proof. We know that the rewritten rules form a Datalog database with a single, finite
model. Because the database rules contain no retractions, invoking rules can only add
ground clauses to the database state. From Lemma 8, we know that the state is still a
subset of the model of the derived Datalog database. Since any sequence of possible state
changes has a finite upper bound, it must eventually reach a fixpoint in which no state
changes occur. Since the state changes are discrete values, every such sequence must also
be finite.
Since there are also finitely many rules in P, there are finitely many sequences that
may exist. (We only need to consider sequences of rules in which each rule actually
changes the database, since if the database remains the same, the accessible items will not
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change.) To decide security of a formula φ, enumerate each such sequence running under
every possible untrusted user. For each sequence, create a copy of the database and
execute the sequence, checking whether φ holds at each step. Because checking for φ is
decidable, and we are checking it finitely many times, the security analysis is also
decidable. 2
It is worth noting that security analysis of a limited variation of the HRU model that
uses only monotonically increasing operations is still undecidable [43]. The difference with
our result is that we require the policies to be safely rewritable, which limits the domain
from being expanded.
Just as in Section 4.3.3, we can extend the usefulness of this class by allowing
unrestricted assertions and retractions only by trusted users, and by separating the write
privileges on the database.
While security analysis is decidable for this case, it is clear that simulating every
possible sequence of commands would be an expensive analysis. An alternative to this
detailed analysis would be to make a conservative estimate of what privileges are possible.
All of the semantics discussed for this paper are monotonic; that is, if a rule can be
executed under a given database state, it can still be executed under a larger database
state. This enables us to use the maximal database computed for Lemma 8 to make this
estimate. This may disallow some safe database configurations, but because computing a
Datalog model is very efficient, this solution may be preferable.
Theorem 10. For a database with state S and transaction base P with rules that contain
no retractions or negations and are safely rewritable, if a given permission does not exist
in the model of the Datalog database derived from the union of S and the rewritten rules
from P (i.e. ⊲(P)), then it will not be accessible in any future state of the current database
if all rules are monotonic.
Proof. We prove this by showing that because all rules are monotonic and contain no
negations, adding data to the database will never subtract privileges. Therefore, a
privilege that exists in a subset of the maximal model must also exist in the maximal
model. From Lemma 8, we know that all possible sequences of commands on the database
51
will still leave the state as a subset of the maximal model; therefore, all privileges granted
in any future state will also be granted in the maximal model. By the contrapositive, if
the maximal model does not contain a privilege, then no future state can either.
Let r be any invocation of any rule in P. That is, there exists a sequence of database
states S, . . . ,Sr such that P : 〈S, . . . ,Sr〉 ⊢ r. Let q be any other invocation of any rule in
P— similarly, there exists a sequence of database states S, . . . ,Sq such that
P : 〈S, . . . ,Sq〉 ⊢ q. We will show by induction on the inference process that r can still be
invoked on the new database state; that is, there exists another sequence of database
states Sq, . . . ,S
′ such that P : 〈Sq, . . . ,S
′〉 ⊢ r; and further, that Sr ⊆ S
′.
Observe first that because no rule in P contains retractions, all ground clauses in S
must still exist in Sq. That is, S ⊆ Sq.
For the basis, assume we can infer r through one of the axioms. For axiom 1, r = true,
so P : 〈S,S〉 ⊢ r. We can also infer P : 〈Sq,Sq〉 ⊢ r using axiom 1. We already have
S ⊆ Sq. For axiom 2, r = p(
−→
t ) for some p(−→t ) ∈ S, so P : 〈S,S〉 ⊢ r. Since S ⊆ Sq,
p(
−→
t ) ∈ Sq, so we can also infer P : 〈Sq,Sq〉 ⊢ r. For axiom 4, r = ins.p(
−→
t ), so
P : 〈S,Sr〉 ⊢ r where Sr = S ∪ {p(
−→
t )}. Then we can infer P : 〈Sq,S
′〉 ⊢ r where
S′ = Sq ∪ {p(
−→
t )}, and since S ⊆ Sq, (S ∪ {p(
−→
t )}) ⊆ Sq ∪ {p(
−→
t )}. By assumption, no r
cannot be a retraction or a negation, so we need not consider axioms 3 or 5.
For the inductive step, assume that we can infer r through rule 1. Then r is of the
form p1, . . . , pk where P : 〈Si,1, . . . ,Si,ni〉 ⊢ pi for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k. For i = 1, Si,1 = S, so by
the inductive hypothesis there exists a S′1,m1 such that S1,n1 ⊆ S
′
1,m1
and
P : 〈Sq, . . . ,S1,m1〉 ⊢ p1. For all other values of i, Si,1 = Si−1,ni−1 ⊆ S
′
i−1,mi−1
, so again by
the inductive hypothesis there exists a S′i,mi such that Si,ni ⊆ S
′
i,mi
and
P : 〈S′i,1, . . . ,Si,mi〉 ⊢ pi with S
′
i,1 = S
′
i−1,mi−1
. Thus we can use inference rule 1 to
conclude that P : 〈Sq, . . . ,S
′
k,mk
〉 ⊢ r, with Sk,nk ⊆ S
′
k,mk
.
Finally, assume that we can infer r through rule 2. Then r = σ(p) for some variable
assignment σ where there exists a rule p :- p1, . . . , pk in P and
P : 〈S, . . . ,Sr〉 ⊢ σ(p1), . . . , σ(pk). By the inductive hypothesis, there exists a database
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state S′ such that P : 〈Sq, . . . ,S
′〉 ⊢ σ(p1), . . . , σ(pk) and Sr ⊆ S
′. We can then use the
same inference rule to conclude P : 〈Sq, . . . ,S
′〉 ⊢ r. 2
In Section 6.1.3 we will describe an implementation of the above security analysis for a
set of policies by encoding the analysis as the evaluation of a query.
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Chapter 5
Implementation
In this chapter we describe how an RDBAC system can be implemented in a standard
SQL-based relational database management system, using Transaction Datalog (TD) as a
policy language, which provides a theoretical formalism for expressing policies that is also
compact and conceptually easy to understand. This system employs a compilation process
to convert TD rules into views in standard SQL, assuming the existence of a system
variable containing the name of the current user. We describe possible optimizations on
the views, and include a performance evaluation of our RDBAC system compared to a set
of views typical of most current, standard relational database management systems. To
evaluate the potential of using our compilation process into other languages besides SQL,
such as XACML or Oracle VPD, we also provide a performance comparison with these
more modern technologies.
Benchmark Policies. We will use an example database that contains data for a
consulting firm that contains branch offices in multiple locations. The database includes
tables for employee data, financial records for each location, and data for the firm’s clients.
The company has various access policies for the data. The user Alice creates all tables
relevant to this scenario, and is allowed full access to them. All HR personnel are allowed
full access to the employee data. Regional managers are allowed access to data of the
employees in their region, indicated by the ID of the store in which they work: stores
100-199 are in region 1, stores 200-299 are in region 2, etc. The company also grants
insurance agents access to employees’ names and addresses, but only for those employees
who have opted to release their data, and all accesses by insurance agents must be audited.
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Table 5.1: Benchmark Policies: employees and store data tables
% base policy, automatically generated
1. view employees(‘alice’, Name, Addr, StoreID, Salary, Optin) :-
employees(Name, Addr, StoreID, Salary, Optin).
% hr policy
2. view employees(User, Name, Addr, StoreID, Salary, Optin) :-
view hr(‘alice’, User),
view employees(‘alice’, Name, Addr, StoreID, Salary, Optin).
% manager policy
3. view employees(User, Name, Addr, StoreID, Salary, Optin) :-
view manager(‘alice’, User, Region),
view employees(‘alice’, Name, Addr, StoreID, Salary, Optin),
>=(StoreID, Region*100), <(StoreID, (Region+1)*100).
% insurance policy
4. view employees(User, Name, Addr, null, null, null) :-
view insurance(‘alice’, User),
view employees(‘alice’, Name, Addr, , , Optin), =(Optin, ‘true’),
ins.accesslog(User, Name, ‘Name & Addr’, current time).
% policy for branch office data
5. view store data(User, StoreID, Data1, Data2) :-
view owner(‘alice’, StoreID, User),
view store data(‘alice’, StoreID, Data1, Data2).
Each store location has an owner, who is allowed to view all financial records for that
location. An owner may own more than one location.
Finally, the firm’s clients may pose conflicts of interest. A Chinese Wall policy [18] is
imposed on data for such clients: any employee may initially view any client’s data, but
after viewing the data, the employee may not view any other data that creates a conflict
of interest.
Table 5.1 contains access rules for the employees and store data tables that implement
these policies, encoded in TD. We call the predicates defined by these rules view predicates.
Rule 1 is defined for a particular user ‘alice’ and is true for all rows in the employees
table. In other words, the view on table employees for user ‘alice’ is the entire table.
Rules 2 and 3 demonstrate how we can leverage the recursive semantics of Datalog to
define other useful policies. In Rule 2, the first predicate in the body of the policy is true if
and only if the querying user is in the hr table. The second predicate, as we explained for
Rule 1, is true for all records in the employees table. In other words, this rule enforces the
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policy that any HR user can see the data for all employees. In Rule 3, the first predicate in
the body of the policy is true if and only if the querying user is in the manager table; if so,
the variable Region is bound to the value of the region that manager is assigned to. The
second predicate is true for all employees in the table, however the final two predicates are
only true for the employees with a StoreID number between Region * 100 and (Region +
1) * 100. In other words, managers can see the data for all employees in their region.
Rule 4 uses an assertion predicate to implement an audit policy. The first predicate in
the body checks whether the querying user is an authorized insurance agent. The second
retrieves the names and addresses of each employee, but uses “don’t care” values for the
StoreID, Salary, and Optin fields (represented by the underscore character). The
corresponding fields in the head of the rule contain null values. The third predicate filters
the table to only those rows with the Optin value set to true. This demonstrates how
cell-level security, using both column-level and row-level restrictions, can be implemented
with a TD rule. Finally, an audit record containing the name of the querying user, the
name of the user whose record is accessed, an explanatory string, and the current time is
added to the accesslog table for each user accessed.
Rule 5 implements the policy for the store data table that branch office owners can
view data for the offices they own. This rule depends on data from other policies for the
store data table and an owner table, which are omitted for brevity.
Table 5.2 contains two alternative rules for implementing the Chinese Wall policy that
protects client data, depending on whether each client’s data is stored in a separate table
(Rule 6), or a single table contains the data for all clients (Rule 7). We provide rule 7 only
to demonstrate the expressive power of RDBAC; hereafter we will only use rule 6. Either
alternative requires some initial setup in creating a table called cwUsers with the following
schema: User of type VARCHAR, CanAccessClient1 of type INT, and CanAccessClient2 of
type INT. The last two columns could equivalently be defined as BOOLEAN. Initially, this
table contains a row for every authorized employee, with both columns set to 1. The first
predicate in rule 6 checks whether the user is allowed to access the client1 table, based on
whether his entry in the cwUsers table has a 1 in the CanAccessClient1 column. Assuming
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Table 5.2: Benchmark Policies: client data
% Chinese Wall policy
6. view client1(User, Data1, Data2) :-
view cwUsers(‘alice’, User, 1, OldVal),
view client1(‘alice’, Data1, Data2),
del.cwUsers(User, 1, OldVal), ins.cwUsers(User, 1, 0).
7. view clientData(User, Client, Data1, Data2) :-
view cwUsers(‘alice’, User, 1, OldVal),
view clientData(‘alice’, Client, Data1, Data2), =(Client, ‘client1’),
del.cwUsers(User, 1, OldVal), ins.cwUsers(User, 1, 0).
8. view client2(User, Data1, Data2) :-
view cwUsers(‘alice’, User, OldVal, 1),
view client2(‘alice’, Data1, Data2),
del.cwUsers(User, OldVal, 1), ins.cwUsers(User, 0, 1).
9. view clientData(User, Client, Data1, Data2) :-
view cwUsers(‘alice’, User, 1, OldVal),
view clientData(‘alice’, Client, Data1, Data2), =(Client, ‘client2’),
del.cwUsers(User, OldVal, 1), ins.cwUsers(User, 0, 1).
this is satisfied, the second predicate returns the data requested by the user. The third
and fourth predicates remove the user’s row from the cwUsers table, whatever the value of
CanAccessClient2 may have been, and replace it with an entry that only allows future
access to the client1 data and turns off future access to the client2 data. Rules 8 and 9
are the corresponding rules for accessing the data for client2, which simply reverse the
columns on the cwUsers table: they check whether CanAccessClient2 is 1, and would set
CanAccessClient1 to 0. Note that the head of rule 9 uses the same predicate name as the
head of rule 7. Which rule is executed for a user’s query depends on whether the query
sets the Client field to client1 or client2.
The access control model used by most modern commercial databases offers a
compelling case for decentralized policy administration, in which table and view owners
define their own access control policies for the resources they create. Ideally, more
advanced access control models should still give users the same kind of autonomy in
defining their own policies. However, this autonomy comes at a price. We have shown in
Chapter 3 that careless definitions of reflective policies can be vulnerable to a Trojan
Horse attack if untrusted users are also allowed to define policies. This problem can easily
be mitigated using TD-based policies by restricting a policy definer from performing any
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operations beyond what that user can perform manually: we simply make the user’s ID an
explicit parameter to all view predicates, and for all predicates in the body of a policy,
that parameter is bound to the ID of the policy definer, thereby executing the policy
under the policy definer’s privileges. The database system can automatically generate
basic privileges that access the table directly, such as the first rule in Table 5.1, to the
table owner. All other user-defined policies must query the database through the view
predicates.
5.1 Prototype Description
5.1.1 Strategy
Our goals in implementing a prototype system to demonstrate the usability of a reflective
database access control system included the following:
• Use a flexible, expressive policy definition language.
• Use, as much as possible, an existing database management system following the
SQL standard.
• Minimize the overhead running time for executing queries.
• Allow scalability both in the number of users and in the amount of data stored.
TD provides a very concise syntax that is capable of expressing a wide range of
policies, as demonstrated in Section 1. Translating classical Datalog rules into SQL
statements has been well-studied in the past [28, 42] and we took a similar approach for
our prototype, in which we compile a set of TD rules into a set of SQL view definitions.
These view definitions can then be added to the database and used normally, with no
additional overhead. Because rules may be recursively defined, it was necessary to use a
database system that implements recursive views as defined by the SQL:1999 standard.
We chose to use Microsoft’s SQL Server 2005.
Unfortunately, there are two significant semantic gaps between TD and SQL. One
problem is that SQL does not allow database update statements within a data retrieval
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query. SQL triggers, while designed to perform updates as side-effects to user actions,
cannot be defined for read-only queries. In some databases, the restriction against
side-effects can be bypassed by calling a user-defined function (UDF) from within the
query which performs the update. Other databases, including SQL Server, preclude this
by disallowing the invocation of any function that causes side-effects on the database from
within read-only queries. Indeed, this is generally a safer configuration; otherwise,
functions with side-effects could be invoked without the user’s knowledge, causing a
vulnerability with Trojan-Horse code similar to the problem described in Section 3.3.1.
However, as described in Section 4.3, such code can be analyzed to detect undesirable
side-effects. One workaround for executing side-effects in SQL Server is to execute it from
within a Common Language Runtime (CLR) function, which can then be registered as an
external function within the SQL Server database. This workaround is not an ideal
solution; it is considered an egregious hack [63] that requires a separate connection to the
database, which adversely affects performance. However, it suffices for a proof-of-concept
prototype.
The other semantic gap between TD and SQL is that the former includes a well-defined
execution ordering in its definition, the latter does not. In other words, SQL provides no
way to distinguish the policies a1 :- b, c and a2 :- c, b. For traditional SQL queries,
this is advantageous to the query optimizer, which can reorder query plans to find highly
efficient executions of the query. However, there are two reasons why lack of ordering is a
cause for concern in implementing TD: the compiled SQL view may not be a valid
execution of the original TD rule, and the order of operations in a query plan may cause
information leakage [53]. To solve both problems, our prototype only implements policies
in which all side-effects occur at the end of the policy execution, after all relevant data has
been retrieved and filtered. It combines all of the read operations into a subquery along
with dynamically-generated parameters to the UDF that executes the side-effect, making
the side-effects dependent on the results of the read operations and thus ensuring that the
execution order is followed and preventing information leakage by guaranteeing that no
side-effects will occur until it knows the transaction will definitely run to completion.
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Such a restriction also raises another significant complication. While direct assertions and
retractions always succeed, due to their semantic definition in TD, rules that contain
side-effects may fail. If a particular rule contains in its body more than one predicate that
may execute a side-effect, there is a possibility that the first will successfully execute but
the second will fail. In such cases, TD semantics require that the first side-effect be rolled
back; however, because our implementation executes side-effects using an external session,
the database has no way of knowing that it is part of a larger transaction. For simplicity,
we will assume that at any rule contains at most one such predicate, and that it occurs
after all read-only predicates but before any direct assertions or retractions, and we leave
the problem of handling more complicated transactions for future work.
Our approach for implementing RDBAC policies is to write a compiler that parses a
TD-based policy and generates a standard SQL:1999 view definition that enforces the
policy. In order to demonstrate the compilation process, we will walk through an example
of the process using rule 4 of our benchmark policies from Table 5.1.
On the first pass, our compiler determines the schema for the view, comprised of an
explicit parameter for the user executing the query, the schema of the base table, and
parameters for any assertions or retractions that any rule for that view might execute. In
this case, the generated schema is: User, Name, Addr, StoreID, Salary, Optin, Assert flag
(a Boolean flag to indicate whether the rule triggers the assertion), Assert param0, and
Assert param1 (parameters to the UDF that will execute the assertion).
The compiler also generates a UDF that creates and executes an SQL INSERT
statement, corresponding to the assertion predicate ins.accesslog(User, Name, ’Name &
Addr’, current time). The values for the string constant ’Name & Addr’ and the keyword
current time can be directly translated into the generated INSERT statement (the latter is
translated to the built-in function GETDATE()). The other parameters, User and Name (not
to be confused with the schema attributes User and Name), are determined at execution
time.
During the second pass, the compiler maintains a list of tables and views accessed in
the rule (which will form the SQL FROM clause), a list of variables and variable bindings
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that appear in the rule, and a list of conditions imposed by built-in predicates or
constants (which together will form the SQL WHERE clause). After this information is
gathered, it uses the variable bindings to form the list of attributes to appear in the view
(which will form the SQL SELECT clause).
First, it examines the body of the rule. The first literal is the view predicate
view insurance(’alice’, User). The view view insurance is added to the FROM clause list,
and given an alias i. The constant ’alice’ adds a condition to the WHERE clause; using the
available metadata for the view, the compiler determines that this condition should be
i.User = ’alice’. The predicate variable User (not to be confused with the table
attribute i.User) is bound to the second attribute in view insurance, i.Name, which is
added to the list of variable bindings.
Similarly, the second literal is the view predicate view employees(’alice’, Name,
Addr, , , Optin). The view view employees is added to the FROM clause list and given an
alias e. The constant ’alice’, together with the metadata for the view, indicates that
e.User = ’alice’ is added to the WHERE clause list. The variables Name, Addr, and Optin
are bound to the attributes e.Name, e.Addr and e.Optin, respectively, all of which are
added to the list of variable bindings. The don’t-care symbols (underscores) are ignored,
since they impose no conditions on the values in the view.
The third literal is the built-in predicate =(Optin, ’true’). Because the variable Optin
was bound to the attribute e.Optin, this adds the condition e.Optin = ’true’ to the
WHERE clause list.
Next, the fourth literal is the assertion predicate ins.accesslog(User, Name, ’Name &
Addr’, current time). As previously described, during the first pass this literal triggered
the creation of a UDF. During the second pass, the compiler uses the list of variable
bindings to determine which values will be passed as parameters to this function,
contained in the view schema as Assert param0 and Assert param1. In this case, i.Name is
added to the SELECT clause list as the former, and e.Name is added as the latter. The value
for Assert flag is also added to the SELECT clause list as 1, indicating that the side-effect
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should be executed. For the other rules, which do not contain assertion predicates, the
value for Assert flag is added as 0, and the other parameters are given null values.
Finally, the head literal is examined to determine the attributes that should appear in
the SELECT clause. The User variable, bound previously to i.Name, is added as User.
Similarly, e.Name is added as Name and e.Addr is added as Addr. The constant null is
added as the other selected attributes: StoreID, Salary, and Optin. In order for the
recursive view to compile properly, SQL Server requires that the null values be cast with
the proper types, which can be retrieved from the metadata for the view employees view.
The final translated SQL for this rule is:
SELECT i.Name AS User, e.Name AS Name, e.Addr AS Addr, CAST(NULL AS INT)
AS StoreID, CAST(NULL AS VARCHAR) AS Salary, CAST(NULL AS VARCHAR) AS
Optin, 1 AS Assert flag, i.Name AS Assert param0, e.Name AS Assert param1
FROM view employees e, view insurance i
WHERE e.User = ’alice’ AND i.User = ’alice’ AND e.Optin = ’true’
The other rules are similarly translated, connected by the UNION ALL operator, and the
UDF is called at the end of the union with:
SELECT DISTINCT User, Name, Addr, StoreID, Salary, Optin FROM view employees
WHERE (Assert flag = 1 AND assert accesslog(Assert flag, Assert param0,
Assert param1) != 0) OR Assert flag = 0;
The complete1 generated view for all the policies for view employees is shown in
Table 5.3, along with another automatically-generated view view employees public that
queries view employees on behalf of the current user and may be safely queried by any
user in the system. The portion of the generated code which we stepped through is
indicated by the comment “-- insurance policy.”
5.1.2 Optimization
Translating the view definition into standard SQL allows the execution of reflective access
policies to take advantage of the large body of work in query optimization that has been
1
For clarity, the cast operations required by SQL Server for its recursive query definitions have been omitted from
the view presented here.
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Table 5.3: Generated SQL view definition for benchmark policies.
--...function assert accesslog definition omitted...
CREATE VIEW view employees AS
WITH view employees AS (
-- base policy
SELECT ’alice’ AS User, e.Name AS Name, e.Addr AS Addr, e.StoreID AS
StoreID, e.Salary AS Salary, e.Optin AS Optin, 0 AS Assert flag,
NULL AS Assert param0, NULL AS Assert param1
FROM employees e
UNION ALL
-- hr policy
SELECT h.Name AS User, e.Name AS Name, e.Addr AS Addr, e.StoreID AS
StoreID, e.Salary AS Salary, e.Optin AS Optin, 0 AS Assert flag,
NULL AS Assert param0, NULL AS Assert param1
FROM view employees e, view hr h
WHERE e.User = ’alice’ AND h.User = ’alice’
UNION ALL
-- manager policy
SELECT m.Name AS User, e.Name AS Name, e.Addr AS Addr, e.StoreID AS
StoreID, e.Salary AS Salary, e.Optin AS Optin, 0 AS Assert flag,
NULL AS Assert param0, NULL AS Assert param1
FROM view employees e, view manager m WHERE e.User = ’alice’
AND m.User = ’alice’ AND e.StoreID >= m.Region*100
AND e.StoreID < (m.Region+1) * 100
UNION ALL
-- insurance policy
SELECT i.Name AS User, e.Name AS Name, e.Addr AS Addr, NULL AS
StoreID, NULL AS Salary, NULL AS Optin,
1 AS Assert flag, i.Name AS Assert param0, e.Name AS Assert param1
FROM view employees e, view insurance i WHERE e.User = ’alice’
AND i.User = ’alice’ AND e.Optin = ’true’
) SELECT DISTINCT User, Name, Addr, StoreID, Salary, Optin
FROM view employees WHERE (Assert flag = 1 AND assert accesslog(
Assert flag, Assert param0, Assert param1) != 0) OR Assert flag = 0;
CREATE VIEW view employees public AS
SELECT Name, Addr, StoreID, Salary, Optin FROM view employees
WHERE User = CURRENT USER;
GRANT SELECT ON view employees public TO PUBLIC;
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implemented in commercial databases. There are also additional possible optimizations we
developed using partial evaluation techniques [16] on the TD rules.
As described in Section 4.2, our system prevents information leakage in reflective
policies by forcing them to run under the definer’s privileges. Only the basic privileges,
defined automatically by the database management system, access the tables directly.
Thus, all user-defined privileges are by nature recursive, since they must in turn be based
on another access rule. However, it should be noted that without this restriction, we can
sometimes define equivalent policies that are recursion-free. For example, the second,
third, and fourth rules in Table 5.1 all depend on the first rule. Since we know from the
first rule that the user ‘alice’ is allowed access to the entire employees table with no
restrictions or filters, the compiler could have simply replaced the references with direct
accesses to the table.
This suggests that unfolding predicates in the rule before compiling it to an SQL view
could yield a significant performance benefit. While more complex partial evaluation
techniques would require a sophisticated TD interpreter, it is simple to keep track of the
basic privileges and unfold them into the rules in which they appear. In our running
example of the policies from Table 5.1, using this optimization generates code that is
similar to the generated view in Table 5.3; hence, we have not included it. The key
difference is that each sub-select accesses the tables employees, hr, etc. directly, rather
than through the views view employees, view hr, etc.
Removing the recursion from a view also enables us to remove the redundant CAST
operations, as SQL Server is better able to match types in recursion-free views.
Additionally, the SELECT DISTINCT to remove duplicate rows at the end of the union is
another costly operation. While this operation technically ensures that the result strictly
adheres to the semantics of TD, removing it still yields the same answer set in our test
cases, and it would similarly be redundant in many other practical cases. We have
implemented all of these optimizations in our prototype system, which we assess in
Section 5.2.
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An opportunity for further optimization would be to pre-compute the parts of the
view that are checks on the user’s identity. For instance, consider the policy rules from
Table 5.1. If a given user is recorded in the insurance table but not in any other table,
then when that user logs in, the database could partially compute the view to determine
that only rule 4 is applicable to this user, not rules 1, 2, or 3. This would enable us to
avoid calculating extraneous UNION ALL operations by constructing the view definition
dynamically. We have written a simulated version of such an optimization using a stored
procedure, and assess its performance in Section 5.2 as well.
5.1.3 Compiling Negation Predicates
In Section 4.1.3 we defined an extended semantics for negation predicates in TD and
showed that a negation predicate can be inferred if and only if there does not exist any
tuple in the database matching its specified pattern. SQL provides for subqueries to
accomplish this using the NOT EXISTS syntax. Our compiler translates negation predicates
into NOT EXISTS subqueries, which can then be included in the list of conditions for the
WHERE clause that were generated as described in Section 5.1.1.
The compiler assumes that the strong safety condition for negation predicates [74]
holds in every rule. That is, every variable that occurs in a negation predicate in a rule’s
body must also appear in a positive, non-built-in2 predicate in the body.
To demonstrate the compilation process, we will assume the existence of tables b and c
and use the example rule a(X) :- b(X,Y), empty{1,3}.c(Y,1). We will assume that table b
has attributes D and E, and table c has attributes F, G, and H. As before, the compiler
stores the bindings for variables X and Y. When the compiler examines the negation
predicate, it examines the list of attribute indexes {1,3}. From this list, it concludes that
the subquery will contain conditions on the first and third attributes of table c, namely, F
and H. The first value in the predicate’s tuple is the variable Y, which was previously
added to the list of variable bindings. From this list, the compiler finds that Y was bound
to attribute b.E; thus, the condition c.F = b.E is added to the subquery’s WHERE clause.
2While built-in predicates do impose positive conditions on variables, there are also generally infinitely
many values that satisfy the built-in predicate.
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The second value in the predicate’s tuple is the constant 1, so the compiler also adds the
condition c.H = 1 to the WHERE clause. Because we are only checking whether a variable
assignment satisfies the subquery, there is no need to generate a list of attributes to
return. The final generated subquery is NOT EXISTS(SELECT * FROM c WHERE c.F = b.E AND
c.H = 1), which is added to the WHERE clause of the query generated as described in
Section 5.1.1. The full generated query is:
SELECT b.D AS X FROM b
WHERE NOT EXISTS(SELECT * FROM c WHERE c.F = b.E and c.H = 1)
5.1.4 Compiling View-assert and View-retract Rules
Rules that define how users can modify the databases require a different compilation
strategy. While most of the translation process is the same, one major difference is that
the data to be inserted or deleted comes from the user, rather than from other data
already in the database. Ideally, to reduce confusion for users already familiar with SQL,
such predicates should be compiled to a view on which a user can execute SQL insert or
delete statements. However, using the same compilation approach as described in
Section 5.1.1 will not work because views consisting of a UNION of subqueries cannot be
updated. A more complicated process in which the rules translate into filters on the
underlying table, rather than into subqueries, could be developed, which we leave for
future work. Such a solution must also take the following factors into account, perhaps by
using a mechanism such as SQL BEFORE or INSTEAD OF triggers:
• Recursive views are not updatable. This can be addressed by using the unfolding
optimization described in Section 5.1.2, if it successfully removes all of the recursion.
• The proper permissions must be used when invoking the view predicate from within
the body of another rule. In other words, the insert or delete may need to be
executed under different users’ permissions. This can be addressed by executing the
query within a UDF that uses impersonation.
• There are useful scenarios in which a policy requires a user to update more than one
table simultaneously. While this can be addressed by defining an updatable view
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over the multiple tables, the compiler must still be able to distinguish the tables
that make up this view from the tables that are updated through side-effects and
should not be directly modifiable by the user.
• TD does not preclude the possibility that a view-assert or view-retract rule does not
even contain a predicate in the body that modifies the underlying table, or even that
it modifies anything at all.
We decided to use an approach that better reuses the code described in Section 5.1.1
by compiling the rule into a normal SQL view definition, and embedding this view
definition into a UDF with the user-provided data passed in as parameters. This follows
nearly the same compilation technique as with normal view predicates, with two
additional pre-processing steps. First, the compiler replaces any constants in the head of
the rule with a unique variable name, and adds an equality predicate to guarantee that
this variable is equal to the given constant. While this may seem to be an obvious
equivalence, the logical basis of TD allows us to establish it in a formal proof, which we
will present later as Theorem 11. Second, we pre-populate the variable list to bind the
variables in the head predicate to the corresponding parameters passed to the UDF.
This approach allows us to translate each rule into a subquery as before, with the
actual update to the underlying table occurring as though it were a side-effect to the
query. One problem that arises is that SQL Server’s query planner for evaluating UDFs
places conditions involving function parameters last, including after the evaluation of the
side-effects. Since the decision of whether or not to execute the rule may depend on the
values of the function parameters, the compiled view must make sure that the side-effects
do not happen until all other conditions are evaluated. To do this, rather than giving an
alias to the UNION of each translated subquery, our compiler stores the subquery into a
temporary table, which is then used to execute the side-effects.
On the first pass, the compiler treats view-assert or view-retract predicates the same
way as assert and retract predicates by generating parameters to pass to a UDF. Because
update operations do not require the database to return any data other than whether the
update was successful, these parameters form the entire schema of the temporary table,
67
which we give the name @temp table.3 On the second pass, the compiler outputs the UDF
name, parameters (including the name of the user whose permissions will be used), and
declares the @temp table variable along with a return value variable @success. It then
outputs the string INSERT INTO @temp table, followed by the subqueries generated for each
view as before, including generating the parameters to indicate whether the side-effect is
allowed. Each rule with the same predicate name in the head is compiled, connected with
UNION ALL. After all the rules have been compiled, the compiler assigns the return value by
outputting the string SELECT @success = 1 WHERE EXISTS (SELECT * FROM @temp table)
and generates the WHERE condition to execute the side effects as described in Section 5.1.1.
Additionally, the compiler generates another UDF that executes the previously-generated
UDF by passing in CURRENT USER as the user parameter, and allowing the user to set the
other parameters arbitrarily. This view must be defined with the WITH EXECUTE AS CALLER
clause so that CURRENT USER will be set properly.
Note that the same complication arises with view-assert and view-retract rules as with
any rule that might contain a side-effect: multiple occurrences in a single rule body could
require rolling back changes made by earlier predicates. We make the same assumption
that the body of any rule, including view-assert and view-retract rules, contains at most
one predicate that might cause a side-effect, and that the predicate occurs after all
read-only predicates but before any direct assertions or retractions.
We now prove that replacing constants in the head of a rule with an equality predicate
in the body of the rule gives the same results.
Theorem 11. Given a TD rule r of the form
h(
−→
T ) :- p1, ..., pm.
where
−→
T is the sequence of attributes T1, ..., Tn and one of the attributes Ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
is a constant c; then r is equivalent to the rule r′ (in terms of facts that can be inferred),
where r′ is
h(
−→
S ) :- p1, ..., pm, =(Vi, c).
3The @ symbol indicates that this is a local variable to the UDF.
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where Vi is a unique variable and
−→
S is the sequence S1, ..., Sn such that Si = Vi and for
all other j between 1 and n, j 6= i, Sj = Tj.
Proof. This can be proven by induction on the inference process if we remove r from a
transaction base P and replace it with r′, which we will call P′, and conversely if we
remove r′ from P′ and replace it with r, giving us P. However, a complete inductive proof
is tedious, so we will only include the inductive step of transforming P into P′; the other
portions are omitted but proven similarly.
Observe that inference rule 2 is the only inference rule that allows us to deduce facts
about h using r. Assume, then, that using inference rule 2 on r yields some fact
P : S ⊢ h(−→t ) where −→t = t1, ..., tn. Then there exists a variable substitution σ such
that σ(Tj) = tj for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n and that P : S ⊢ σ(p1), . . . , σ(pm). Inference rule 1 is
the only inference rule that allows us to deduce facts about sequences of literals, so this
must have been inferred from previously inferred facts
P : 〈S1,1, . . .S1,k1〉 ⊢ σ(p1), . . . , P : 〈Sm,1, . . .Sm,km〉 ⊢ σ(pm)
where the concatenation of the sequences of states form the sequence S. Without loss of
generality, we will assume that σ does not map any other variables besides those that
appear in r. Let σ′ be a variable mapping such that σ′(X) = σ(X) for all variables X that
appear in r, and σ′(Vi) = c. Thus our previously inferred facts still hold using σ
′, so by
the inductive hypothesis:
P′ : 〈S1,1, . . .S1,k1〉 ⊢ σ
′(p1), . . . , P
′ : 〈Sm,1, . . .Sm,km〉 ⊢ σ
′(pm)
We are given that Ti = c, so ti = c, and thus σ
′(Vi) = ti. Finally, because = is a built-in
predicate for equality, we have P′ : 〈Sm,km ,Sm,km〉 ⊢ = (c, c), and thus
P′ : 〈Sm,km ,Sm,km〉 ⊢ σ
′(= (Vi, c)), so by inference rule 1 we have
P′ : S ⊢ σ(p1), . . . , σ(pm), σ(= (Vi, c)) and by inference rule 2 on rule r
′ we have
P′ : S ⊢ σ(h(
−→
S )) which is the same fact deduced from r, P′ : S ⊢ h(−→t ). 2
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Table 5.4: Hand-coded baseline SQL views.
-- base policy
GRANT SELECT ON employees TO alice;
-- hr policy
GRANT SELECT ON employees TO {username(s)};
-- manager policy
CREATE VIEW region1 view AS
SELECT * FROM employees WHERE StoreID >= 100 AND StoreID < 200;
GRANT SELECT ON region1 view TO {username(s)};
CREATE VIEW region2 view AS
SELECT * FROM employees WHERE StoreID >= 200 AND StoreID < 300;
GRANT SELECT ON region2 view TO {username(s)};
-- similar views created for each region
-- insurance policy
CREATE VIEW insurance view AS
SELECT Name, Addr FROM employees WHERE Optin=’true’ AND
assert accesslog(CURRENT USER, Name, ’Name & Addr’, GETDATE())=1;
GRANT SELECT ON insurance view TO {username(s)};
5.2 Evaluation
We evaluated the performance of our reflective database access control system based on
three criteria: expressiveness and conciseness of policies, execution time for running
queries, and scalability of data size.
Policy Conciseness While we have already motivated the use of TD-based RDBAC
policies in Section 1, it is important to evaluate the ease of expressing RDBAC policies in
our system as compared to standard ACM-based SQL views. The most obvious point of
comparison is that TD-based views automatically inherit the ability to express side-effects
from TD syntax, whereas traditional SQL syntax does not allow for SQL-based views to
cause side-effects on the database, at least not without resorting to UDFs. On the other
hand, TD does not handle aggregation operators like summation and average.
Augmenting TD with aggregation semantics, which we leave for future work, would
facilitate the adoption of such a language in a practical database, since TD is otherwise a
very concise representation of access policies.
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Recall the TD policies from Table 5.1. For comparison, we have hand-coded separate
SQL views that enforce these policies, shown in Table 5.4. While these example view
definitions appear simple to understand, it is important to note that many more view
definitions are required. In our example, each region requires its own view, and it is not
difficult to imagine a scenario in which a large number of regions necessitates an unwieldy
number of views to manage. Additionally, the security policy is split between the view
definitions and the grant statements, rather than being self-contained policy statements
like the RDBAC version. Note also that if a particular user is given access to data from
this table through more than one policy, that user must query the table through more
than one view. By contrast, using TD to express the policies is expressed completely using
the rules from Table 5.1.
Execution time and scalability We evaluated the execution time of running queries
on views generated from the benchmark policies by our implementation, such as the view
from Table 5.3, to a baseline of running queries on custom-written views, such as those in
Table 5.4. To test these views, we used Microsoft’s SQL Server 2005 database
management system, running on a 2.4 GHz Intel Core2 machine with Windows Vista
Business 64-bit Edition. The base tables all have appropriately-defined indexes on the
user names, in order to minimize the cost of performing joins.
Each test was performed using an external application written in C# and compiled by
Microsoft’s Visual C# 2008 compiler version 3.5. The application was run locally so as
not to include network latency. For each user, the application constructed a query for the
entire table and iterated through each row of the table. The query was repeated until the
query time reached a stable state, after which we gathered multiple execution times, of
which we report the average query time. Thus, our results represent the time for “hot”
queries, or queries which have been loaded and executed recently.
We tested two versions of our prototype code: one which directly translates the
policies into a recursive view, and another which performs the unfolding optimization
defined in Section 5.1.2. We also tested a simulated version of the partial-evaluation
optimization, also described in Section 5.1.2, using a stored procedure. To assess the
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Figure 5.1: Execution time results for employee policies, logarithmic scale, fixed database
size (100,000 empl.)
Figure 5.2: Execution time results for employee policies, logarithmic scale, fixed query type
(HR query)
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Table 5.5: Execution time results (in msec) for employees and client1 policies
Query Baseline Recursive Optimized Target
HR
(1000) 0.604 2,950 1.15 0.859
(10,000) 5.79 231,000 10.8 6.47
(100,000) 56.8 28,200,000 107 62.4
Manager
(1000) 1.01 2,940 1.38 1.26
(10,000) 5.01 231,000 8.19 5.56
(100,000) 49.5 28,200,000 81.3 53.3
Insurance
(1000) 2,190 553 5,260 2,230 2,190
(10,000) 21,700 1,570 257,000 21,800 21,700
(100,000) 214,000 15,600 29,000,000 216,000 216,000
Chinese Wall
(1000) 9.17 2.17 17,200 23.2 6.90
(10,000) 24.6 6.71 261,000 38.7 14.7
(100,000) 142 105 10,200,000 289 129
scalability of the generated views, the experiment was repeated on databases with 1000
users, 10,000 users, and 100,000 users, each with a record in the employees table. The size
of the hr, manager, and insurance tables also increase proportionally in each experiment,
with 100 entries each, 1000 entries each, and 10,000 entries each, respectively. The results,
rounded to 3 significant digits, are shown in Table 5.5, in which the column labeled
“Baseline” is the result of querying the hand-coded views from Table 5.4. In the queries
that contain side-effects, two baseline times were calculated: one in which the view calls a
UDF that executes the side-effect, and another in which the side-effect is not enforced by
the view at all, but rather by the querying application. This allows us to measure the cost
of using UDFs, apart from the cost of using a compiled view. The column labeled
“Recursive” is the result of querying the compiled view from Table 5.3, “Optimized” is the
result of querying the compiled view using our predicate unfolding optimization, and
“Target” is the result of executing the stored procedure that uses partial evaluation with
dynamic view construction. Figure 5.1 shows these results graphically for the database
with 100,000 users, and Figure 5.2 shows the results of querying each view as an HR user
as the database size increases from 1000 to 100,000. Queries from the other users scaled
similarly, so those results are not shown. Because Baseline 2 is no different than Baseline
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Figure 5.3: Execution time results for employee policies, normal scale, fixed query type (HR
query) and database size (100,000 empl.)
1 for the HR query, we omitted the data for Baseline 2 in Figure 5.2 for clarity. Notice
that on both charts we use a logarithmic scale for the execution time; in Figure 5.1 this
helps demonstrate the successive improvements each optimization makes, and in
Figure 5.2, this shows the scalability of executing the views as the size of the database
increases exponentially. Figure 5.3 compares the results of the HR query at the largest
database size, using a normal scale.
The queries with side-effects show the cost of using the workaround in SQL Server
which opens a separate connection to execute the update. Our results show that this does
indeed noticeably affect all three views that use the workaround. Databases that could
handle allowing side-effects in selection queries would not experience this effect as
dramatically.
For the Chinese Wall query, which uses the workaround twice on each row, the
recursive view behaves as expected. However, neither the optimized view nor the first
baseline, both of which also use the workaround, show much effect from its use. After
tracing the execution of the query, we discovered the cause of this unexpected result. SQL
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Server recognized that the same parameters are being passed to the UDF, and rather than
re-executing the function on each row, it cached the return value after executing on the
first row and used the cached value on each subsequent row. Effectively, the side-effects
are being executed once per query rather than once per row. While this still correctly
enforces the Chinese Wall policy (access to the other table is prohibited, whether the user
queries one row or all of the rows), the execution order is not semantically equivalent to
the recursive query.
Increasing the database size shows that while the recursive view does not scale very
well, the optimized view and the stored procedure handle larger data sizes much better,
remaining at roughly the same proportion to the performance of the baseline views for all
our tests. The workaround for executing side-effects drastically affects queries for small
data sizes, so seeing the same effect on queries for large data sizes is no surprise. This
should be a major focus for improvement in the future.
The unfolding optimization from Section 5.1.2 is clearly beneficial, since it removes the
recursion from the rules, eliminating the need for executing a fixed-point algorithm to
evaluate queries. The additional optimization using partial evaluation further improves
the performance to nearly as fast as the baseline.
In cases where fewer policies protect a table, the performance of the compiled view is
even better. Recall the policy for the store data table from Table 5.1. This policy poses
additional administration difficulties when using traditional ACM-based approaches,
which are automatically solved by an RDBAC-based approach. Because a single owner
may need access to multiple parts of the table, and there is no simple, single encapsulation
of the conditions describing all of these parts, a traditional ACM-based view requires more
complicated conditions than those described in the baseline for the employees table. These
more complicated conditions therefore become more difficult to keep updated when the
data or the permissions on the data change.
We describe four baselines for querying this table using traditional ACM-based views,
each of which requires a somewhat different configuration by the database administrator.
One approach, which we will call “Union Baseline,” is where the administrator creates a
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Table 5.6: Execution time results (in msec) for store data policy
Table Size Union App-Level Disjunction Join Optimized
1000 0.146 0.279 0.145 0.156 0.179
10,000 0.443 0.839 0.348 0.365 0.423
100,000 3.31 7.30 2.03 2.25 2.95
1,000,000 40.8 74.5 20.9 21.5 28.1
separate view for each franchise, and the owner executes a UNION ALL over each view. A
similar approach, “App-Level Baseline,” queries each view individually but aggregates the
data at the application level, rather than at the database level. These two approaches
minimize the work needed when a store location is sold to a different owner, requiring only
one REVOKE and one GRANT statement and no view redefinitions; however, the processing
times for queries using these baselines are considerably more costly, as demonstrated by
the results. Another approach, “Disjunction Baseline,” requires the administrator to
create a customized view for each owner that includes data from each store he owns,
implemented as a disjunction of the Store ID’s in the WHERE clause of the view. This
approach makes the store owners’ jobs much easier, since it does not require them to
query multiple views, and also executes faster than the other two baselines. However, it
also requires more upkeep by the administrator, who must redefine two views each time a
location changes hands. A fourth approach, “Join Baseline,” joins the data from the owner
table, but is otherwise similar to the Disjunction Baseline in creating a customized view
for each owner. This requires less upkeep from the Disjunction Baseline when owners are
changed, but still requires new views to be defined when new owners are added. Note that
this is nearly the same approach as described in the TD rule, except that the Join
Baseline does not use a single all-purpose view that depends on the user’s identity.
Table 5.6 shows the results of running the optimized compiled view for the store data
table compared with the results of using each of the four baselines. Figure 5.4 shows a
graph of these results, again using a logarithmic scale. Figure 5.5 shows the same results
for the largest database size, using a normal scale. The reflective view generated by our
compiler offers performance comparable to the fastest of these baselines, and requires less
maintenance than any of the baselines when the data changes. Only a single view is
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Figure 5.4: Execution time results for store data policy using logarithmic scale
Figure 5.5: Execution time results for store data policy using normal scale, fixed database
size (1,000,000 stores)
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created, and if a store location changes owners, this information simply needs to be
updated in the owner table, which must still be maintained even when using the other
baselines anyway.
5.3 Comparison with VPD and XACML
As described in Section 3.3, Oracle’s VPD technology and XACML are currently capable
of expressing and enforcing RDBAC policies. Either of these could be used as a target
language for our compiler, rather than SQL. In this section we compare these three
languages, both in the ability to express our benchmark policies in Table 5.1 and in the
efficiency of evaluating the policies. This comparison also allows us to analyze what
performance costs would be considered acceptable in industry by using well-established,
mature software packages that provide similar functionality.
Table 5.7 contains a hand-coded example of how the benchmark policies could be
compiled into a VPD function. There are two important differences in how VPD and TD
rewrite queries that complicate the translation process. First, TD is capable of replacing
one entire query with another, whereas VPD can only change the original query by
possibly adding a filter condition. In a deployed compiler that translates TD rules to VPD
functions, this difference would facilitate the optimization described in Section 5.1.2 in
which portions of the policy are pre-computed to determine which rules apply to a user,
since the filter conditions are constructed dynamically. However, it also prevents us from
fully implementing the insurance policy from Table 5.1, in which the StoreID, Salary, and
Optin values are replaced by NULL values. VPD allows policy definers to specify that a
policy applies only when certain columns are included in a query, so this policy rule could
be fully implemented by writing a separate function that is invoked when none of these
values are accessed. The second difference is that row-by-row operations on the database
cannot be performed in the function without executing a separate subquery on the base
table. This requires us to execute side-effects for each accessed row through a user-defined
function, as we did for the compilation algorithm described in Section 5.1. For simplicity,
we will assume that the function in Table 5.7 is sufficient.
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Table 5.7: VPD Encoding of Benchmark Policies
create or replace function vpd employees filter
(p schema varchar2, p obj varchar2)
return varchar2 as
username varchar2(32767) := SYS CONTEXT(’userenv’, ’POLICY INVOKER’);
condition varchar2(32767);
begin
condition := ’0=1’; -- default is no access
-- base policy
if (username = ’ALICE’) then
condition := condition || ’ OR 0=0’; -- full access
end if;
-- hr policy
for x in (select * from vpd hr h where h.name = username)
loop
condition := condition || ’ OR 0=0’; -- full access
end loop;
-- manager policy
for mgr in (select m.Region as region from vpd manager m
where m.name = username)
loop
condition := condition || ’ OR (StoreID >= ’ || (mgr.region*100) ||
’ AND StoreID < ’ || ((mgr.region+1)*100) || ’)’;
end loop;
-- insurance policy
for x in (select * from vpd insurance i where i.name = username)
loop
condition := condition || ’ OR (Optin=’’true’’ AND’ ||
’leolson1.assert accesslog0(1, ’’’ || username || ’’’, Name)!=0)’;
end loop;
return condition;
end;
For our comparison with XACML, we used an approach similar to the Ladon
project [78] in which resources are defined to be full tables, and if access is permitted, the
responses contain obligations that specify how to rewrite the user’s query. Unlike the
Ladon project, which defines a set of XML elements to specify how the rewriting should
occur, we took an approach similar to VPD and simply returned an SQL substring that
can be inserted into a WHERE clause in the obligation. We called the identifier for this
obligation “rewrite-query.” For easier human-readability, the substring “#USER#” occurs
in this return value to represent the logged-in user and require the policy enforcement
point to replace the substring with the user’s login name. This could equivalently be
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accomplished at the policy decision point by using the standard XACML
“string-concatenate” operation and accessing the user’s name in the request document.
In order to return different substrings based on the user’s attributes stored in the
database, we defined a custom operation on attributes, which we called
“principal-in-table.” This operation takes two parameters, a user name and a table
name, and causes the policy decision point to open a connection to the database and
query whether the user’s name is present in the table. A more robust mechanism that
executes a wider range of queries could be defined, at the expense of more complicated
programming and error-checking; for the purposes of our comparison, we will use the more
straightforward principal-in-table operation as defined.
Because the policy returns a condition string in the same manner as VPD functions,
this architecture suffers from the same drawbacks as VPD: it cannot change the columns
retrieved, and it cannot enforce row-by-row side-effects without an external auxiliary
function invoked by the query. More complex custom operations could be defined to
handle such functionality, but as with the VPD translation from Table 5.7, we will avoid
such added complexity for our comparison. Table 5.8 contains a hand-coded example of
how the benchmark policies could be compiled into an XACML policy document.
Table 5.8: XACML Encoding of Benchmark Policies
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE PolicySet [
<!ENTITY xacml "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:">
<!ENTITY string "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
<!ENTITY seclab "http://seclab.uiuc.edu/">
]>
<PolicySet PolicySetId="&seclab;employees-table-read-access"
PolicyCombiningAlgId="&xacml;policy-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides">
<Target>
<Resources>
<Resource>
<ResourceMatch MatchId="&xacml;function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="&string;">employees</AttributeValue>
<ResourceAttributeDesignator
AttributeId="&xacml;resource:resource-id" DataType="&string;"/>
</ResourceMatch>
</Resource>
</Resources>
Continued on next page. . .
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Table 5.8 – Continued
<Actions>
<Action>
<ActionMatch MatchId="&xacml;function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="&string;">read</AttributeValue>
<ActionAttributeDesignator
AttributeId="&xacml;action:action-id" DataType="&string;"/>
</ActionMatch>
</Action>
</Actions>
</Target>
<Policy PolicyId="&seclab;full-access"
RuleCombiningAlgId="&xacml;rule-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides">
<Target/>
<!-- base policy -->
<Rule RuleId="&seclab;alice" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<Subject>
<SubjectMatch MatchId="&xacml;function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="&string;">ALICE</AttributeValue>
<SubjectAttributeDesignator
AttributeId="&xacml;subject:user-id" DataType="&string;"/>
</SubjectMatch>
</Subject>
</Subjects>
</Target>
</Rule>
<!-- hr policy -->
<Rule RuleId="&seclab;hr" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<Subject>
<SubjectMatch MatchId="&seclab;principal-in-table">
<AttributeValue DataType="&string;">hr</AttributeValue>
<SubjectAttributeDesignator
AttributeId="&xacml;subject:user-id" DataType="&string;"/>
</SubjectMatch>
</Subject>
</Subjects>
</Target>
</Rule>
</Policy>
<Policy PolicyId="&seclab;filter-on-StoreID"
RuleCombiningAlgId="&xacml;rule-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides">
<Target/>
<!-- manager policy -->
Continued on next page. . .
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Table 5.8 – Continued
<Rule RuleId="&seclab;manager" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<Subject>
<SubjectMatch MatchId="&seclab;principal-in-table">
<AttributeValue DataType="&string;">manager</AttributeValue>
<SubjectAttributeDesignator
AttributeId="&xacml;subject:user-id" DataType="&string;"/>
</SubjectMatch>
</Subject>
</Subjects>
</Target>
</Rule>
<Obligations>
<Obligation ObligationId="&seclab;rewrite-query" FulfillOn="Permit">
<AttributeAssignment
AttributeId="&seclab;condition" DataType="&string;">
exists (select * from manager m where m.name=’#USER#’
and (m.region*100) &lt;= StoreID
and ((m.region+1)*100) &gt; StoreID)
</AttributeAssignment>
</Obligation>
</Obligations>
</Policy>
<Policy PolicyId="&seclab;filter-on-optin"
RuleCombiningAlgId="&xacml;rule-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides">
<Target/>
<!-- insurance policy -->
<Rule RuleId="&seclab;insurance" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<Subject>
<SubjectMatch MatchId="&seclab;principal-in-table">
<AttributeValue DataType="&string;">insurance</AttributeValue>
<SubjectAttributeDesignator
AttributeId="&xacml;subject:user-id" DataType="&string;"/>
</SubjectMatch>
</Subject>
</Subjects>
</Target>
</Rule>
<Obligations>
<Obligation ObligationId="&seclab;rewrite-query" FulfillOn="Permit">
<AttributeAssignment
AttributeId="&seclab;condition" DataType="&string;">
optin = ’true’ AND assert accesslog0(1, ’#USER#’, Name)!=0
</AttributeAssignment>
Continued on next page. . .
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Table 5.8 – Continued
</Obligation>
</Obligations>
</Policy>
</PolicySet>
For comparison of the performace of policy evaluation using these technologies, we
used the same machine as described in Section 5.2. Instead of Microsoft SQL Server, we
used the Oracle Database 10g Enterprise Edition, version 10.2.0.3.0; and instead of using
C# (due to problems with the database interface package) we used Sun’s Java compiler
version 1.6.0 06. For the XACML policy, we adapted the Sun XACML
Implementation [79] to interface with tables in the same Oracle database system, but did
not use VPD functions to protect the tables.
The results of evaluating the policies from Tables 5.7 and 5.8 are shown in Table 5.9,
rounded to three significant digits. These results should not be interpreted as a
comparison with the results from Table 5.5, which use a different database management
system. Aside from using different programming languages to access the two systems, no
effort was made to calibrate the databases in terms of memory usage, locking mechanisms,
etc. since comparing database systems is not the focus of this thesis. Because the VPD
and XACML policies are both capable of creating the rewritten query dynamically, we
compared them with both the “Optimized” (which uses the predicate unfolding
optimization but not the partial evaluation) and the “Target” (the hand-coded simulation
of both optimizations) versions of our compilation process. We performed two versions of
the code to evaluate XACML policies: for the first, we built a single XACML request and
resent it for each trial; for the second, labeled “XACML with req,” we built a new
XACML request for each trial.
Graphs of the results from Table 5.9 for the database sizes of 1000 employees and
100,000 employees are shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7, respectively. Only the results for
users that satisfy the hr and manager policies are shown in these graphs since evaluating
the insurance policy is much more slow than these two policies, and does not exhibit much
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Figure 5.6: Execution time results for VPD and XACML, 1,000 empl.
Figure 5.7: Execution time results for VPD and XACML, 100,000 empl.
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Table 5.9: Execution time results (in msec) for VPD and XACML
Query Optimized Target VPD XACML XACML with req
HR
(1000) 10.0 12.2 12.4 10.6 12.1
(10,000) 89.4 88.1 88.2 85.7 88.0
(100,000) 874 831 836 832 834
Manager
(1000) 4.31 6.26 6.92 5.23 6.80
(10,000) 27.7 27.1 27.8 28.4 29.8
(100,000) 259 231 237 252 254
Insurance
(1000) 187 192 192 193 193
(10,000) 3,940 3,930 3,990 3,940 3,960
(100,000) 41,000 40,800 40,900 41,100 41,500
difference among the various alternatives since most of the time is spent executing the
side-effects, and all three methods use the same user-defined function to execute them.
The results show that all three alternatives give nearly identical performance for both
queries and at all database sizes. The “Target” stored procedure consistently outperforms
both the VPD function and the XACML interpreter since it doesn’t require the overhead
of invoking the policy function or parsing the XML, respectively. The “Optimized” views
are slightly better at smaller database sizes, since the UNION operator is less costly for
smaller tables.
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Chapter 6
Case Studies
We developed two case studies to demonstrate the usability of RDBAC. The first
describes a medical database for a hospital/clinic system. This database configuration is
an in-depth case study that is more complete than any other in this domain that we are
aware of. It is designed to balance current practice in medical access control with new
ideas for experimental access patterns, such as allowing access by patients as well as by
medical staff. While such access patterns are not generally implemented in current
medical databases, we envision such a system facilitating patient access to data and input
on disclosure of data, perhaps through web interfaces. It also contains policies for business
data, such as hiring, payroll, and patient billing, demonstrating that such widely-differing
needs can still be served with a single database system. Our case study database is not
based on any particular medical database system, but it is generic and represents the
general type and scale that might be seen in such a system. RDBAC offers an ideal
framework for defining policies for such a large and complicated system, since it allows
policies to express general rules for granting access without the need to specify individual
users, even though each user requires a unique view of the database.
The second case study is a school building automation system (BAS) modeled as a
database, which interfaces disparate resources such as electronic door locks, internet
routers, and the school’s user identity data. This is an unorthodox case study for database
security; however, it demonstrates the potential usefulness of RDBAC in other areas of
access control, using a wide range of expressive policies.
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6.1 Medical Database
Adoption of Electronic Health Records (EHR) has led to much study regarding both how
to represent medical data and how to protect it. While there are still many systems that
do not use EHRs, it is likely that they will become more pervasive due to the recent
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which includes incentives for medical facilities
that serve Medicare patients to adopt EHR systems [86]. Electronic representations of
medical data have opened the door to other advances, including the use of mobile devices
in home care [41, 92] and telemedicine [3], which can range from robotic surgery [58] to
using a video conferencing software such as Skype and a USB stethoscope to listen to a
patient’s heart and lungs over the Internet [39].
Legislation such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
addresses concerns over the security of maintaining EHRs by requiring facilities that
maintain EHRs to protect the privacy of the subjects of the records [85]. Specifically, they
are to “develop and implement policies and procedures that restrict access and uses of
protected health information based on the specific roles of the members of their
workforce.” [87] While it is tempting to write simple policies that only allow a patient’s
data to be accessible by his primary care physician, in practice there are frequent cases in
which emergency access must be granted, such as when the primary care physician is out
of town and unreachable.
Reflective access control policies offer a unique solution to resolve the conflicting goals
of privacy and ease of access in emergencies. Regular-use policies could allow restricted
access to a patient’s records only to primary-care physicians or to other professionals who
have been specifically invited to consult the patient’s case. Emergency-use, or
“break-the-glass,” policies allow broadened access to a patient’s records, and these
accesses can be audited for later review. This audit record could be used to comply with
legislative requirements to notify the patient of any abuse of privacy and to take
disciplinary action against the offender, if necessary. Etalle and Winsborough argue that
in cases where exceptions to preventative access control are commonly needed, the
knowledge that actions are audited and the threat of punitive action when misuse occurs
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are generally sufficient deterrent for preventing abuses [31]. While audit records are not a
new idea, RDBAC provides a novel method of expressing how these audit records are to
be kept, specifies which queries should be audited and under which conditions, and allows
formal guarantees that keeping audit records does not cause any security violations.
RDBAC also provides a consistent mechanism for enforcing policies. Medical data may
be accessed through many different applications, such as retrieving a certain patient’s
medical history, listing all currently-admitted patients on a given floor, or creating a
billing statement for a patient. As previously mentioned, our scenario also allows patients
themselves to access their own information. Because the database itself enforces the access
control policies, RDBAC allows each of these applications to be written separately
without the need for duplicating policy logic in each application.
We first give a high-level overview of the table schemas in our proposed database. The
formal definitions of the relevant table schemas can be found in Appendix A.1. We next
describe the policies protecting the data, for which the TD encodings can be found in
Appendix A.2. We also demonstrate an example of formal security analysis using this
policy configuration by automatically verifying that unauthorized users cannot gain access
to patient data. Finally, we conclude the section with a discussion of the advantages of
using RDBAC for this case study.
6.1.1 Schema Overview
Data describing attributes of the system users are stored in several tables, including a
general person table that contains information relevant to all users of the system, such as
name and contact information. Users may be considered as patients or employees,
possibly both. This is indicated by listing the user’s identifier from the person table in the
patient or the employee table, respectively. Data stored in the patient table includes the
identifier of the patient’s primary care physician and the patient’s insurance data. Other
patient data will be described later. Employee data includes salary and tax information
and office location. Some employees may additionally be managers, such as shift
supervisors. We must also account for the facts that employees sometimes leave and must
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have their access privileges revoked, and that their records may need to be maintained for
archival purposes—for example, a new doctor may need to check a patient’s history and
find out who ordered a particular treatment, even if it was ordered by an employee that is
no longer active. To address this, the employee table contains a Boolean value indicating
whether the employee is currently active and should be given system access. Employees
may be secretaries, human resource directors (HR), accountants, nurses, lab technicians,
pharmacists, or doctors, indicated by creating tables for each employee type and listing
the user’s identifier in the appropriate table. Employee payroll information, including the
date and amount of each paycheck and the tax withholding amounts, are stored in another
table.
General medical information, including instructions for drugs, information for adverse
drug interactions, and codes for symptoms and diagnoses is stored in the database.
Other tables containing patient data include visits, current medications, measurements
taken, treatments administered, prescriptions written, lab tests administered, and teams
of medical professionals who assist during the patient’s visit. These tables for patient data
contain the following:
• A record for a patient’s visit includes the identifier of the treating physician (which
may not be the same as the primary care physician), the date admitted, the
symptom for which the patient is requesting treatment, and the diagnosis reached.1
Some visits may be hospital admittances which require overnight stays, for which we
also store a room number and the date when the patient is discharged.
• The table of current medications contains identifiers for the drugs that the patient is
currently taking.
• The table of measurements lists the identifier of the employee taking the
measurement, the type of measurement, and the result.
• The table of treatments lists the identifier of the employee administering the
treatment and either the identifier of the drug administered or the name of the
1Multiple symptoms and diagnoses could be stored as set-valued attributes, if supported by the database
system, or stored in a separate table. For simplicity, we treat them as single-valued attributes.
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procedure administered. A treatment record may also represent a past immunization
that was imported from an external health record, in which case the record also
contains information concerning where and by whom the treatment was given.
• The table of prescriptions lists the identifier of the doctor who wrote the
prescription and the date it was written, the identifier of the pharmacist who filled
the prescription and the date it was filled, the identifier of the drug prescribed, the
quantity, and the number of refills.
• The table of lab results lists the identifier of the technician who performed the lab
test, the type of test, and the result of the test.
• The table of medical team consultants lists the identifiers of employees who are
consulting on a patient’s visit.
For each table containing patient data, doctors may opt not to release certain information
to patients, which can be indicated with a Boolean value called ReleaseToPatient. Each of
the tables containing patient data may be accessed in an emergency. In such cases, the
database also maintains tables to audit such accesses.
Finally, the database also contains tables for tracking billing and payment information.
This includes invoice items for visit fees and for treatments administered. Multiple
payments for each invoice may be recorded.
6.1.2 Policies
The following policies apply to general user data:
• Users may view their own data in the person, patient, or employee tables.
• Users registered as employees, whether active employees or previous employees, may
view any person’s name data.
• Users may view their own contact information data.
• Current employees who are registered as managers may view contact data for the
employees they manage.
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• Current employees may view e-mail data and office phone contact data for other
current employees.
• Medical staff with a working relationship with a patient may view contact data for
that patient. A user has a “working relationship” with a patient if any of the
following are true:
– The user is the patient’s primary care physician.
– The user has admitted the patient for a visit of any kind.
– The user has consulted with the patient as part of an assigned medical team.
• Current doctors and pharmacists may view contact data for patients for whom they
have written or filled prescriptions.
• Current secretaries may view any user’s contact data.
• Current accountants may view any user’s address data.
• Users may update their own contact data.
• Current secretaries may update any patient’s contact data.
Many of the policies already listed motivate the need for RDBAC enforcement. For
instance, many of the users in the database are patients, not employees. The first policy
requires that patients be able to view their own data, and no other policy allows them to
view anyone else’s data. This means that each patient will require his own view of each of
the tables. If we were to enforce this policy using traditional ACM-based access control by
creating an explicit view definition for each of these views, one per patient per table, the
number of view definitions would be too difficult to manage. By contrast, if we use
RDBAC, we can use the data in the database table itself to enforce the policy: if the
person record matches the user executing the query, it is returned.
Similarly, using RDBAC to implement the policies defining which employees have
access to a patient’s record (i.e. the “working relationship” definition) takes advantage of
data already in the database, such as a patient’s visit records or the data listing medical
91
teams that consult with a patient. RDBAC gives the added advantage that the policy
automatically updates itself when new data is added. When a doctor is brought in to
consult with a patient, for example, as soon as the doctor is added to the medical team,
she automatically gains access to the patient’s records.
The following policies apply to employee-specific data:
• Current employees may view the offices, managers, and active status of other
employees.
• Current accountants may view all employee data.
• Current HR directors may add or delete employees. The new employee’s manager
must be set to an existing employee. “Deleting” an employee should not actually
remove the record from the database, but rather set their current status as inactive
for archival purposes.
• Accesses to data specific to the employee type (secretary, HR director, etc.) follow
the same policies as the employee table.
• Employees may view their own payroll data.
• Current accountants may view all payroll data.
• Current accountants may insert new payroll data for any employee except
themselves, providing a rudimentary separation of duty policy.2 The tax information
must follow particular formulas: in our case we will require the state tax withheld to
be 10% of the salary minus $500 for each exemption, and the federal tax withheld to
be 20% of the salary minus $1000 for each exemption. The payroll must not be
applied retroactively; that is, it must occur at some point in the future.
The following policies apply to patient-specific data:
• Current doctors, nurses, secretaries, and accountants may view the primary care
provider and insurance data for any patient.
2A more complex separation of duty policy, such as assigning each employee to an accountant, who is
the only user allowed to add payroll data for that employee, could be implemented similarly to the policy
that assigns each patient to a primary care physician.
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• Users may update their own insurance data, and current accountants may update
anyone’s insurance data.
• Current doctors and secretaries may update anyone’s insurance data and add new
patients. The new patient’s primary care physician must be an existing doctor in
the database.
• Patients may view their own data, if it has been released for viewing.
• Users with a working relationship with a patient, as previously defined, may view,
update, or add to that patient’s data. When a patient is admitted for a new visit,
the treating physician must be a current doctor.
• Any current employee may gain emergency access to a patient’s data, but the access
must be logged for later review. This rule could easily be adapted to allow such
access only to certain users, such as doctors and nurses.
• Any current employee may enter new data for a patient’s measurements or
treatments administered, but the employee’s identifier must be recorded with the
measurement or treatment.
• Current lab technicians may enter new data for a patient’s lab test results.
• Current doctors may write a prescription for any patient.
• Current pharmacists may fill existing prescriptions.
• Current secretaries, admitting physicians, and shift supervisors (managers) may
change members of a medical team.
• All users can access symptom code data, diagnosis code data, and general drug data.
The following policies apply to invoice data:
• Patients may view their own invoice and payment data.
• Current accountants may view all invoice and payment data.
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• Current accountants may add new invoice and payment data except on invoices sent
to themselves.
6.1.3 Formal Security Analysis
There are many security properties that would be desirable for the policy configuration for
a medical database case study. We will demonstrate the process of proving one such
property: no non-employee users can ever view any patient records in the labResult table
besides their own. We ran the verification process using SWI-Prolog version 5.6.64 using
the same Windows Vista platform as described in Section 5.2.
If we assume no users are trusted, it is easy to show that the policy configuration is
not safe: given two patients p1 and p2 and an untrusted employee e such that e is a
secretary,3 the employee e can execute Policy 22 to insert p2 as an active employee, and
then execute Policy 101 as view.ins.medicalTeam(e, VisitID, p2, 0) where VisitID is
the identifier for one of patient p1’s visits. Now hasAccess(p2, p2) is true by Policy 3, and
patient p2 can access the labResult table entries for p1 using Policy 69. Thus, we will
hereafter assume that all employee users are trusted users.
Unfortunately, the policy rules do not all satisfy the conditions of Theorems 9 and 10
from Section 4.3.4 that define decidable algorithms for security analysis. Several of them
contain negations or retractions, or are not safely rewritable. The audit policies (namely,
Policies 66, 70, 74, 81, 89, 94) and those policies that call the audit policies (namely,
Policies 77 and 96) have only one unbound variable that prevents safe rewritability: Note.
For instance, rewriting Policy 70 gives the following rules, the second of which is unsafe
due to the unbound Note variable in the head of the rule:
• view emergency labResult(User, ID, Date, Type, Value, PatientID, TechID,
ReleaseToPatient, Note) :-
labResult(ID, Date, Type, Value, PatientID, TechID, ReleaseToPatient),
person(UserID, User, ), employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1).
• labResultEmergencyAccessLog(ID, UserID, now, Note) :-
3There are other types of employees that can cause leaks: HR employees, for instance, can “hire” them-
selves as secretaries with Policy 29 and then follow the same method.
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labResult(ID, Date, Type, Value, PatientID, TechID, ReleaseToPatient),
person(UserID, User, ), employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1).
We can mitigate this by leaving the variable unbound in the rewritten rule, and assuming
that any value can be assigned to it. This accurately models the values that might be
possible, since there are no constraints over what may appear in this field of the database.
While this technically causes an infinite domain, preventing an actual computation of the
classical Datalog model, in practice we can still guarantee a finite domain as far as our
security analysis is concerned because we do not need to enumerate every possible value
for Note to determine the users that can access the labResult table. Indeed, Prolog can
already logically interpret rules with unbound variables in the head predicate.
It is tempting to treat the rules that allow untrusted users to insert data similarly,
namely, Policies 15 and 54. Policy 15 can indeed be rewritten to allow unbound variables
in the head of the rule. Policy 54, however, requires special consideration. Rewriting this
rule gives the following rules:
• view.ins.patient(User, ID, PCPhys, Provider, Policy) :-
patient(ID, PCPhys, , ),
person(ID, User, ).
• patient(ID, PCPhys, Provider, Policy) :-
patient(ID, PCPhys, , ),
person(ID, User, ).
Because the head of the second rule contains the unbound variables Provider and Policy,
this causes Prolog to infer an infinite number of patient predicates for each patient. This
directly affects its ability to evaluate any query on the hasAccess view, since Policy 1
contains patient in its body and therefore similarly causes Prolog to infer an infinite
number of hasAccess predicates. This in turn prevents the evaluation of the
view.labResults view. For the purposes of verifying the security property we need, we
may safely omit this rule because the only other rules in our policy configuration that
depend on the Provider and Policy attributes are the rules for the view.patient view.
Since the other rules can be evaluated without reading these values from the patient
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table, omitting Policy 54 from our analysis does not affect their evaluation. Policy 55 may
similarly be omitted. As future work, a more sophisticated analysis algorithm might
annotate each attribute singly, depending on whether the domain of the attribute is
infinite, without explicitly listing each valid literal.
For now, we will omit the other rules containing assertions, retractions, and negations
for our automatic analysis, and then manually prove that the omitted rules do not change
the result.
We generated sample databases with various numbers of patients, ranging from 1,000
to 100,000 patients, each with 10 records in the labResult table. For one set of sample
databases, we also varied the number of employees to 1/25 the number of patients
(equally divided among the different types of employees), and for another set we kept a
constant number of 50 employees. These databases along with the rewritten rules were
analyzed to verify that for every row in the labResult table, only the patient on whom the
lab test was performed and the trusted users can ever gain access to the data. This was
accomplished by executing the following commands:
view.labResult(User, , , , , PtntID, , ),
\+trustedUser(User),
\+person(PtntID, User, ).
view.emergency labResult(User, , , , , PtntID, , , ),
\+trustedUser(User),
\+person(PtntID, User, ).
where \+ is Prolog’s negation operator and the predicate trustedUser is populated
with the initial set of employees. No results are returned for either command, indicating
that the defined safety condition on the labResult table does indeed hold. Table 6.1 shows
the time required to perform the analysis, where the database size represents the number
of records in the labResult table (10 times the number of patients), each running time
shows the time to perform the automated analysis (measured in seconds and rounded to
three significant digits), “Running Time A” represents the databases in which the number
of employees is proportional to the number of patients, and “Running Time B” uses the
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Table 6.1: Execution time results (in sec) for verifying security of labResult table
Database size Running Time A Running Time B
10,000 1.13 1.57
20,000 4.19 3.10
40,000 16.5 6.31
80,000 65.3 12.9
100,000 105 15.7
200,000 416 32.3
400,000 1,630 67.0
800,000 7,140 145
1,000,000 12,200 190
2,000,000 55,200 448
constant number of employees. Figure 6.1 shows these results graphically, using a
logarithmic scale.
Running Time A follows a quadratic running time. This is because each employee is
allowed to view each patient’s records, at least through the emergency access rule. Thus,
when the number of patients doubles and the number of employees doubles, the number of
ways to satisfy the view.emergency labResult predicate quadruples. Running Time B,
which keeps the number of employees constant, thus follows a linear running time.
We now address analysis of the rules we previously omitted. One of these rules,
Policy 16, may still be executed by untrusted users, but it simply allows users to remove
records that had been added by its corresponding insertion policy, Policy 15. Because our
automated verification process has already found the policy configuration to be secure for
the maximal database, even when the variables in the corresponding insertion policies are
unbound, any sequence of policy invocations that use the deletion policies will still
constitute a subset of the maximal database, and thus the security guarantee will still
hold.
All the other omitted policies can only be executed by trusted users. This can be
verified on most of the rules simply by noting that one of the conditions in each rule’s
body constrains the querying user to be an active employee. The other rules constrain the
querying user to satisfy the hasAccess predicate with the patient, which is defined by
Policies 1, 2, and 3, and all three of these policies require the user to be an active
employee.
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Figure 6.1: Execution time results from Table 6.1
We must also ensure that untrusted users cannot execute operations that would cause
any of these policies to execute on behalf of a trusted user. This can be verified by
building a transitive closure: starting with the names of the head predicates for the
omitted policies, add the names of the head predicate of any rule that contains in its body
one of the predicate names in the transitive closure. For example, to compute the
transitive closure of Policies 22 and 23, we start with their head predicate,
view.ins.employee. We then add the head predicates of any rule that contains
view.ins.employee in its body, namely: view.ins.secretary, view.ins.hr,
view.ins.accountant, view.ins.nurse, view.ins.labTechnician,
view.ins.pharmacist, and view.ins.doctor. There are no other rules that contain any of
these predicate names in the body, so this forms the complete transitive closure. None of
the rules with head predicates in the closure can be executed by untrusted users; thus,
there is no operation initiated by an untrusted user that could ever cause any of these
rules to execute. Otherwise, one of these operations must have in its body one of the
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predicate names contained in the closure, and thus the head predicate of such a rule would
also have to appear in the closure.
6.1.4 Summary and Discussion
This case study demonstrates the usefulness of RDBAC in a practical scenario. The
policies we defined are easily expressed in TD, and the TD rules express the intent of the
policies rather than the extent (i.e. explicitly listing the users that should be granted
access to each table). Because of this, such a system is less susceptible to error than an
access control matrix-based system, in which user privileges must be updated frequently
as new data is entered into the system; or a system with application-level security, in
which program errors or incorrectly duplicated policy logic may cause policy violations.
There could understandably be concerns about the safety of using such a
security-critical system as suggested by our case study to allow access by patients
themselves. However, we have demonstrated the feasibility of formal security verification
on our system. This capability of RDBAC can ease such concerns about more broadened
database access.
6.2 Building Automation System
BASs are increasingly used for the control of lighting, HVAC, and physical security in
modern “smart” buildings and are extending their functionality to include advanced
features like resource location and mesh networking. It is common to protect the security
of such computerized control systems for physical processes by isolating the control
network from computers that may perform malicious actions. If there is a need to
communicate information from the enterprise database to the control database, this is
done manually.
However, this isolation comes at a cost to the value of the control network, since use of
the Internet provides convenient access at low cost as well as resources that may be useful
to the control network, such as personnel databases. Because of the value of the resources
on the control network and the limited protections on the control computers, many view
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classical security solutions such as firewalls as insufficient. Opening such systems to the
enterprise network and Internet entails significant risks and opportunities. Research is
needed to understand and balance these tradeoffs. One such field of research is providing
access control to the building resources. RDBAC, coupled with techniques in federated
databases [24] provides an ideal model for BAS systems with complex access policies. This
case study provides a sample of what policies are possible in such a system.
Our hypothetical BAS is part of a larger integrated database system for a university
that also keeps track of personnel, enrollment, and room scheduling. Such a system would
maintain a large number of database tables that do not directly affect access to building
automation controls. For this case study, the focus is on building controls, and we will
only address other data in the system as it relates to defining policies for these controls.
The database system controlling access to building resources contains several tables
that may not be co-located with the database, such as internet routing rules or school
enrollment data; or may even be a placeholder for a physical object, such as a door lock.
We assume that the database system is coupled with these resources in a
fully-synchronized manner so that external changes are immediately updated in the
database, and that database changes immediately trigger the external changes.
As in Section 6.1, we first give a high-level overview of the table schemas in our
proposed database. The formal definitions of the relevant table schemas can be found in
Appendix B.1. We next describe the policies protecting the data, for which the TD
encodings can be found in Appendix B.2. We will not perform any security verification for
this case study; however, verification can be done in the same fashion as described in
Section 6.1.3. Finally, we discuss the case study and propose features of an RDBAC
system that would be needed for a more advanced implementation of a BAS.
6.2.1 Schema Overview
As in the medical database case study, data describing attributes of the system users are
stored in several tables. The person table contains a record for each user, which lists
information relevant to all types of users, such as usernames, passwords, and an account
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balance that can be used to purchase resources. For simplicity, we assume passwords are
stored in plaintext; in a deployed system, encryption or cryptographic hashing should be
used for further protection. Our table also contains full name and address information.
Students in the database are identified by listing their ID in a separate students table,
along with student-specific data such as their year in school. Faculty are likewise identified
by listing their ID in a teachers table. Visitors are given temporary IDs which are listed
in a visitors table, which also keeps track of who is responsible for the visitor (assumed
to be a faculty member).
Enrollment data includes offered courses, semesters in which the courses are scheduled,
room assignments, course registration, and attendance. We assume that each course has
one teacher per semester. Cross-listed courses are listed separately, but may be given
identical room assignments. We list one room assignment for every time the class meets,
which could include more than one meeting time per day. For simplicity, we do not keep
track of grading information, which could be added to the schema in a deployed
application.
Building data includes rooms, doors, video feeds, internet access, and a vending
machine. The rooms table also keeps track of thermostat settings for the room. Each door
is associated with one room; however, each room may have multiple doors. Likewise, each
video feed is also associated with one room, and each room may have multiple video feeds.
We assume that the video feeds are given in segments that correspond to class meeting
times. A roomAccess table is also defined to associate which users are allowed full access to
which rooms, and also indicates whether the user is allowed to delegate room access to
other users. For simplicity, the internetAccess table consists of listing the users that are
allowed to use the router. In a deployed system, this could be refined to list allowed
external hosts and port numbers, similar to a firewall configuration. The vending machine
keeps track of the costs and quantities of items it contains.
6.2.2 Policies
The TD encoding of these policies is found in Appendix B.2.
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The following policies apply to personnel records in the database:
• All users are granted access to their own records.
• Teachers may view IDs, names, addresses, and usernames (but not passwords or
balances) of students currently enrolled in a class that they teach.
• Teachers may view IDs, names, addresses, and usernames (but not passwords or
balances) of visitors they are hosting.
• Teachers’ IDs, names, and usernames (but not addresses, passwords, or balances) are
publicly available. That is, any user (student, visitor, or teacher) may view this data.
• Accesses to the students, visitors, and teachers tables follow these same policies as
previously listed. That is, a user can see the StudentID and Year of a student if and
only if he can see that student’s record in the person table, etc.
The following policies apply to enrollment data:
• Any user is allowed read access to the courses, courseSchedule, and
roomAssignments tables.
• Teachers are allowed to view enrollment data for the courses they teach.
• Students are allowed to view their own enrollment data.
• Teachers are allowed to view attendance data for the courses they teach.
The following policies apply to building resources:
• Any user that has been given full access to a room may see the list of other users
that can access that room.
• Users who are given delegation privileges for a room may grant or revoke any other
user’s access to that room.
• Users who have been given full access to a room are allowed to change its thermostat
settings within the range 65-75.
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• Users who have been given full access to a room are allowed to unlock its doors.
• Students attending class in a room are allowed to unlock doors during the time class
is in session, and they are automatically recorded as being in attendance that day.
Also, internet access is disabled4 to discourage distractions during the lecture period.
• Students enrolled for a course are allowed to view video feeds for that course.
• Teachers are allowed to grant internet access to any user. This can be used to grant
exceptions to the policy of disabling internet access during a lecture, and to grant
temporary access to visitors.
• Anyone is allowed to buy items from the vending machine, provided that their
account balance is greater than the cost of the item and the quantity of the item is
nonzero. Their balance is deducted by the amount of the item.
6.2.3 Summary and Discussion
This case study demonstrates the expressiveness of RDBAC in defining a wide range of
policies for a practical scenario using data that does not necessarily reside in a single
database source. As with the medical database case study, the intent of these policies can
be easily expressed in TD, allowing the system privileges to be kept current with the
potentially large turnover in users that occurs in a school environment. It also enables
delegation of privileges for certain resources, which can ease the administration burden for
staff members who would normally entrusted with maintaining access control lists for each
room.
The policies related to granting and revoking internet access warrant some additional
discussion. Our scenario simplified these policies to either granting full access or revoking
all access. In practice, internet policies are often more complicated and may specify
bandwidth quotas or packet filters to disable certain network applications. Such
capabilities could allow even more exotic policies such as “during class lectures, all
internet access is disabled except to the web server that provides the lecture notes.” We
4This policy does not provide the logic to re-enable internet access at the end of the class period. Hence,
it must be explicitly re-enabled by teacher at end of the period, perhaps by an automated script.
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could currently implement such a policy in TD with negation by defining a rule that finds
a record for a given student in the internetAccess, sets it to be inactive (perhaps through
a Boolean field in the table), then recursively calls itself until all such records have been
marked. Note, however, that in such a rule, the side-effects occur before the recursive call,
rather than at the end of the rule. This motivates both the need for formal analysis
strategies beyond those discussed in Section 4.3 and the need for implementation of such
rules beyond the compilation process from Section 5.1. Alternatively, such a policy could
be defined using syntax and semantics for bulk updates, not currently implemented in TD.
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Chapter 7
Future Work and Conclusion
7.1 Future Work
The research already completed on RDBAC suggests a rich field of further research with
important benefits. Future work in this area directly motivated by our work falls into
three categories: logic, security analysis, and implementation.
Logic The TD language provides a powerful logical basis for RDBAC; however, it still
lacks syntax and semantics that correspond to certain commonly-used operations in SQL.
Aggregations such as summation, averages, and minimum/maximum are among these,
and such operations are important enough to be evaluated by common benchmarks such
as TPC-H [70]. Formal logic for defining aggregation semantics, similar to the aggregation
operators defined in the Cassandra project [11], would be beneficial for defining policies
for aggregation queries that may be different from policies on the base table. The problem
of query complexity [14] under such an augmentation, as well as the formulation of
policies allowing queries on aggregations but not on the base table, would also need to be
addressed.
Our case studies described in Chapter 6 contain several policies for modifying existing
values in the database. While our formulation of such policies using a combination of
assertion and retraction predicates is adequate, a more natural formulation that explicitly
modifies values in the database would be more ideal. A predicate with such semantics
would have to be able to distinguish the data passed in by the user to identify the values
to update from the data containing the new values to be stored. Similarly, semantics for
bulk insert and delete operations would require similar syntax.
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While we have introduced a form of negation predicate in Section 4.1.3 to generalize
the empty predicate defined in TD, the semantics of this negation are still limited to base
tables. It is often useful to be able to perform negations on a more complex sub-query.
For example, recall the medical database case study from Section 6.1. A policy for
preventing prescriptions that cause adverse drug reactions could be written by ensuring
that no current prescriptions of any drugs listed in the adverseDrugReactions table exist
for a given patient. This would require using a negation over a join of the prescription
table with the adverseDrugReactions table. Analyzing whether such a negation predicate
would affect the query complexity would also be necessary. In fact, as previously
mentioned in Section 4.1.3, it is currently unknown whether this generalization even adds
expressive power to TD [15].
Some policy scenarios, such as the building control system scenario described in
Chapter 6, could benefit from policy logic that allows system-triggered events to perform
transactions on the database, rather than solely through user-triggered events. For
example, a student’s internet access is disabled when entering a classroom for a scheduled
lecture. A teacher must remember to re-enable internet access for all the students at the
conclusion of the lecture. It would be less error-prone to be able to write a policy in which
the system would automatically re-enable the access after a certain time. The semantics of
TD do not currently accommodate the execution of rules that are not directly invoked by
a user.
Security Analysis In order to prevent the Trojan Horse vulnerability described in
Chapter 3, policies could be forced to execute only under the definer’s privilege. While
this restriction does successfully prevent problems of this sort, it also needlessly prohibits
some useful policies. For example, several of the policies for both case studies described in
Chapter 6 execute under the invoker’s privilege. Analysis of the information flow under
RDBAC policies would provide greater understanding of when other privileges can safely
be used.
The theorems in Chapter 4 enable us to guarantee analyzability of policy rules under
certain conditions. These conditions prohibit rules that contain retractions and negations.
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Further work is needed to establish analyzability conditions for such rules. These
theorems also depend on the current state of the database. This could mean that a set of
rules that are considered safe for one database state may be unsafe for another database
state. It also means that when a trusted user adds a new domain value to the database,
the security analysis must be re-executed. This suggests the need for security analysis
that is state-independent. Indeed, the analysis performed on our case study in
Section 6.1.3 demonstrates the impact of increasing the database size. More efficient
analysis algorithms, possibly using data indexing (which is not provided by SWI-Prolog)
or using fast model-checking based techniques [50], may also be more desirable.
Adding aggregation operations to database queries introduces new privacy concerns.
The research field of “k-anonymity” [80] has produced solutions to these concerns.
Implementation of such solutions in an RDBAC system and formal security analysis of the
implementation is also an open problem relevant to adding aggregation capabilities to TD.
As demonstrated by the medical database case study from Section 6.1, many useful
policy rules are not safely rewritable, but can still be analyzed. A more sophisticated
analysis algorithm, perhaps one that annotates the domain of each attribute based on
whether it is infinite rather than explicitly creating literals for each domain value, could
enable more automatic analysis while still allowing such policies. Another improvement
would be to detect and omit irrelevant rules automatically, rather than manually as we
did for our analysis.
Implementation Our prototype implementation does not prohibit policies from
executing under arbitrary users’ permissions, nor does it perform security analysis. Thus,
unsafe policy configurations will not be detected. Such work would be necessary in order
to use such a system in a critical environment.
As demonstrated by our case studies, the restriction that all side-effects must occur at
the end of a policy rule still allows many useful policies. However, an implementation that
allows more generalized TD rules with arbitrary ordering of side-effects, including rollback
on failure, would be even more useful. Note that such an implementation must be very
careful with exception handling to prevent information leakage, as explained by Kabra et
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al. [53], but a correct rollback procedure will prevent most of the problems they describe
because the only side-effects that will run to completion are those the user is allowed to
execute.
RDBAC does not address user authentication. While the authentication mechanisms
for off-the-shelf database systems can be used, it may not be desirable to create full
database accounts for every user that might access the system. For example, patients
would likely only gain access to their data through a web application. Other applications
might benefit from allowing medical devices to authenticate a user with RFID tags or bar
codes [41]. Integrating our access control policies with more flexible authentication
mechanisms would increase the usability of our RDBAC system.
While our translation algorithm can already be used for current SQL database
systems, the translation process could be made easier using predicated grants [23]. For
example, the hr policy from Table 5.1 can be expressed in a predicated grant as
grant select on employees where userId() in (select Name from hr) to public
or by defining a query-defined user group for all hr users as
create group hrGrp as (select Name from hr);
grant select on employees to hrGrp
Column-level privileges simply follow the SQL standard of listing the allowed columns
after the table name, such as grant select on employees(Name, Addr) e where
e.Optin=’true’ to insuranceGrp.
Predicated grants do not currently support side-effects, required by policies such as the
insurance policy from Table 5.1 or the Chinese Wall policy from Table 5.2, so further
extensions would be necessary to implement them. One possibility might be simply to use
user-defined functions, as our implementation does. Another possibility might be to allow
compound statements in the predicate of the grant, such as:
grant select on employees(Name, Addr) e where e.Optin=’true’ and userId() in
(select Name from insurance i;
insert into accesslog values(i.Name, e.Name, ’Name and Addr’, GETDATE()))
to public
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Such an extension would facilitate a more direct translation from TD semantics into
SQL, including execution ordering.
Developing a DBMS with reflective access control capabilities built in, rather than
adapting an existing system with no special reflective functionality, opens up the
possibility for further optimizations. The performance penalty of opening a separate
connection to execute the side-effect would be greatly reduced. The proposed optimization
described in Section 5.1.2 that pre-computes which rules are applicable to the current user
and builds the query dynamically with as few unions as possible could be fully
implemented, rather than simulated. Further techniques such as caching partial results
based on the user identity and using these results for each subsequent query could also
save steps over several queries. Such a system could use predicated grants as a policy
definition language.
7.2 Conclusion
We have described a model for reflective database access control based on the semantics of
Transaction Datalog. This model provides a clear description of how access control
policies should be evaluated, and under whose privileges, and can be extended to users
that do not have omniscient access to the database. The Transaction Datalog model also
inherits the ability to effect changes to the database during policy evaluation. We have
shown that formal analysis may be performed on certain classes of reflective policies to
guarantee security properties.
We have described an implementation of reflective database access control based on
the semantics of Transaction Datalog. This implementation compiles a set of policies into
standard SQL views that can be used in current database management systems. We have
evaluated this implementation and demonstrated an optimization that eliminates
recursion in many common cases.
We have also developed two case studies containing detailed RDBAC policies, thereby
demonstrating the usability of RDBAC in real-world applications. Using one of these case
studies, we have shown an example of how to make a formal safety guarantee in practice.
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Appendix A
Case Study: Medical Database
We present here the schema definitions and TD rules for our medical database case study
described in Section 6.1. For improved readability, we allow rules to access the base tables
directly. These direct accesses can easily be replaced by references to the table owner’s
view of the table in a system that requires policies to be defined that way.
A.1 Schemas
As with the BAS case study, user data is stored in several tables, including a general
person table that contains information relevant to all users of the system.
• create table person(
PersonID int primary key,
Username varchar(10),
FullName varchar(100));
• create table contactInformation(
PersonID int references person(PersonID),
Type varchar(15),
Value varchar(50));
Users may be considered as employees or patients, possibly both. Employees, in turn,
may be secretaries, human resource directors (HR), accountants, nurses, lab technicians,
pharmacists, or doctors. Some employees may additionally be managers, such as shift
supervisors. We must also account for the facts that employees sometimes leave and must
have their access privileges revoked, and that their records may need to be maintained for
archival purposes—for example, a new doctor may need to check a patient’s history and
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find out who ordered a particular treatment. To address this, the employee table contains
a Boolean value indicating whether the employee is currently active and should be given
system access. Employee payroll information and patient insurance information is also
maintained.
• create table employee(
PersonID int primary key references person(PersonID),
Salary money,
SSN char(11),
Exemptions int,
BankRouting int,
BankAcctNum int,
Office char(10),
Manager int references employee(PersonID),
Active bit);
• create table secretary(
PersonID int primary key references employee(PersonID));
• create table hr(
PersonID int primary key references employee(PersonID));
• create table accountant(
PersonID int primary key references employee(PersonID));
• create table nurse(
PersonID int primary key references employee(PersonID));
• create table labTechnician(
PersonID int primary key references employee(PersonID));
• create table pharmacist(
PersonID int primary key references employee(PersonID));
• create table doctor(
PersonID int primary key references employee(PersonID),
Specialty varchar(150));
111
• create table payroll(
PersonID int references employee(PersonID),
Date datetime,
Gross money,
FedTax money,
StateTax money);
• create table insuranceProviders(
ProviderID int primary key,
Name varchar(150),
Address varchar(500));
• create table patient(
PersonID int primary key references person(PersonID),
PrimaryCare int references doctor(PersonID),
ProviderID int references insuranceProviders(ProviderID),
PolicyID varchar(150));
General medical information is stored in the database.
• create table drugs(
DrugID int primary key,
Name varchar(50),
Instructions text,
Cost money,
Manufacturer varchar(50),
Quantity int,
MechanismOfAction varchar(150));
• create table symptomCodes(
CodeID int primary key,
Description varchar(500));
• create table diagnosisCodes(
CodeID int primary key,
Description varchar(500));
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• create table adverseDrugInteractions(
Drug1ID references drugs(DrugID),
Drug2ID references drugs(DrugID),
Description varchar(500));
Patient data includes visits, current medications, measurements taken, treatments
administered, prescriptions written, and lab tests administered. Teams of medical
professionals who assist during a given patient’s visit are also maintained in a separate
table. The attributes SymptomID and DiagnosisID could be set-valued, if supported by the
database system, or multiple values could be stored in a separate table referencing the
original table. For simplicity, we treat them as single-valued attributes. Doctors may opt
not to release certain information to patients, which can be indicated in each table with a
Boolean value called ReleaseToPatient.
• create table visit(
VisitID int primary key,
PatientID int references patient(PersonID),
TreatingPhysicianID int references doctor(PersonID),
DateAdmitted datetime,
SymptomID int references symptomCodes(CodeID),
DiagnosisID references diagnosisCodes(CodeID),
ReleaseToPatient bit);
• create table inpatientVisit(
VisitID int primary key references visit(VisitID),
EndDate datetime,
RoomNumber int);
• create table otcMeds(
MedID int primary key,
PatientID int references Patient(PersonID),
DrugID int references drugs(DrugID));
• create table vitalMeasurements(
MeasurementID int primary key,
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VisitID int references visit(VisitID),
AdministeredBy int references employee(PersonID),
TestType varchar(150),
measurement varchar(150),
ReleaseToPatient bit);
• create table treatment(
TreatmentID int primary key,
VisitID int references visit(VisitID),
AdministeredBy int references employee(PersonID),
When datetime,
DrugID int references drugs(DrugID),
Procedure varchar(150),
Quantity int,
ReleaseToPatient bit);
• create table immunization(
TreatmentID int primary key references treatment(TreatmentID),
ExternalLocation varchar(500),
ExternalAdministeredBy varchar(150));
• create table prescription(
PrescriptionID int primary key,
PatientID int references patient(PersonID),
PrescribedBy int references doctor(PersonID),
DatePrescribed datetime,
FilledBy int references pharmacist(PersonID),
DateFilled datetime,
DrugID int references drugs(DrugID),
Quantity int,
Refills int,
ReleaseToPatient bit);
• create table labResult(
ResultID int primary key,
TestDate datetime,
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Type varchar(150),
Value varchar(250),
PatientID int references patient(PersonID),
TechnicianID int references labTechnician(PersonID),
ReleaseToPatient bit);
• create table medicalTeam(
VisitID int references visit(VisitID),
MemberID int references employee(PersonID),
ReleaseToPatient bit);
Each of the tables containing patient data may be accessed in an emergency. In such
cases, the database also maintains tables to audit such accesses.
• create table visitEmergencyAccessLog(
VisitID references visit(VisitID),
UserID references Employee(PersonID),
Date datetime,
Note text);
• create table otcMedsEmergencyAccessLog(
MedID references otcMeds(MedID),
UserID references Employee(PersonID),
Date datetime,
Note text);
• create table vitalMeasurementsEmergencyAccessLog(
MeasurementID references vitalMeasurements(MeasurementID),
UserID references Employee(PersonID),
Date datetime,
Note text);
• create table treatmentEmergencyAccessLog(
TreatmentID references treatment(TreatmentID),
UserID references Employee(PersonID),
Date datetime,
Note text);
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• create table prescriptionEmergencyAccessLog(
PrescriptionID references prescription(PrescriptionID),
UserID references Employee(PersonID),
Date datetime,
Note text);
• create table labResultEmergencyAccessLog(
ResultID references labResult(ResultID),
UserID references Employee(PersonID),
Date datetime,
Note text);
Finally, the database also contains tables for tracking billing and payment information.
• create table invoice(
InvoiceID int primary key,
InvoiceTo int references Person(PersonID),
DateIssued datetime);
• create table invoiceItem(
InvoiceID int references invoice(InvoiceID),
VisitID int references visit(VisitID),
PrescriptionID references Prescription(PrescriptionID),
Cost money);
• create table paymentReceived(
InvoiceID int references invoice(InvoiceID),
AmountReceived money,
PaymentCleared datetime);
A.2 Policies
We first define a rule for active employees that are considered to have a working
relationship with each patient. These include the primary care physician, the admitting
physician (if different than the primary care physician), and those medical professionals
that have consulted with a patient as part of an assigned medical team. Note that this
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rule defines a view that is not based on a particular base table. Our compiler does not
require this to be the case, and easily handles such rules.
1. hasAccess(EmployeeID, PatientID) :-
employee(EmployeeID, , , , , , , , , 1),
patient(PatientID, EmployeeID, , ).
2. hasAccess(EmployeeID, PatientID) :-
employee(EmployeeID, , , , , , , , , 1),
visit( , PatientID, EmployeeID, , , , ).
3. hasAccess(EmployeeID, PatientID) :-
employee(EmployeeID, , , , , , , , , 1),
visit(VisitID, PatientID, , , , , ),
medicalTeam(VisitID, EmployeeID, ).
Users may view their own data in the person table.
4. view.person(User, ID, Username, FullName) :-
person(ID, Username, FullName), User = Username.
Other employees (active or not) may view any person’s name data. Note that the
inequality at the end of this rule is not strictly necessary, although it does prevent
duplicate data from appearing when employees query on their own data.
5. view.person(User, ID, Username, FullName) :-
person(ID, Username, FullName),
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , ),
person(UserID, User, ), UserID \= ID.
A record is added to the person table through the view.ins.employee and
view.ins.patient views; thus, we do not define policies for modifying this table directly.
Users may view their own data in the contactInformation table.
6. view.contactInformation(User, ID, Type, Value) :-
contactInformation(ID, Type, Value),
person(ID, User, ).
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Active managers may view contact data for their employees.
7. view.contactInformation(User, ID, Type, Value) :-
contactInformation(ID, Type, Value),
employee(ID, , , , , , , ManagerID, ),
employee(ManagerID, , , , , , , , , 1),
person(ManagerID, User, ).
Active employees may view e-mail data and office phone data for other employees.
8. view.contactInformation(User, ID, Type, Value) :-
contactInformation(ID, Type, Value),
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ),
Type = ’e-mail’.
9. view.contactInformation(User, ID, Type, Value) :-
contactInformation(ID, Type, Value),
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ),
Type = ’office phone’.
Users with a working relationship with a patient, as previously defined, may view
contact data for that patient.
10. view.contactInformation(User, ID, Type, Value) :-
contactInformation(ID, Type, Value),
person(UserID, User, ), hasAccess(UserID, ID).
Doctors and pharmacists may view contact data for patients for whom they have
written or filled prescriptions.
11. view.contactInformation(User, ID, Type, Value) :-
contactInformation(ID, Type, Value),
prescription( , ID, UserID, , , , , , , ),
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ).
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12. view.contactInformation(User, ID, Type, Value) :-
contactInformation(ID, Type, Value),
prescription( , ID, , , UserID, , , , , ),
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ).
Active secretaries may view any user’s contact data.
13. view.contactInformation(User, ID, Type, Value) :-
contactInformation(ID, Type, Value),
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), secretary(UserID).
Active accountants may view any user’s address data.
14. view.contactInformation(User, ID, Type, Value) :-
contactInformation(ID, Type, Value),
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), accountant(UserID),
Type = ’address’.
Users may update their own contact data.
15. view.ins.contactInformation(User, ID, Type, Value) :-
person(ID, User, ),
ins.contactInformation(ID, Type, Value).
16. view.del.contactInformation(User, ID, Type, Value) :-
person(ID, User, ),
del.contactInformation(ID, Type, Value).
Active secretaries may update any patient’s contact data.
17. view.ins.contactInformation(User, ID, Type, Value) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), secretary(UserID),
ins.contactInformation(ID, Type, Value).
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18. view.del.contactInformation(User, ID, Type, Value) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), secretary(UserID),
del.contactInformation(ID, Type, Value).
Employees (active or not) may view their own data in the employee table.
19. view.employee(User, EmployeeID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active) :-
employee(EmployeeID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed, BankRoutingNumber,
BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active),
person(EmployeeID, User, ).
Active accountants may view all employee data.
20. view.employee(User, EmployeeID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active) :-
employee(EmployeeID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed, BankRoutingNumber,
BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active),
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), accountant(UserID).
Active employees may view the offices, managers, and active status of other employees.
21. view.employee(User, EmployeeID, null, null, null, null, null,
Office, Manager, Active) :-
employee(EmployeeID, , , , , , Office, Manager, Active),
person(UserID, User, ), employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1).
Active HR directors may add or delete employees. An employee’s manager must be an
existing employee. “Deleting” an employee does not actually remove the record from the
database, but rather sets the Active field to 0. Note that because employee inherits from
person, either a record with the same ID must already exist in the person table or the
insertion must propagate to the person table. We assume that a Username and FullName
together uniquely identify a person.
22. view.ins.employee(User, EmployeeID, Username, FullName, Salary, SSN,
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ExemptionsClaimed, BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office,
Manager, Active) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), hr(UserID),
person(EmployeeID, Username, FullName),
employee(Manager, , , , , , , , ),
ins.employee(EmployeeID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber,
BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active).
23. view.ins.employee(User, EmployeeID, Username, FullName, Salary, SSN,
ExemptionsClaimed, BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office,
Manager, Active) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), hr(UserID),
empty{1}.person(EmployeeID),
employee(Manager, , , , , , , , ),
ins.employee(EmployeeID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber,
BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active),
ins.person(EmployeeID, Username, FullName).
24. view.del.employee(User, EmployeeID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), hr(UserID),
del.employee(EmployeeID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber,
BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active),
ins.employee(EmployeeID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber,
BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, 0).
Accesses to the secretary, hr, accountant, nurse, labTechnician, pharmacist, and
doctor tables follow the same policies as the employee table. Note both that these rules
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use the policy invoker’s privilege on the employee table, and that the updates on any of
these tables cause cascading updates on the employee table. This assumes that each of the
employee categories are mutually exclusive.
25. view.secretary(User, PersonID) :-
view.employee(User, PersonID, , , , , , , , ),
secretary(PersonID).
26. view.ins.secretary(User, PersonID, Username, FullName, Salary, SSN,
ExemptionsClaimed, BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office,
Manager, Active) :-
view.ins.employee(User, PersonID, Username, FullName, Salary, SSN,
ExemptionsClaimed, BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber,
Office, Manager, Active),
ins.secretary(PersonID).
27. view.del.secretary(User, PersonID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active) :-
view.del.employee(User, PersonID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active),
del.secretary(PersonID).
28. view.hr(User, PersonID) :-
view.employee(User, PersonID, , , , , , , , ),
hr(PersonID).
29. view.ins.hr(User, PersonID, Username, FullName, Salary, SSN,
ExemptionsClaimed, BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office,
Manager, Active) :-
view.ins.employee(User, PersonID, Username, FullName, Salary, SSN,
ExemptionsClaimed, BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber,
Office, Manager, Active),
ins.hr(PersonID).
30. view.del.hr(User, PersonID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active) :-
view.del.employee(User, PersonID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
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BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active),
del.hr(PersonID).
31. view.accountant(User, PersonID) :-
view.employee(User, PersonID, , , , , , , , ),
accountant(PersonID).
32. view.ins.accountant(User, PersonID, Username, FullName, Salary, SSN,
ExemptionsClaimed, BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office,
Manager, Active) :-
view.ins.employee(User, PersonID, Username, FullName, Salary, SSN,
ExemptionsClaimed, BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber,
Office, Manager, Active),
ins.accountant(PersonID).
33. view.del.accountant(User, PersonID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active) :-
view.del.employee(User, PersonID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active),
del.accountant(PersonID).
34. view.nurse(User, PersonID) :-
view.employee(User, PersonID, , , , , , , , ),
nurse(PersonID).
35. view.ins.nurse(User, PersonID, Username, FullName, Salary, SSN,
ExemptionsClaimed, BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office,
Manager, Active) :-
view.ins.employee(User, PersonID, Username, FullName, Salary, SSN,
ExemptionsClaimed, BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber,
Office, Manager),
ins.nurse(PersonID).
36. view.del.nurse(User, PersonID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active) :-
view.del.employee(User, PersonID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active),
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del.nurse(PersonID).
37. view.labTechnician(User, PersonID) :-
view.employee(User, PersonID, , , , , , , , ),
labTechnician(PersonID).
38. view.ins.labTechnician(User, PersonID, Username, FullName, Salary, SSN,
ExemptionsClaimed, BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office,
Manager, Active) :-
view.ins.employee(User, PersonID, Username, FullName, Salary, SSN,
ExemptionsClaimed, BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber,
Office, Manager, Active),
ins.labTechnician(PersonID).
39. view.del.labTechnician(User, PersonID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active) :-
view.del.employee(User, PersonID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active),
del.labTechnician(PersonID).
40. view.pharmacist(User, PersonID) :-
view.employee(User, PersonID, , , , , , , , ),
pharmacist(PersonID).
41. view.ins.pharmacist(User, PersonID, Username, FullName, Salary, SSN,
ExemptionsClaimed, BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office,
Manager, Active) :-
view.ins.employee(User, PersonID, Username, FullName, Salary, SSN,
ExemptionsClaimed, BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber,
Office, Manager, Active),
ins.pharmacist(PersonID).
42. view.del.pharmacist(User, PersonID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active) :-
view.del.employee(User, PersonID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active),
del.pharmacist(PersonID).
124
43. view.doctor(User, PersonID, Specialty) :-
view.employee(User, PersonID, , , , , , , , ),
doctor(PersonID, Specialty).
44. view.ins.doctor(User, PersonID, Specialty, Username, FullName, Salary, SSN,
ExemptionsClaimed, BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office,
Manager, Active) :-
view.ins.employee(User, PersonID, Username, FullName, Salary, SSN,
ExemptionsClaimed, BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber,
Office, Manager, Active),
ins.doctor(PersonID, Specialty).
45. view.del.doctor(User, PersonID, Specialty, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active) :-
view.del.employee(User, PersonID, Salary, SSN, ExemptionsClaimed,
BankRoutingNumber, BankAccountNumber, Office, Manager, Active),
del.doctor(PersonID, Specialty).
Employees may view their own data in the payroll table. Note that a join with the
employee table is not necessary, assuming that the database enforces foreign key constraint
requiring EmployeeIDs in the payroll table to appear in the employee table.
46. view.payroll(User, EmployeeID, Date, GrossAmount, FederalTax, StateTax) :-
payroll(EmployeeID, Date, GrossAmount, FederalTax, StateTax),
person(EmployeeID, User, ).
Active accountants may view all payroll data.
47. view.payroll(User, EmployeeID, Date, GrossAmount, FederalTax, StateTax) :-
payroll(EmployeeID, Date, GrossAmount, FederalTax, StateTax),
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), accountant(UserID).
Active accountants may insert new payroll data for any employee except themselves,
providing a rudimentary separation of duty policy. This rule also checks that tax withheld
follows a particular formula, and that the payment is not applied retroactively.
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48. view.ins.payroll(User, EmployeeID, Date, Salary, FederalTax, StateTax) :-
employee(EmployeeID, Salary, , ExemptionsClaimed, , , , , ),
FederalTax = Salary*0.2 - 1000*ExemptionsClaimed,
StateTax = Salary*0.1 - 500*ExemptionsClaimed,
Date >= now,
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), accountant(UserID),
UserID \= EmployeeID,
ins.payroll(EmployeeID, Date, Salary, FederalTax, StateTax).
Users may view their own data in the patient table.
49. view.patient(User, ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy) :-
patient(ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy),
person(ID, User, ).
Active doctors, nurses, secretaries, and accountants may view primary care provider
and insurance data.
50. view.patient(User, ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy) :-
patient(ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy),
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), doctor(UserID, ).
51. view.patient(User, ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy) :-
patient(ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy),
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), nurse(UserID).
52. view.patient(User, ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy) :-
patient(ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy),
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), secretary(UserID).
53. view.patient(User, ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy) :-
patient(ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy),
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), accountant(UserID).
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Users may update their own insurance data, and active accountants may update
anyone’s insurance data.
54. view.ins.patient(User, ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy) :-
patient(ID, PCPhys, , ),
person(ID, User, ),
ins.patient(ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy).
55. view.del.patient(User, ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy) :-
patient(ID, PCPhys, , ),
person(ID, User, ),
del.patient(ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy).
56. view.ins.patient(User, ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy) :-
patient(ID, PCPhys, , ),
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), accountant(UserID),
ins.patient(ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy).
57. view.del.patient(User, ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy) :-
patient(ID, PCPhys, , ),
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), accountant(UserID),
del.patient(ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy).
Active doctors and secretaries may update any data in the patient table. The primary
care physician must be an existing doctor in the database. Note that because patient
inherits from person, either a record with the same ID must already exist in the person
table or the insertion must propagate to the person table. Deletions, on the other hand,
are not propagated, because a person may also be an employee. The criteria for deleting a
record in the person table may vary; we will assume for our case study that the record
continues to exist for archival purposes. We also assume that a Username and FullName
together uniquely identify a person.
58. view.ins.patient(User, ID, Username, FullName, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy)
:-
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employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), doctor(UserID, ),
person(ID, Username, FullName),
doctor(PCPhys, ),
ins.patient(ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy).
59. view.ins.patient(User, ID, Username, FullName, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy)
:-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), doctor(UserID, ),
empty{1}.person(ID),
doctor(PCPhys, ),
ins.patient(ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy),
ins.person(ID, Username, FullName).
60. view.del.patient(User, ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), doctor(UserID, ),
del.patient(ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy).
61. view.ins.patient(User, ID, Username, FullName, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy)
:-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), secretary(UserID),
person(ID, Username, FullName),
doctor(PCPhys, ),
ins.patient(ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy).
62. view.ins.patient(User, ID, Username, FullName, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy)
:-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), secretary(UserID),
empty{1}.person(ID),
doctor(PCPhys, ),
ins.patient(ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy),
ins.person(ID, Username, FullName).
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63. view.del.patient(User, ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), secretary(UserID),
del.patient(ID, PCPhys, InsProvider, Policy).
Users may view their own data in the vitalMeasurements table, if it has been released
for viewing.
64. view.vitalMeasurements(User, ID, VisitID, AdministeredBy, TestType,
Measurement, ReleaseToPatient) :-
vitalMeasurements(ID, VisitID, AdministeredBy, TestType,
Measurement, ReleaseToPatient),
visit(VisitID, UserID, , , , , ),
person(UserID, User, ), ReleaseToPatient = 1.
Users with a working relationship with a patient, as previously defined, may view that
patient’s data.
65. view.vitalMeasurements(User, ID, VisitID, AdministeredBy, TestType,
Measurement, ReleaseToPatient) :-
vitalMeasurements(ID, VisitID, AdministeredBy, TestType,
Measurement, ReleaseToPatient),
visit(VisitID, PatientID, , , , , ),
person(UserID, User, ), hasAccess(UserID, PatientID).
Any active employee may gain emergency access to a patient’s data, but the access is
logged. This rule could easily be adapted to allow such access only to certain users, such
as doctors and nurses.
66. view.emergency vitalMeasurements(User, ID, VisitID, AdministeredBy, TestType,
Measurement, ReleaseToPatient, Note) :-
vitalMeasurements(ID, VisitID, AdministeredBy, TestType,
Measurement, ReleaseToPatient),
person(UserID, User, ), employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
ins.vitalMeasurementsEmergencyAccessLog(ID, UserID, now, Note).
The user making the measurement may enter new data.
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67. view.ins.vitalMeasurements(User, ID, VisitID, UserID, TestType,
Measurement, ReleaseToPatient) :-
person(UserID, User, ), employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
ins.vitalMeasurements(ID, VisitID, UserID, TestType,
Measurement, ReleaseToPatient).
Users may view their own data in the labResult table, if it has been released for
viewing.
68. view.labResult(User, ID, Date, Type, Value, PatientID, TechID,
ReleaseToPatient) :-
labResult(ID, Date, Type, Value, PatientID, TechID, ReleaseToPatient),
person(PatientID, User, ), ReleaseToPatient = 1.
Users with a working relationship with a patient may view that patient’s data.
69. view.labResult(User, ID, Date, Type, Value, PatientID, TechID,
ReleaseToPatient) :-
labResult(ID, Date, Type, Value, PatientID, TechID, ReleaseToPatient),
person(UserID, User, ), hasAccess(UserID, PatientID).
Any active employee may gain emergency access to a patient’s data, but the access is
logged.
70. view.emergency labResult(User, ID, Date, Type, Value, PatientID, TechID,
ReleaseToPatient, Note) :-
labResult(ID, Date, Type, Value, PatientID, TechID, ReleaseToPatient),
person(UserID, User, ), employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
ins.labResultEmergencyAccessLog(ID, UserID, now, Note).
Active lab technicians may enter new data in the labResult table.
71. view.ins.labResult(User, ID, Date, Type, Value, PatientID, TechID,
ReleaseToPatient) :-
employee(TechID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(TechID, User, ), labtechnician(TechID),
ins.labResult(ID, Date, Type, Value, PatientID, TechID, ReleaseToPatient).
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Users may view their own data in the treatment table, if it has been released for
viewing.
72. view.treatment(User, ID, VisitID, AdministeredBy, Date, DrugID, Procedure,
Quantity, ReleaseToPatient) :-
treatment(ID, VisitID, AdministeredBy, Date, DrugID, Procedure,
Quantity, ReleaseToPatient),
visit(VisitID, UserID, , , , , ),
person(UserID, User, ), ReleaseToPatient = 1.
Users with a working relationship with a patient may view that patient’s data.
73. view.treatment(User, ID, VisitID, AdministeredBy, Date, DrugID, Procedure,
Quantity, ReleaseToPatient) :-
treatment(ID, VisitID, AdministeredBy, Date, DrugID, Procedure,
Quantity, ReleaseToPatient),
visit(VisitID, PatientID, , , , , ),
person(UserID, User, ), hasAccess(UserID, PatientID).
Any active employee may gain emergency access to a patient’s data, but the access is
logged.
74. view.emergency treatment(User, ID, VisitID, AdministeredBy, Date, DrugID,
Procedure, Quantity, ReleaseToPatient, Note) :-
treatment(ID, VisitID, AdministeredBy, Date, DrugID, Procedure,
Quantity, ReleaseToPatient),
person(UserID, User, ), employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
ins.treatmentEmergencyAccessLog(ID, UserID, now, Note).
The user administering the treatment may enter new data into the treatment table.
75. view.ins.treatment(User, ID, VisitID, UserID, Date, DrugID, Procedure,
Quantity, ReleaseToPatient) :-
person(UserID, User, ), employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
visit(VisitID, PatientID, , , , , ),
ins.treatment(ID, VisitID, UserID, Date, DrugID, Procedure,
Quantity, ReleaseToPatient).
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Access to the immunization table follows the same policy as the treatment table, in the
same manner as described for the tables of employees.
76. view.immunization(User, ID, Location, AdministeredBy) :-
view.treatment(User, ID, , , , , , , ),
immunization(ID, Location, AdministeredBy).
77. view.emergency immunization(User, ID, Location, AdministeredBy, Note) :-
view.emergency treatment(User, ID, , , , , , , , Note),
immunization(ID, Location, AdministeredBy).
78. view.ins.immunization(User, ID, Location, AdministeredBy, VisitID, UserID,
Date, DrugID, Procedure, Quantity, ReleaseToPatient) :-
view.ins.treatment(User, ID, VisitID, UserID, Date, DrugID, Procedure,
Quantity, ReleaseToPatient),
ins.immunization(ID, Location, AdministeredBy).
Users may view their own data in the prescription table, if it has been released for
viewing.
79. view.prescription(User, ID, PatientID, PrescribedBy, DatePrescribed,
FilledBy,
DateFilled, DrugID, Quantity, Refills, ReleaseToPatient) :-
prescription(ID, PatientID, PrescribedBy, DatePrescribed, FilledBy,
DateFilled, DrugID, Quantity, Refills, ReleaseToPatient),
person(PatientID, User, ), ReleaseToPatient = 1.
Users with a working relationship with a patient may view that patient’s data.
80. view.prescription(User, ID, PatientID, PrescribedBy, DatePrescribed,
FilledBy,
DateFilled, DrugID, Quantity, Refills, ReleaseToPatient) :-
prescription(ID, PatientID, PrescribedBy, DatePrescribed, FilledBy,
DateFilled, DrugID, Quantity, Refills, ReleaseToPatient),
person(UserID, User, ), hasAccess(UserID, PatientID).
Any active employee may gain emergency access to a patient’s data, but the access is
logged.
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81. view.emergency prescription(User, ID, PatientID, PrescribedBy,
DatePrescribed,
FilledBy, DateFilled, DrugID, Quantity, Refills, ReleaseToPatient, Note) :-
prescription(ID, PatientID, PrescribedBy, DatePrescribed, FilledBy,
DateFilled, DrugID, Quantity, Refills, ReleaseToPatient),
person(UserID, User, ), employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
ins.prescriptionEmergencyAccessLog(ID, UserID, now, Note).
Active doctors may enter new data in the prescription table, but cannot enter data of
when and by whom the prescription was filled.
82. view.ins.prescription(User, ID, PatientID, UserID, now, null, null,
DrugID, Quantity, Refills, ReleaseToPatient) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), doctor(UserID, ),
ins.prescription(ID, PatientID, UserID, now, null, null, DrugID, Quantity,
Refills, ReleaseToPatient).
83. view.del.prescription(User, ID, PatientID, PrescribedBy, DatePrescribed,
FilledBy, DateFilled, DrugID, Quantity, Refills, ReleaseToPatient) :-
person(UserID, User, ), doctor(UserID, ),
del.prescription(ID, PatientID, PrescribedBy, DatePrescribed, FilledBy,
DateFilled, DrugID, Quantity, Refills, ReleaseToPatient).
Active pharmacists may fill existing prescriptions. Note that because this requires a
retraction and an assertion in a single transaction, this rule is neither a view-assert nor a
view-retract rule. TD semantics for updating existing data would make this rule more
intuitive.
84. view.fillPrescription(User, ID, PatientID) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), pharmacist(UserID),
prescription(ID, PatientID, PrescribedBy, DatePrescribed, null, null,
DrugID, Quantity, Refills, ReleaseToPatient),
del.prescription(ID, PatientID, PrescribedBy, DatePrescribed, null, null,
DrugID, Quantity, Refills, ReleaseToPatient),
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ins.prescription(ID, PatientID, PrescribedBy, DatePrescribed, UserID, now,
DrugID, Quantity, Refills, ReleaseToPatient).
Users may view their own data in the visit table, if it has been released for viewing.
85. view.visit(User, ID, PatientID, TreatingPhys, Date, Symptoms, Diagnosis,
ReleaseToPatient) :-
visit(ID, PatientID, TreatingPhys, Date, Symptoms, Diagnosis,
ReleaseToPatient),
person(PatientID, User, ), ReleaseToPatient = 1.
Users with a working relationship with a patient may view or update that patient’s
data. New data for a user must include a doctor as the treating physician.
86. view.visit(User, ID, PatientID, TreatingPhys, Date, Symptoms, Diagnosis,
ReleaseToPatient) :-
visit(ID, PatientID, TreatingPhys, Date, Symptoms, Diagnosis,
ReleaseToPatient),
person(UserID, User, ), hasAccess(UserID, PatientID).
87. view.ins.visit(User, ID, PatientID, TreatingPhys, Date, Symptoms, Diagnosis,
ReleaseToPatient) :-
person(UserID, User, ), hasAccess(UserID, PatientID),
doctor(TreatingPhys, ),
ins.visit(ID, PatientID, TreatingPhys, Date, Symptoms, Diagnosis,
ReleaseToPatient).
88. view.del.visit(User, ID, PatientID, TreatingPhys, Date, Symptoms, Diagnosis,
ReleaseToPatient) :-
person(UserID, User, ), hasAccess(UserID, PatientID),
del.visit(ID, PatientID, TreatingPhys, Date, Symptoms, Diagnosis,
ReleaseToPatient).
Any active employee may gain emergency access to a patient’s data, but the access is
logged.
89. view.emergency visit(User, ID, PatientID, TreatingPhys, Date, Symptoms,
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Diagnosis, ReleaseToPatient, Note) :-
visit(ID, PatientID, TreatingPhys, Date, Symptoms, Diagnosis,
ReleaseToPatient),
person(UserID, User, ), employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
ins.visitEmergencyAccessLog(ID, UserID, now, Note).
Users may view their own data in the otcMeds table. Since users are already presumed
to know what over-the-counter medications they are taking, there is no benefit for placing
a restriction on releasing such data to the patient as there is in other patient data tables.
90. view.otcMeds(User, ID, PatientID, DrugID) :-
otcMeds(ID, PatientID, DrugID),
person(PatientID, User, ).
Users with a working relationship with a patient may view or update that patient’s
data.
91. view.otcMeds(User, ID, PatientID, DrugID) :-
otcMeds(ID, PatientID, DrugID),
person(UserID, User, ), hasAccess(UserID, PatientID).
92. view.ins.otcMeds(User, ID, PatientID, DrugID) :-
person(UserID, User, ), hasAccess(UserID, PatientID),
ins.otcMeds(ID, PatientID, DrugID).
93. view.del.otcMeds(User, ID, PatientID, DrugID) :-
person(UserID, User, ), hasAccess(UserID, PatientID),
del.otcMeds(ID, PatientID, DrugID).
Any active employee may gain emergency access to a patient’s data, but the access is
logged.
94. view.emergency otcMeds(User, ID, PatientID, DrugID, Note) :-
otcMeds(ID, PatientID, DrugID),
person(UserID, User, ), employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
ins.otcMedsEmergencyAccessLog(ID, UserID, now, Note).
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Access to the inpatientVisit table follows the same policy as the visit table, in the
same manner as described for the tables of employees.
95. view.inpatientVisit(User, ID, EndDate, RoomNumber) :-
view.visit(User, ID, , , , , , ),
inpatientVisit(ID, EndDate, RoomNumber).
96. view.emergency inpatientVisit(User, ID, EndDate, RoomNumber, Note) :-
view.emergency visit(User, ID, , , , , , , Note),
inpatientVisit(ID, EndDate, RoomNumber).
97. view.ins.inpatientVisit(User, ID, EndDate, RoomNumber, PatientID,
TreatingPhys, Date, Symptoms, Diagnosis, ReleaseToPatient) :-
view.ins.visit(User, ID, PatientID, TreatingPhys, Date, Symptoms,
Diagnosis, ReleaseToPatient),
ins.inpatientVisit(ID, EndDate, RoomNumber).
98. view.del.inpatientVisit(User, ID, EndDate, RoomNumber, PatientID,
TreatingPhys, Date, Symptoms, Diagnosis, ReleaseToPatient) :-
view.del.visit(User, ID, PatientID, TreatingPhys, Date, Symptoms,
Diagnosis, ReleaseToPatient),
del.inpatientVisit(ID, EndDate, RoomNumber).
Patients may view members of medical team assigned to them, i.e. the data in the
medicalTeam table, if it has been released for viewing.
99. view.medicalTeam(User, VisitID, MemberID, ReleaseToPatient) :-
medicalTeam(VisitID, MemberID, ReleaseToPatient),
visit(VisitID, UserID, , , , , ),
person(UserID, User, ), ReleaseToPatient = 1.
Active members of a medical team may view the other members.
100. view.medicalTeam(User, VisitID, MemberID, ReleaseToPatient) :-
medicalTeam(VisitID, MemberID, ReleaseToPatient),
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), medicalTeam(VisitID, UserID, ).
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Active secretaries, admitting physicians, and shift supervisors (managers) may change
members of a medical team.
101. view.ins.medicalTeam(User, VisitID, MemberID, ReleaseToPatient) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), secretary(UserID),
ins.medicalTeam(VisitID, MemberID, ReleaseToPatient).
102. view.del.medicalTeam(User, VisitID, MemberID, ReleaseToPatient) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), secretary(UserID),
del.medicalTeam(VisitID, MemberID, ReleaseToPatient).
103. view.ins.medicalTeam(User, VisitID, MemberID, ReleaseToPatient) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), visit(VisitID, , UserID, , , , ),
ins.medicalTeam(VisitID, MemberID, ReleaseToPatient).
104. view.del.medicalTeam(User, VisitID, MemberID, ReleaseToPatient) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), visit(VisitID, , UserID, , , , ),
del.medicalTeam(VisitID, MemberID, ReleaseToPatient).
105. view.ins.medicalTeam(User, VisitID, MemberID, ReleaseToPatient) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), employee(MemberID, , , , , , , UserID, ),
ins.medicalTeam(VisitID, MemberID, ReleaseToPatient).
106. view.del.medicalTeam(User, VisitID, MemberID, ReleaseToPatient) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), employee(MemberID, , , , , , , UserID, ),
del.medicalTeam(VisitID, MemberID, ReleaseToPatient).
All users can access medical data in the symptomCodes, diagnosisCodes, drugs, and
adverseDrugInteractions tables.
107. view.symptomCodes(User, Code, Description) :-
person( , User, ),
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symptomCodes(Code, Description).
108. view.diagnosisCodes(User, Code, Description) :-
person( , User, ),
diagnosisCodes(Code, Description).
109. view.drugs(User, Name, Instructions, Cost, Manufacturer, Quantity, Mechanism)
:-
person( , User, ),
drugs(User, Name, Instructions, Cost, Manufacturer, Quantity, Mechanism).
110. view.adverseDrugInteractions(User, Drug1ID, Drug2ID, Description) :-
person( , User, ),
adverseDrugInteractions(Drug1ID, Drug2ID, Description).
Patients may view their own invoice data in the invoice table.
111. view.invoice(User, InvoiceID, InvoiceTo, Date) :-
person(InvoiceTo, User, ),
invoice(InvoiceID, InvoiceTo, Date).
Active accountants may view invoice data.
112. view.invoice(User, InvoiceID, InvoiceTo, Date) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), accountant(UserID),
invoice(InvoiceID, InvoiceTo, Date).
Active accountants may add invoice data except on invoices sent to themselves.
113. view.ins.invoice(User, InvoiceID, InvoiceTo, Date) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), accountant(UserID),
UserID \= InvoiceTo,
ins.invoice(InvoiceID, InvoiceTo, Date).
114. view.del.invoice(User, InvoiceID, InvoiceTo, Date) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), accountant(UserID),
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UserID \= InvoiceTo,
del.invoice(InvoiceID, InvoiceTo, Date).
Access to the invoiceItem and paymentReceived tables follow the same policy as the
invoice table, in the same manner as described for the tables of employees.
115. view.invoiceItem(User, InvoiceID, VisitID, PrescriptionID, Cost) :-
view.invoice(User, InvoiceID, , ),
invoiceItem(InvoiceID, VisitID, PrescriptionID, Cost).
116. view.ins.invoiceItem(User, InvoiceID, VisitID, PrescriptionID, Cost) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), accountant(UserID),
invoice(InvoiceID, InvoiceTo, ),
UserID \= InvoiceTo,
ins.invoiceItem(InvoiceID, VisitID, PrescriptionID, Cost).
117. view.del.invoiceItem(User, InvoiceID, VisitID, PrescriptionID, Cost) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), accountant(UserID),
invoice(InvoiceID, InvoiceTo, ),
UserID \= InvoiceTo,
del.invoiceItem(InvoiceID, VisitID, PrescriptionID, Cost).
118. view.paymentReceived(User, InvoiceID, Amount, Cleared) :-
view.invoice(User, InvoiceID, , ),
paymentReceived(InvoiceID, Amount, Cleared).
119. view.ins.paymentReceived(User, InvoiceID, Amount, Cleared) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
person(UserID, User, ), accountant(UserID),
invoice(InvoiceID, InvoiceTo, ),
UserID \= InvoiceTo,
ins.paymentReceived(InvoiceID, Amount, Cleared).
120. view.del.paymentReceived(User, InvoiceID, Amount, Cleared) :-
employee(UserID, , , , , , , , 1),
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person(UserID, User, ), accountant(UserID),
invoice(InvoiceID, InvoiceTo, ),
UserID \= InvoiceTo,
del.paymentReceived(InvoiceID, Amount, Cleared).
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Appendix B
Case Study: Building Automation
System
We present here the schema definitions and TD rules for our building automation system
case study described in Section 6.2. For improved readability, we allow rules to access the
base tables directly. These direct accesses can easily be replaced by references to the table
owner’s view of the table in a system that requires policies to be defined that way.
B.1 Schemas
User data is stored in several tables. Each user contains a record in the person table,
which lists information relevant to all users, such as usernames, passwords, and an account
balance that can be used to purchase resources. For simplicity, we assume passwords are
stored in plaintext; in a deployed system, encryption or hashing should be used for further
protection. Our table also contains full name and address information. Students in the
database are identified by listing their ID in a separate students table, along with
student-specific data such as their year in school. Faculty are likewise identified by listing
their ID in a teachers table. Visitors are given temporary IDs which are listed in a
visitors table, which also keeps track of who is responsible for the visitor (assumed to be
a faculty member). The schemas for these tables are:
• create table person(
PersonID int primary key,
Name varchar(100),
Address varchar(100),
Username varchar(10),
Password varchar(10),
Balance smallmoney);
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• create table students(
StudentID int primary key references person(PersonID),
Year int);
• create table teachers(
TeacherID int primary key references person(PersonID));
• create table visitors(
VisitorID int primary key references person(PersonID),
host int references teachers(TeacherID));
Enrollment data includes offered courses, semesters in which the courses are scheduled,
room assignments, course registration, and attendance. We assume that each course has
one teacher per semester. Cross-listed courses are listed separately, but may be given
identical room assignments. We list one room assignment for every time the class meets,
which could include more than one meeting time per day. For simplicity, we do not keep
track of grading information, which could be added to the schema in a deployed
application. The schemas for these tables are:
• create table courses(
CourseID int primary key,
Department varchar(10),
CourseNum varchar(10));
• create table courseSchedule(
ScheduleID int primary key,
CourseID int references courses(CourseID),
TeacherID int references teachers(TeacherID),
Semester char(10));
• create table roomAssignments(
AssignmentID int primary key,
ScheduleID int references courseSchedule(ScheduleID),
RoomID int references rooms(RoomID),
BeginTime datetime,
EndTime datetime);
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• create table registration(
RegistrationID int primary key,
ScheduleID int references courseSchedule(ScheduleID),
StudentID int references students(StudentID));
• create table attendance(
StudentID int references students(StudentID),
RoomAssignmentID references roomAssignments(AssignmentID));
Building data includes rooms, doors, video feeds, internet access, and a vending
machine. The rooms table also keeps track of thermostat settings for the room. Each door
is associated with one room; however, each room may have multiple doors. Likewise, each
video feed is also associated with one room, and each room may have multiple video feeds.
We assume that the video feeds are given in segments that correspond to class meeting
times. A roomAccess table is also defined to associate which users are allowed full access to
which rooms, and also indicates whether the user is allowed to delegate room access to
other users. For simplicity, the internetAccess table consists of listing the users that are
allowed to use the router. In a deployed system, this could be refined to list allowed
external hosts and port numbers, similar to a router configuration. The vending machine
keeps track of the costs and quantities of items it contains. The schemas for these tables
are:
• create table rooms(
RoomID int primary key,
Building varchar(10),
RoomNumber varchar(10),
ThermostatSetting float,
Temperature float);
• create table door(
DoorID int primary key,
RoomID int references rooms(RoomID),
Unlocked bit,
Open bit);
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• create table videoFeeds(
VideoID int primary key,
RoomID int references rooms(RoomID),
BeginTime datetime,
EndTime datetime,
Video image);
• create table roomAccess(
AccessID int primary key,
RoomID int references rooms(RoomID),
PersonID int references person(PersonID),
CanDelegate bit);
• create table internetAccess(
PersonID int references person(PersonID));
• create table vendingMachine(
ItemID int primary key,
Quantity int,
Cost smallmoney);
B.2 Policies
All users are granted access to their own records in the person table.
1. view.person(User, PersonID, Name, Addr, Username, Passwd, Balance) :-
person(PersonID, Name, Addr, Username, Passwd, Balance),
User=Username.
Teachers may view IDs, Names, Addresses, and Usernames (but not Passwords or
Balances) of students in their classes.
2. view.person(User, StudentID, Name, Addr, Username, null, null) :-
person(StudentID, Name, Addr, Username, , ),
registration( , ScheduleID, StudentID),
courseSchedule(ScheduleID, , TeacherID, ),
person(TeacherID, , , User, , ).
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Teachers may view IDs, Names, Addresses, and Usernames (but not Passwords or
Balances) of visitors they are hosting.
3. view.person(User, VisitorID, Name, Addr, Username, null, null) :-
person(VisitorID, Name, Addr, Username, , ),
visitors(VisitorID, UserID),
person(UserID, , , User, , ).
Teachers’ IDs, Names, and Usernames (but not Addresses, Passwords, or Balances) are
publicly available. That is, any user (student, visitor, or teacher) may view this data.
4. view.person(User, TeacherID, Name, null, Username, null, null) :-
person(TeacherID, Name, , Username, , ),
teachers(TeacherID, ),
person( , , , User, , ).
Accesses to the students, visitors, and teachers tables follow the same policy as the
person table. That is, a user can see the StudentID and Year of a student if and only if he
can see that student’s record in the person table, etc. Note that these policies use the
invoker’s privilege on the person table, rather than the definer’s privilege. This is an
example of when definer’s privilege would be undesirable, as it would require each policy
from the person table to be duplicated. In this case, using another privilege rather than
the policy definer’s privilege does not cause a vulnerability to Trojan Horse code as
described in Chapter 3 because the policy definer can already see the data from the
person table that the invoker can see.
5. view.students(User, StudentID, Year) :-
students(StudentID, Year),
view.person(User, StudentID, , , , , ).
6. view.visitors(User, VisitorID, Host) :-
visitors(VisitorID, Host),
view.person(User, VisitorID, , , , , ).
7. view.teachers(User, TeacherID, Department) :-
teachers(TeacherID, Department),
view.person(User, TeacherID, , , , , ).
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Any user is allowed read access to the courses, courseSchedule, and roomAssignments
tables.
8. view.courses(User, CourseID, Department, CourseNum) :-
person( , , , User, , ),
courses(CoursesID, Department, CourseNum).
9. view.courseSchedule(User, ScheduleID, CourseID, TeacherID, Semester) :-
person( , , , User, , ),
courseSchedule(ScheduleID, CourseID, TeacherID, Semester).
10. view.roomAssignments(User, AssignmentID, ScheduleID, RoomID, BeginTime,
EndTime) :-
person( , , , User, , ),
roomAssignments(AssignmentID, ScheduleID, RoomID, BeginTime, EndTime).
Teachers may view enrollment data for classes they teach.
11. view.registration(User, RegistrationID, ScheduleID, StudentID) :-
person(TeacherID, , , User, , ),
courseSchedule(ScheduleID, , TeacherID, ),
registration(RegistrationID, ScheduleID, StudentID).
Students may view their own enrollment data.
12. view.registration(User, RegistrationID, ScheduleID, StudentID) :-
person(StudentID, , , User, , ),
registration(RegistrationID, ScheduleID, StudentID).
Any user that has been given full access to a room may see anyone else that can access
the same room(s).
13. view.roomAccess(User, RoomID, PersonID, CanDelegate) :-
roomAccess( , RoomID, PersonID, CanDelegate),
roomAccess( , RoomID, UserID, ),
person(UserID, , , User, , ).
Users who are given CanDelegate privileges for a room in the RoomAccess table may
add or remove other users for that room.
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14. view.ins.roomAccess(User, AccessID, RoomID, PersonID, CanDelegate) :-
roomAccess( , RoomID, UserID, 1),
person(UserID, , , User, , ),
ins.roomAccess(AccessID, RoomID, PersonID, CanDelegate).
15. view.del.roomAccess(User, AccessID, RoomID, PersonID, CanDelegate) :-
roomAccess( , RoomID, UserID, 1),
person(UserID, , , User, , ),
del.roomAccess(AccessID, RoomID, PersonID, CanDelegate).
Users who have been given access to a room in the RoomAccess table are allowed to
change thermostat settings within the range 65-75. Note that this view definition does not
correspond to a base table, since it does not simply insert or simply delete a value from
the rooms table. Using the syntax of TD, this approach is necessary because both the
insertion and deletion must be carried out for this to be a valid operation. If a user only
deletes the old record without replacing the record with the updated value, then that user
has the ability to remove an entire room from the database, which is clearly not desirable
for this policy. This is an example of a policy that would benefit from a more formal
syntax and semantics of TD policies that update existing data, rather than simply
inserting or simply deleting data.
16. view.changeThermostat(User, RoomID, NewSetting) :-
rooms(RoomID, Building, RoomNum, OldSetting, Temperature),
roomAccess( , RoomID, UserID, ),
person(UserID, , , User, , ),
NewSetting >= 65, NewSetting <= 75,
del.rooms(RoomID, Building, RoomNum, OldSetting, Temperature),
ins.rooms(RoomID, Building, RoomNum, NewSetting, Temperature).
Users who have been given access to a room in the RoomAccess table are allowed to
unlock doors. This is another policy similar to the view.changeThermostat that could be
written as a policy to update existing data.
17. view.unlockDoor(User, DoorID) :-
door(DoorID, RoomID, Unlocked, Open),
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roomAccess( , RoomID, UserID, ),
person(UserID, , , User, , ),
del.door(DoorID, RoomID, Unlocked, Open),
ins.door(DoorID, RoomID, 1, Open).
Students attending class in a room are allowed to unlock doors during the time class is
in session, and they are recorded as being in attendance that day. Also, internet access is
disabled (re-enabled by teacher at end of class).
18. view.unlockDoor(User, DoorID) :-
door(DoorID, RoomID, Unlocked, Open),
roomAssignments(RoomAssignmentID, ScheduleID, RoomID, BeginTime, EndTime),
registration( , ScheduleID, StudentID),
person(StudentID, , , User, , ),
BeginTime <= now, now <= EndTime,
del.door(DoorID, RoomID, Unlocked, Open),
ins.door(DoorID, RoomID, 1, Open),
ins.attendance(StudentID, RoomAssignmentID),
del.internetAccess(StudentID).
Students enrolled for a course are allowed to view video feeds for that course.
19. view.videoFeeds(User, VideoID, RoomID, Day, BeginTime, EndTime, Video) :-
videoFeeds(VideoID, RoomID, BeginTime, EndTime, Video),
roomAssignments( , ScheduleID, RoomID, BeginTime, EndTime),
registration( , ScheduleID, StudentID),
person(StudentID, , , User, , ).
Teachers are allowed to view attendance data for the courses they teach.
20. view.attendance(User, StudentID, RoomAssignmentID) :-
roomAssignments(RoomAssignmentID, ScheduleID, , , ),
courseSchedule(ScheduleID, , TeacherID, ),
teachers(TeacherID, ),
person(TeacherID, , , User, , ),
attendance(StudentID, RoomAssignmentID).
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Teachers are allowed to grant internet access to anybody (can be automated to regrant
access to students after the lecture, to grant exceptions during a lecture if needed, and to
grant temporary access to visitors).
21. view.ins.internetAccess(User, RecipientID) :-
teachers(TeacherID, ),
person(TeacherID, , , User, , ),
ins.internetAccess(RecipientID).
22. view.del.internetAccess(User, RecipientID) :-
teachers(TeacherID, ),
person(TeacherID, , , User, , ),
del.internetAccess(RecipientID).
Anyone is allowed to buy items from the vending machine, provided that their account
balance is greater than the cost of the item and the quantity of the item is nonzero. Their
balance is deducted by the amount of the item. This is another policy similar to the
view.changeThermostat policy that updates existing data, but with the added complication
that it simultaneously updates both the vendingMachine table and the person table.
23. view.purchaseItem(User, ItemID) :-
vendingMachine(ItemID, Quantity, Cost), Quantity > 0,
person(PersonID, Name, Addr, User, Passwd, Balance), Balance >= Cost,
del.vendingMachine(ItemID, Quantity, Cost),
ins.vendingMachine(ItemID, NewQuantity, Cost),
NewQuantity = Quantity-1,
del.person(PersonID, Name, Addr, User, Passwd, Balance),
ins.person(PersonID, Name, Addr, User, Passwd, NewBalance),
NewBalance = Balance - Cost.
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